THE TACIT ALLIANCE BETWEEN OFFENSIVE REALISM AND gAME THEORy
It may seem like a bold claim to assert that applying game theory to solving the problem of nuclear deterrence, and to the more general international relations challenge of anarchy, not only sets up MAD to lose to NUTS but also results in a predatory defense posture.
However, if it is generally accepted that game theory is the gold standard of instrumental rationality, then it becomes apparent that the boldness of the assertion does not lie in claiming too much authority for game theory. Instead, it resides in the implication that game theory structures decision making in a manner that restricts agents from utilizing resources and logics of action outside its scope. When stated in this way, most rational choice theorists would likely agree that decision theory represents the state-of-the-art approach to sound action, and that rationales for judgment outside its scope are not only unsubstantiated but also invalid.[320] Jervis observes that “In microeconomics, SEU [subjective expected utility] theories can be both descriptive and prescriptive because of the argument that only those who behave in accordance with them can flourish.”108 Game theory buttresses offensive realism by equating sound judgment with the eschewal of “irrational” or metaphysical considerations consistent with idealism, social constructivism, or naivety.109 Insofar as offensive realism can boast of being consistent with game theoretic strategic rationality, then its pedigree and policy proposals seem credible beyond dispute.In his recent defense of defensive realism against its offensive alternative, Tang directly states that his argument rests on acknowledging that “ontological reason must take priority over instrumental reason” in appraising the security dilemma.11o This idea of straying from instrumental rationality to marshal a defensive realist national security protocol is not reassuring to those who view the world from the perspective of realpolitik.
Yet, ahead I show how the originators of a classical liberal perspective that rests on a reciprocal stance of not harming others believed they were advancing a strict pragmatism to solve the security dilemma. Recall the elementary theoretical commitments structuring game theory. Only ends, and not the means by which they are obtained, register in payoffs. This assumption rejects the no-harm principle, fair play, the internalization of norms, and commitment to agreements made, unless decision rules not limited to individual optimization are introduced.111 Payoffs in many game contexts, specifically those that are repeating or involve multiple actors, are assumed to reflect an intersubjectively obvious resource over which actors vie as a criterion of success within their environment.112 Solidarity and team reasoning are contrary to the individualistic maximization deemed consistent with instrumental rationality. Altruism, although possible in principle, is either too difficult to track mathematically or even more likely too costly.Each of these assumptions is consistent with a realpolitik approach to international relations. From this perspective, the raison d’etat supersedes principled action and norm-governed conduct.113 It stands to reason that instrumentally astute states will acquire the scarce natural resources necessary to project power through causal efficacy. Maximin logic of strategic independence demands acting so as not to be dependent on any other actor. Solidarity and altruism are easily rejected by the realist, the first because it is contrary to reason, and the latter because only the altruism that pays is worthwhile.
To understand the contrast between strategic rationality and offensive realism on one hand and defensive realism and classical liberalism on the other, let us consider four questions. First, how is self-preservation defined, and what are its imperatives? Second, what is the source of value that affords instrumental power? Third, what is the source of power that enables purposive action among other purposive actors? Fourth, what steps are necessary to deter a predator? These questions afford insight into how strategic rationality offers a perspective on the character of purposive action that forecloses on the possibilities for cooperation anticipated by classical liberalism and defensive realism. Awareness of game theory’s predisposition toward offensive realism provides actors with a vantage point from which to evaluate which position makes more sense.