New behavioural economics and cognitive economics
The work of Simon is the common denominator of both new behavioural and cognitive economics, but whether his work is either a shared contact or a source of ambiguity between the two disciplines is uncertain.
As seen above, Simon’s analysis of rationality has been interpreted in different ways by new behavioural economics and by cognitive economics. An element that can be added is the effect of the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). With regard to their way of connecting psychology and economics, Sent underlines that according to Camerer (1999) “this sort of psychology provided a way to model bounded rationality which is more like standard economics than the more radical departure that Simon had in mind” (Camerer 1999, cited in Sent 2004: 743). Generalizing, he writes that “much of behavioural economics consists of trying to incorporate this kind of psychology into economics” (Camerer 1999, cited in Sent 2004: 743). This interpretation, shared by many new behavioural economists, confirms the aim to maintain a reference to Simon, but also to the neoclassical system (Augier 2003). Simon appreciates the work of Kahneman and Tversky. The appreciation could surely be motivated by the pluralism supported and demonstrated by Simon in various circumstances (Augier 2003). Probably, the same prospect theory assumes a different meaning if frame or prospect are intended just as some fixed, predictable and objective series of possible outcomes and probabilities, or if they are intended, like Simon, as a frame wide enough to include objectives, definition of the situations, resources of calculation and processes that generate the subjective representation of the decisional problem by an agent (Simon 1986).