2. SOCIAL FORMATIONS
None of these modes of production has ever existed in a pure state: the societies known to history are “formations” that on the one hand combine modes of production and on the other organize relations between the local society and other societies, expressed in the existence of long-distance trade relations.
Social formations are thus concrete, organized structures that are~marked~by a domiriant"mode of ρroduction~an¾^The articulation around~fhιs of a complex group of modes of production that are-subordinate to it. Thus, one can observe the. simple petty- Commodity mode of production linked to a dominant tribute-paying mode ofproduction (whether “early” or “feudal”), to a slaveowning mode of production, or even to a capitalist mode. Similarly, the slaveowning mode of production may be nondominant, which is the rule when it is linked to a dominant tribute-paying mode (or even to the capitalist mode, as in the United States until 1865), or, by way of exception, it may constitute the dominant mode (as in the formations of Classical Antiquity.)
All precapitalist societies are social formations combining the same elements, and marked by: (1) the predominance of a communal or tribute-paying mode of production; (2) the existence of simple commodity relations in limited spheres; and (3) the existence of long-distance trade relations. When the feudal mode of production is absent or embryonic and there are no simple commodity relations within the given society, the formation, thus reduced to the combination of an undeveloped communal or tributepaying mode of production with long-distance trade relations, is of the “African” type.
Long-distance trade is not a mode of production but is the way in which independent formations are linked together. This is the difference between it and trade within a given social formation, which is constituted by the commodity exchanges typical of the simple petty-commodity or slaveowning modes of production, these being elements in the formation in question.
Internal trade can also, however, be a prolongation of long-distance trade.Long-distance trade brings into mutual relations societies that are ignorant of each other, that is to say, it brings together products whose cost of production in one society is not known in the other, and scarce goods for which substitutes cannot be found, so that the social groups that engage in this trade hold a, monopoly position from which they profit. This long-distance trade plays a decisive role when the surplus that the local, dominant classes can extract from the producers within the formation is limited, owing to the less advanced level of development of the productive forces, to difficult natural conditions, or to successful resistance by the village community. In these cases, long-distance trade makes possible, through the monopoly profit it permits, the transfer of part of the surplus from one society to another. For the society that benefits from such a transfer the latter may be vital, forming the main foundation of the wealth and power of its ruling classes. The civilization in question may depend entirely upon this trade, and a shift in trade routes may cause a whole region to fall into decline, or, contrariwise, may provide conditions for it to flourish without any significant advance or regression of the productive forces having occurred.
Analysis of a concrete social formation must therefore be or- Iganized around an analysis of the way in which the surplus is Sgenerated in this formation, the transfers of surplus that may be ’effected from or to other formations, and the internaΓof the productive forces (and so the degree of division of labor accompanying it) shall be sufficient for a “surplus” to appear — in other words, an excess of production over the consumption needed in order to ensure the reconstitution of the labor force. This concept of “surplus” assumes different forms in different modes of production — noncorhmodity forms such as tribute, rent in kind, etc., or commodity forms.
In the latter case the term “surplus value” is employed. Under the capitalist mode of production “profit” is the specific form assumed by surplus value when it is distributed in proportion to capital invested. Since a social formation is an organized complex involving several modes of production, the surplus generated in this formation is not homogeneous but is the sum of surpluses of differing origin. It is essential to know, in relation to any particular formation, what the predominant mode of production is, and thus the predominant form of the surplus. Then we need to know the extent to which the given society lives on the surplus that it produces for itself and the extent to which it depends on surplus transferred from another society (in other words, what is the relative importance of long-distance trade?). The distribution of this surplus among social classes that are defined in relation to the different modes of production characteristic of the formation, and the social groups whose existence is related to the ways in which these modes of production are linked together, provides us with the true “face” of the formation concerned.Thus, analysis of a concrete formation demands that we discover how one mode of production predominates over the others, and how these modes of production are interconnected.
The family of formations that is most widespread in the history of precapitalist civilizations is that of the formations in which the tribute-paying mode predominates. On emerging from primitive communism, communities evolve toward hierarchical forms. It is this evolution that gives rise to the tribute-paying mode of production. The slaveowning and simple commodity modes are linked with the dominant tribute-paying mode, and occupy in the given society a place that is of greater or lesser importance depending on the relative importance of the surplus extracted in the form of tribute. If the natural and social conditions (the degree of development of the productive forces) are favorable, the tribute is large.
The state-class that levies it, the royal court, redistributes a considerable proportion of it by providing a living for the craftsmen who supply it with the luxury goods it consumes. These craftsmen are often petty-commodity producers. Craft production may also be organized in enterprises in which the workers are slaves or free wage earners and which produce commodities. A class of merchants inserts itself between the state, the village communities, the craftsmen, and the entrepreneurs (whether slaveowners or not), and organizes these trade circuits. The linking of these secondary modes of production to the dominant tribute-paying mode has thus to be analyzed (as was done by Franpois Quesnay) in terms of the circulation of the original surplus, to which is added the possible generation of secondary surpluses (in the case of enterprises in which the workers are slaves or wage earners). To this circulation of the surplus may also be added a surplus transferred from outside, if long-distance trade exists and is dominated by the merchants of the formation being considered. In a case where the tribute of internal origin is not great, a tribute-paying society may be expected to be poor: it may, however, be rich if the surplus of external origin from which it benefits is substantial. This is what happens with societies based on control over long-distance trade circuits. The existence and prosperity of such a society depends on monopoly control over the relations that other formations (in which an original surplus is generated and then transferred) maintain with each other through the mediation of this society. Here we have formations of the kind that may be called “tributepaying and trading” formations. The relations can even be reversed: at the level of the formation the transferred surplus feeds the secondary circuits (of simple commodity production, etc.), and a tribute may be levied on this transferred surplus by the dominant state-class.The first subfamily of tribute-paying formations, that of the I rich tribute-paying formations (based on a large internal surplus), i is the one that embraces all the great, long-lasting civilizations, : especially Egypt and China. The second subfamily, that of the I poor tribute-paying formations (characterized by a small internal surplus), embraces the bulk of the civilizations of Antiquity and 5 the Middle Ages. The third, the subfamily of the tribute-paying i and trading formations, appears here and there for periods of vary- i ing duration, depending on the vicissitudes of trade routes: ancient I Greece, the Arab world at its apogee, and some states of the Black 1 African savannah are the most striking examples.
In comparison with this group of formations, predominantly of the tribute-paying type (with the tribute-paying and trading type as a marginal case), the formations in which slaveowning and simple commodity modes predominate appear as exceptions.
The type of formation in which the slaveowning mode is predominant is not universal and is practically nowhere found to be at the origin of class differentiation. The slaveowning mode of production acquires considerable scope only in connection with the development of commodity exchange, in ancient Greece and Rome. In Greece we find long-distance trade at the origin of civilization. The profits of this trade made possible the organizing of commodity production by slave labor, and this brought a shift in the center of gravity of the formation. At first, the principal surplus originated from outside; then, with the growth of slavery, the internally produced surplus became increasingly important, and some of the commodities produced by slaves came to be exported. Alexander’s empire, and then its Roman successor, enlarged the geographical area in which this exceptional formation prevailed. Its spread eastward, where it came up against solidly established tribute-paying formations, proved difficult, and its center of gravity shifted northward and westward to regions where the tribute levied was smaller.
Even in this imperial zone, in which slavery, simple commodity production, and trade both internal and external acquired exceptional dimensions, the communal mode of production (in the West) and the tribute-paying mode (in the East) persisted. This formation’s dependence on what lay outside it — its source of slaves — made it fragile. In comparison with the duration of the Egyptian and Chinese civilizations, the period covered by the Roman slaveowning civilization is brief. Out of the ruins of its destruciLon_b-y-the-Barb-arians~a~ne.w-,trib.ute-pa.yin.g formation emerged: that of feudal.Europe.Predominance of the simple commodity mode of production is even more exceptional. We find it only in New England between! 1600 and 1750, in the South Africa of the Boers between 1600'. and 1880, and in Australia and New Zealand from the beginning, of white settlement to the rise of modern capitalism. These societies of small farmers and free craftsmen, where the simple commodity mode of production was not tacked on to tribute-paying or slaveowning modes but constituted the principal mode of social organization, would be inexplicable if one did not know that they were the by-product of the breakup of feudal relations in England., (and, secohdaπly, in the ’Netherlands and France). The poor people Proletarianized by this breakup emigrated, and the ideal model th^at they established in the new lands where theγ~settled gave; expressibfΓTd^This exceptiohal~5aclcground. Such formations have! a^^strong tendency to developjnto full-fledged capitalist formations. ∣
The concept of the social formation is thus indeed a historical concept. Technological progress — the level of development of the productive forces — is cumulative. As Darcy Ribeiro and Silva Michelena have shown, it takes place within the framework of a formation and enables us to mark the stages of history.
However, this historical sequence of formations is not unique. The principal, most common line of development shows us first a series of communal formations, then a series of tribute-paying ones. But this main line becomes relatively “blocked” in that technological progress may take place with the tribute-paying formation, even though slowly. A secondary, marginal line of development shows a succession of communal formations, and then of feudal formations (which are a borderline variety of the tribute-paying family) with a strong commodity element in them (slaveowningcommodity and/or nonslaveowning simple commodity), which testifies to the original, or in other words, peripheral, character of this line. Along this line, the development of the productive forces comes once more into conflict with social relations, and the formations of capitalism are the result.
The historical sequence of social formations, in contrast to the lack of sequence in the modes of production they combine, shows that it is absurd to. draw any sort of analogy between identical modes of production integrated in formations belonging to different epochs — for example, between African or Roman slavery and that in nineteenth-century America.
Capitalist formations are all marked by the dominance of the capitalist mode of production. All products in these formations are commodities, whereas only prδ¾ucts-πT~which-^the~surplus of e^af∏er modes was incorporated could previously assume this form. IrTaIl the precapitalist mddes~~ the means of subsistence were not objects of exchange (whence the description of “subsistence economies” applied to precapitalist formations) and the surplus was often transferred in other than commodity form (as tribute, or rent in kind). Moreover, whereas the precapitalist formations were marked by a stable coexistence of different modes, linked together and arranged hierarchically, the capitalist mode tends to become exclusive, destroying all the others. The condition, however, to which this tendency to exclusiveness is subject, is, as will be seen, that it be based on the widening and deepening of the internal market. This applies in the case of the central CapitaIistJforniations but not in that of the peripheral ones⅞Γthe latter, the capitalist mode, WhicfTis dominant, subjects the others and transforms them, depriving Them of their distinctive functioning in order to subor- dinateThemJe⅛-0wtt7-¾⅛0utTh¾wevef7 radically destroying them.
TΓfiF^predominance of the capitalist mode of production is also ! expressed-on-a-nother piane.-Itcmκtitutes^wτ>rl±systemjiLwhicK~all ItheTormations, central and peripheral alike, are arranged in asjngle "system, organized and hierarchical. Thus, there are not two world markets, the capitalist and socialist, but only one, the capitalist wdfΓd-mafketjih-wfiicfi"EasTei¾^Europe^^participates marginally.
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