The homo aconomicus in Hobbes
Interpreting the theory of Thomas Hobbes - in particular the core passages sections 10-13 of Leviathan (1651 [1968]) - as an extended effort to provide explanations for all social behaviour in terms of the homo wconomicus model is not an anachronistic (“hindsight-biased”) projection of modern rational choice thinking.
As the following citation shows, Spinoza’s seventeenth-century “rational choice” interpretation of Hobbesian “economic philosophy” is strikingly modern:Now it is a universal law of human nature that no one ever neglects anything which he judges to be good, except with the hope of gaining a greater good, or from the fear of a greater evil; nor does anyone endure an evil except for the sake of avoiding a greater evil, or gaining a greater good. That is, everyone will, of two goods, choose that which he thinks the greatest; and of two evils, that which he thinks the least. I say advisedly that which he thinks the greatest or the least, for it does not necessarily follow that he judges right. This law is so deeply implanted in the human mind that it ought to be counted among the eternal truths and axioms.
As a necessary consequence of the principle just enunciated, no one can honestly forego the right which he has over all things, and in general no one will abide by his promises, unless under the fear of a greater evil, or the hope of a greater good... Hence though men make promises with all the appearances of good faith, and agree that they will keep to their engagement, no one can absolutely rely on another man’s promise unless there is something behind it. Everyone has by nature a right to act deceitfully, and to break his compacts, unless he be restrained by the hope of some greater good, or the fear of some greater evil. (Spinoza 1670 [1951]: 203-4)
As Spinoza clearly indicates, according to the Hobbesian model, actors will comply with (legal) norms if and only if the expected negative sanctions are even more costly than the expected “profitability” of violating the norm in the case at hand. That is, “people would act economically; when an opportunity of an advantage was presented to them they would take it” (Hicks 1979: 43, original emphasis).
This conception of case-by-case opportunity taking behaviour has far reaching consequences. It gives rise to the so-called (Parsons 1968) “Hobbesian order problem” of explaining the existence and the workings of social/legal institutions solely in terms of opportunity taking individual behaviour. Economists believe that homines wconomici could create social order while other social theorists deny this.According to the economic model a norm as such has never weight in the opportunity-seeking calculus of the individual. The “norm” is “announcing” future causal consequences of behaviour as triggered by it as a response. To the extent that the announcement is credible, it enters the expected value calculation of the individual when considering an action. Yet, beyond shaping the perception of likely (“predicted”) future consequences, the information contained in a norm is irrelevant for the rational actor. As clearly stated already by Spinoza, the rational actor chooses exclusively in view of the expected causal negative or positive external consequences of each act taken separately. Neither falling under a rule nor the evaluative intention behind the rule matter when deciding on an act.
Fully rational actors are not intrinsically motivated by rules. Norms operate only as external and not as internal constraints on maximizing behaviour of rational Hobbesian (wo)men.