Self-Preservation
Game theory shares with offensive realism the view that an actor’s identity is defined by the actor’s preferences and opportunities. From the perspective of rational choice, no natural boundaries to personal or national identity define a perimeter, which if transgressed, represents harm.
From the perspective of offensive realism, “there is no possibility of drawing a sharp line between the will-to-live and the will-to-power.”114 This means that the survival of a state in anarchy depends on the continual augmentation of power, regardless of the effect on other states. Hence, resonating with Schlesinger’s strategic wisdom, offensive realist John Mearsheimer recommends the policy of hegemony to secure the immediate survival and long-term prospects of a powerful state.[321] [322] [323]It is not immediately obvious that rational choice theory tacitly endorses the pursuit of hegemony among states, or the exercise of domination among individuals.116 Certainly, the PD preference matrix accepts that every actor will cheat the other, even if that party already cooperated. Both offensive realism and game theory accept that actors would if they could without negative repercussions seek resources without limit, despite the impact on others, and therefore will tend to express PD preferences that track fungible rewards. Strategically rational individuals have preference orderings that by design rule out side constraints, fair play, and commitment, which evaluate the appropriateness of action choices based on procedural considerations. They therefore do not recognize or uphold a threshold demarcating self-preservation distinct from the conquest of others. Hence, the theoretical structure of game theory presupposes an offensive realist orientation to interactions among states and people.117
The classical liberal who views the security of selfhood, whether of a corporeal person or physical territory, in terms of maintenance of the status quo, is able to differentiate between harming others and self-defense. Acting on the principle of no-harm requires both striving to understand how to enact the concept and constraining one’s actions accordingly.118 Rational choice theory renders it difficult to express the idea that perpetuation of selfhood is not equivalent to unconstrained preference satisfaction. Consequently, the game theoretical perspective of agentive identity is at odds with the classical liberal commonsensical intuition that it is possible to define self-preservation without encumbering it with expansionist intention or unavoidable cross purposes against others.