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The emergence of banks and paper money

Private banking flourished as early as the twelfth century and banking institutions appeared from the beginning of the seventeenth century onwards. The Bank of Amsterdam was established in 1609.

In the beginning, it was a municipal agency, without shareholders’ funds, which had a monopoly on exchange operations. It did not take any liquidity risk, did not grant credit, did not issue banknotes but collected deposits expressed in florin banco. Their convertibility quickly became limited, and consequently their value fluctuated. The Bank of Stockholm was established in 1656, issued notes from 1661 and went bankrupt in 1664. The Bank of England was established in 1694, after three years of negotiations between an investors’ group, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Parliament. They were not discussing the creation of a bank, but a new kind of Treasury debt that would be more liquid and less expensive. The issue was the interme­diation of the Treasury debt through the establishment of a commercial joint company, with a large amount of shareholders’ funds, authorised to issue banknotes payable at sight and to grant credit. The outstanding amount of banknotes and deposits was limited to the outstanding amount of shareholders’ funds. However, there was no rule concern­ing the management of the cash reserve that was contributed by the shareholders when paying for their shares.

Although the establishment of the Bank of England seemed opportunistic, it emerged in an intellectual context that was favourable to banks. In England, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, there was a focus on providing credit to the poor, and the establishment of “banks of charity” in order to oust usurers. Dealing with credit risks, the mercantilists stressed the guarantees given by the borrowers - registration of prop­erty rights, solidarity mechanisms - insurance policies and bank shareholders’ funds (J.

Benbrigge 1646; J. Cooke 1648; H. Chamberlen 1649). Then the focus shifted towards the means of improving commercial credit risk, for example, with William Potter’s The Key of Wealth (1650) or William Petty’s Quantulumcunque (1682). The contributions were rich, but limited to the problem of bank solvency. There were no plans to create banks that would take liquidity risk. It was the same with land bank projects, which appeared in the 1690s (N. Barbon 1690; J. Biscoe 1694; H. Chamberlen 1695; J. Asgill 1696), whereby shareholders contributed property assets when paying their shares and where banknotes were convertible into, and backed by, property assets. This system appeared again in John Law’s projects (1703-05), in which the bank would not have a cash reserve but would issue legal tender paper money. Law argued that such bank notes issued on demand and backed by property assets would be more stable in value than bank notes backed by precious metals whose value fluctuates according to changes in supply and demand. The hope that such a bank could lower interest rates was linked to the mercantilist view, as in Locke (1692), according to which an abundance of money would diminish the purchasing power of each unit of money and interest rates at the same time.

After Louis XlV’s death, Law established in France a bank with very low sharehold­ers’ funds and which did not issue notes convertible into property assets but into specie. This bank was joined to a commercial company whose aim was to restructure the state debt (twice the level of national income). Law’s scheme was that the company would issue shares payable with state notes and banknotes. In fact, at the end of 1719, Law’s system turned into a speculative bubble where the bank granted loans and issued notes to speculators for buying the shares. At the peak of the speculation, the market value of the company was equal to six times the level of national income, and the outstand­ing amount of bank notes to three and half times.

The system was illiquid and crashed during the following year. This failure contrasts with the success of the eighteenth century British financial revolution (Dickson 1967).

Indeed, from the start, the Bank of England succeeded in creating liquidity: although only 60 per cent of the capital was called up, the bank issued banknotes to up to 100 per cent of the authorised capital for financing a loan to the treasury, at 8 per cent, meaning that it was 400 basis points below the goldsmiths’ interest rate. In 1697, it issued new shares payable with public debt, with a view to sustaining its price. To reduce the interest rate, it systemically and successfully intervened in the Exchequer bills market from 1707 on. For a century, until 1797, although its cash reserve fluctuated between 10 per cent and 40 per cent of the value of its outstanding issues, the bank succeeded in reimbursing its notes. England had invented the modern bank. Its note was not legal tender; it was a debt payable at sight issued against a credit debt payable at term. It created liquidity and helped to increase the liquidity of public debt and lower interest rates. The Bank of Scotland was established on the same model in 1695. Neither of the two banks had a monopoly on issuing notes, that is, creating liquidity. Private banks imitated them, and their banknotes circulated along with legal tender coins. The monetary debates during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries inquired into the nature and effects of this paper money.

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Source: Faccarello G., Kurz H.-D.. Handbook on the history of economic analysis. Volume III, Developments in major fields of economics. Edward Elgar,2016. — 659 p. 2016

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