Friedrich August von Hayek (1899-1992)

Nobody can be a great economist who is only an economist - and I am even tempted to add that the economist who is only an economist is likely to become a nuisance if not a positive danger.

Friedrich A. Hayek passed away on 23 March 1992, at the age of 92. His first academic publication was in the 1920s and his last was in the late 1980s. As Bruce Caldwell has put it:

The volume of Hayek’s work provides another daunting challenge for interpreters. Hayek lived from 1899 to 1992, and his writings span seven decades. Worse, he was incredibly prolific. Even worse, he did not restrict himself to economics, making contributions in fields as diverse as psy­chology, political philosophy, the history of ideas, and social-science methodology. (Caldwell 2004: 4)

Hayek’s depth and breadth was probably unmatched among twentieth-century econo­mists, and was more in keeping with the grand tradition of moral philosophy and political economy as it was practised from Adam Smith to J.S. Mill. There certainly can be little doubt that Hayek was among the most prodigious classical liberal scholars of the twentieth century. Though he was awarded the 1974 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, his scholarly endeavours extended well beyond economics. At the time of his death, he had published 130 articles and 25 books on topics ranging from technical economics to theoretical psychology, from political philosophy to legal anthropology, and from the philosophy of science to the history of ideas. Hayek was no mere dabbler; he was an accomplished scholar in each of these fields of inquiry. On Google Scholar, his article “The use of knowledge in society” has been cited over 11000 times, while his classic works in political economy The Road to Serfdom, The Constitution of Liberty, and Law, Legislation and Liberty all have over 5000 citations each.

Hayek was born into a family of intellectuals in Vienna on 8 May 1899. He earned doctorates from the University of Vienna (1921 and 1923). During the early years of the twentieth century the theories of the Austrian School of Economics, sparked by Menger’s Principles of Economics (1871), were gradually being formulated and refined by Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk, his brother-in-law, Friedrich von Wieser, Joseph Schumpeter and Ludwig von Mises. Hayek’s grandfather was an academic colleague and friends with Bohm-Bawerk and Wieser. His father was a physician and botanist. Hayek grew up in an atmosphere of science and scholarship.

Economics at the University of Vienna was integrated with the study of law. Hayek began his studies at the University of Vienna in November 1918 and earned his first doctorate in law in 1921, and his second doctorate in political economy in 1923. As a student, Hayek studied law, psychology and economics, before specializing in economic theory. As a student during his first doctorate, he recalled attending one of Mises’s classes, but found Mises’s anti-socialist position too strong for his liking. Wieser, who was more interventionist with respect to economic policy and a very distinguished pro­fessor, offered an approach that was more attractive to Hayek at the time, and Hayek became his pupil.

After graduating in 1921, Hayek via an introduction from Wieser was hired by Mises to work in a government office set up for the primary purpose of the settlement of pre­war private debts between nations as part of the peace treaty of 1919. Hayek worked under Mises’s direct supervision in this office, interrupted only by his visit to the US, until 1927. In 1927, Mises helped Hayek establish the Austrian Institute for Business Cycle Research, which Hayek directed after Mises was able to secure the necessary funds. Hayek would in turn bring in Oskar Morgenstern as his collaborator. When Hayek left for the London School of Economics (LSE) in 1931, Morgenstern would assume the directorship until he himself emigrated to the US.

The best way to understand Hayek’s vast contributions to economics and classical liberalism is to view them in light of the programme for the study of social cooperation laid out by Mises. Mises, the great system builder, provided Hayek with the research programme. Hayek became the great dissector and analyser. His life’s work can best be appreciated as an attempt to make explicit what Mises had left implicit, to refine what Mises had outlined, and to answer questions Mises had left unanswered. Of Mises, Hayek stated: “There is no single man to whom I owe more intellectually” (1978 [1983]: 17).

In 1923, after Mises had secured Hayek the necessary leave of absence on financial terms favourable enough to make the plan possible, Hayek travelled to the US to observe and study the latest statistical techniques that were being developed to study industrial fluctuations. Hayek spent time both at New York University (NYU, where he worked as a research assistant to Jeremiah Jenks, and actually submitted work towards earning a PhD) and Columbia during that year in NYC. He was interested in the work at Columbia, where Wesley Claire Mitchell was pioneering the empirical approach to business cycles that would define the early National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) approach. Upon his return to Vienna, Hayek continued his work with Mises, and, as already men­tioned, they established the Austrian Institute for Business Cycle Research, which Hayek would direct. During his trip to the US, Hayek had already begun to draft “The monetary policy of the United States after the recovery from the 1920s crisis” (1925), which sought to apply the Mises-Wicksell theory of the business cycle to contemporary events.

Building on Mises’s The Theory of Money and Credit (1912), Hayek refined both the technical understanding of capital coordination and the institutional details of credit policy. Seminal studies in monetary theory and the trade cycle followed. Hayek’s first book, Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle (1929), analysed the effects of credit expan­sion on the capital structure of an economy.

Publication of that book prompted an invitation from Lionel Robbins for Hayek to lecture at the LSE. His lectures there were published in a second book on the “Austrian theory of the trade cycle”, Prices and Production (1931), which was cited by the Nobel Prize Committee in 1974.

Hayek’s 1930-31 lectures at the LSE were received with such great acclaim that he was called back and appointed Tooke Professor of Economic Science and Statistics. At age 32, Hayek had secured one of the more prestigious appointments in the economics profession. As he has said in an interview with Axel Leijonhufvud, when you get an appointment as a professor in London at 32, you take it (Hayek 1979b).

The Mises-Hayek theory of the trade cycle explained the “cluster of errors” that characterizes the cycle. Credit expansion, made possible by the artificial lowering of interest rates, misleads businessmen; they are led to engage in ventures that would not otherwise have appeared profitable. The false signal generated by credit expansion leads to mal-coordination of the production and consumption plans of economic actors. This mal-coordination first manifests itself in a “boom,” and then, later, in the “bust” as the time pattern of production adjusts to the real pattern of savings and consumption in the economy.

Hayek versus Keynes

Soon after Hayek’s arrival in London he crossed swords with John Maynard Keynes. Keynes, a prominent member of the British civil service then serving on the govern­mental Committee on Finance and Industry, was credited by the academic community as the author of serious books on economics. The Hayek-Keynes debate was perhaps the most fundamental debate in monetary economics in the early twentieth century. Beginning with his essay, The End of Laissez Faire (1926), Keynes presented his posi­tion in the language of pragmatic liberalism. As a result, Keynes was heralded as the “saviour of capitalism,” rather than being viewed as a critic of the existing order.

Hayek believed he had pinpointed the fundamental problems with Keynes’s economics - his failure to understand the role that interest rates and capital structure play in a market economy. Because of Keynes’s habit of using aggregate (collective) concepts, he failed to address these issues adequately in A Treatise on Money (1930). Hayek pointed out that Keynes’s aggregation tended to redirect the analytical focus of the economist away from examining how the industrial structure of the economy emerged from the economic choices of individuals.

Keynes did not take kindly to Hayek’s criticism. Hayek had accused Keynes of drop­ping the capital theory and microeconomic analysis of intertemporal coordination from the Wicksellian system; but of course, those elements in the Wicksellian system were being developed by Mises and Hayek. So in essence, Hayek was criticizing Keynes for not incorporating the Mises-Hayek work into his analysis, despite the fact that Keynes’s work was written before Mises’s Theory of Money and Credit had been translated into English (1953), and before Hayek had published Prices and Production (1931). Keynes chose to respond at first by attacking Hayek’s Prices and Production. As Keynes wrote:

The book, as it stands, seems to me to be one of the most frightful muddles I have ever read, with scarcely a sound proposition in it beginning with page 45, and yet it remains a book of some interest, which is likely to leave its mark on the mind of the reader. It is an extraordinary example of how, starting with a mistake, a remorseless logician can end up in bedlam... (1931: 394)

So rather than judging the Mises-Hayek theory of industrial fluctuations as one of the first systemic attempts to integrate micro and macro and provide a choice-theoretic foundation for industrial fluctuations and economic coordination more generally, Keynes judged the effort as a muddle.

Keynes’s second intellectual move was to ally himself with fellow Cambridge econo­mist Piero Sraffa against Hayek’s suggested adoption of Bohm-Bawerkian capital theory. As Kurz explains, “When Sraffa was confronted with Hayek’s argument, he knew already that its theoretical core - Bohm-Bawerk’s theory of capital and interest - was shaky” (Kurz 2015: 111). It is thus unsurprising that Sraffa argued that he found internally contradictory Hayek’s attempt at construction of a monetary theory upon a foundation that was in his estimation unsound. Hayek’s emphasis on the coordination in a monetary economy provided by the “natural rate of interest” was one such faulty step in the construction, as there simply was no such singular rate but rather a collection of natural rates. Considered within the economics profession at the time to be obscure if not incomprehensible, the exchange between Hayek and Sraffa (Hayek 1932; Sraffa 1932a, 1932b) regarding the perceived flaws in Hayek’s theoretical arguments blunted the force of Hayek’s call for Keynes to adopt Hayek’s own capital theory in the medium-term. Only later, in light of the evolution of the theoretical systems developed by Hayek and Sraffa following the debate, were these articles seen as providing insights into the nature of each thinker’s understanding of the roles played by capital theory, interest rates, and equilibrium in the economic system (Lachmann 1986).

Finally, Keynes’s third intellectual move was equally interesting and proved very effec­tive as well. Keynes claimed that he no longer believed what he had written in A Treatise on Money, and turned his attention to writing another book, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936), which in time became the most influential book on economic policy in the twentieth century. As Mark Blaug (1997: 642) remarks, never before had we seen such a quick and complete conversion of the profession to the new paradigm as we saw in the decade after the publication of the General Theory. Throughout the US and Europe, Keynesian thought dominated economic discourse from the basic teaching of the discipline to the highest level deliberations of public policy. The entire discipline of economics was transformed as a result, and the discipline that Hayek was trained in, and practised, seemed to vanish as he was still working out the implications of his own thinking.

Rather than attempting to criticize directly what Keynes presented in his General Theory, Hayek turned his analytical attention to refining capital theory. Hayek was convinced that the essential point to convey to Keynes and the rest of the economics profession concerning monetary policy lay in working out the implications of a consist­ent and coherent capital theory. Thus Hayek proceeded to set forth his thesis in The Pure Theory of Capital (1941). However correct his assessment may have been, this book, Hayek’s most technical, was his least influential. In the eyes of the public Keynes had defeated Hayek. Hayek lost standing in the profession and with students. If in the early 1930s almost every one of his students at the LSE was a Hayekian, then by the end of the decade barely a Hayekian could be found.

During this time, Hayek was also involved in another grand debate in economic policy, the socialist calculation debate, triggered by a 1920 article by Mises that stated that socialism was technically impossible because in abolishing private property in the means of production it would lack market prices for capital goods. Without prices guiding production decisions, economic planning would be lost amid the sea of economic possibilities. Socialist planning, Mises demonstrated, would not be able to engage in rational economic calculation of the alternative investment plans. The socialist planner would not know, for example, whether to build railroad tracks out of platinum or steel owing to the inability to engage in rational economic calculation. Mises had refined this argument in 1922 in Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis, the book which had profoundly impressed the young Hayek (and the young Lionel Robbins) when it appeared. Hayek developed Mises’s argument further in several articles during the 1930s. In 1935, he collected and edited a series of essays on the problems of socialist economic organization, Collectivist Economic Planning, in which Mises’s original 1920 article was published in English for the first time. Hayek and Robbins also worked to get Mises’s Socialism translated and published in English, which it was in 1936. Robbins would publish Economic Planning and the International Order in 1937, and additional Hayek essays on the problems of socialism, and specifically the model of “market social­ism” developed by Oskar Lange and Abba Lerner in their attempt to answer Mises and Hayek, were later collected in Individualism and Economic Order (Hayek 1948).

Again, the economics profession and the intellectual community in general did not view Hayek’s criticism as decisive in the dispute. The socialist calculation debate of the 1930s took place on two levels - as a technical question of economic theory and as an outgrowth of the progressive social, cultural, and philosophical approach to modernity. As a proposition of economic theory, since Mises’s original challenge in 1920, economists had developed in more detail the perfectly competitive model and refined the general equilibrium concept central to neoclassical economics. While the early Austrian econo­mists had viewed themselves as squarely in the scientific mainstream of the then emerging neoclassical economics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, by the 1930s it was becoming increasingly clear to Mises, and especially Hayek, that in the context of the socialist calculation debate the neoclassical tradition of price determination modelled as a simultaneous system of equations within a perfectly competitive economy had diverged significantly from the Austrian school’s understanding of the theory of price formation through the “higgling and bargaining” in the entrepreneurial and competitive market economy (Lavoie 1985). Competition in the model of perfect competition was no longer seen as a rivalrous activity, but instead as an equilibrium state of affairs with a set of corresponding optimality conditions. To the Austrian economists, in contrast, the competitive market process emerges out of the ongoing exchange relations and produc­tive activities that are engaged in by economic participants and the institutions within which these activities take place.

The strategic move made by Oskar Lange and Abba Lerner in developing the model of market socialism was to substitute for the Walrasian auctioneer and the tatonnement process the Central Planning Board and the establishment of the optimality rule of price equals marginal cost and the directive to produce at that level that minimizes average costs as the guide to socialist enterprises. If the essence of either the capitalist or socialist system was captured in the simultaneous equation system of general competitive equilibrium, then the institutional background of private property or collective ownership should not matter for the achievement of optimality in allocation and production decisions. They argued that such a response to Mises (and to Hayek) effectively answered the challenge of economic calculation and production could in fact be rationalized under socialism. Lange argued that his model had demonstrated that socialist economies in theory could achieve the same optimality results as those achieved in the market, but also that since under socialism the problems of monopolistic exploitation and the instability of business cycles would be eliminated socialist planning would outperform capitalist economies in practice. In addition, since distribution would be determined through socialist and democratic deliberation, the injustice of the capitalist system would be overcome.

Alongside of the technical economic theory arguments for market socialism, there was also a general cultural sense that modern science and technology had delivered mankind into such an advanced state of affairs that more rational control over the economy was not only possible, but a moral imperative. Had not modern science given man the ability to control and design society according to moral rules of his own choosing? The planned society envisioned under socialism was supposed to be not only as efficient as capitalism (especially in view of the chaos capitalism was said to generate with its business cycles and monopoly power), but socialism, with its promise of social justice, was expected to be morally superior. Moreover, it was considered the wave of the future. Only a reac­tionary, it was argued, could resist the inevitable tide of history. Not only had Hayek appeared to lose the technical economic debate with Keynes and the Keynesians con­cerning the causes of business cycles, but, in view of the rising tide of socialism through­out the world, his general philosophical perspective was increasingly seen as decidedly out of step with the march of progress.

The experience of the 1930s and 1940s dramatically shaped Hayek’s subsequent research programme. Why was it that economists trained in the early neoclassical tradi­tion that Hayek’s teachers were responsible for developing, and to which he thought his own original contributions were directed at advancing, got so off-track from his perspec­tive on the fundamental questions of the monetary economy, the capital structure, the price system, and the competitive market process? The discerning reader of Hayek will see in his “Trend of economic thinking” (1933) the claim that neoclassical economics provides the proper analytics for studying the problems of economic coordination in a systematic way; yet by the time that same reader is confronting “Economics and knowl­edge” (1937), let alone “The use of knowledge in society” (1945), he or she will see that Hayek is arguing that the preoccupation among neoclassical theorists with the equilib­rium conditions is causing confusion rather than illumination.

In order to understand the events of the previous decade, Hayek undertook two important foundational scientific and scholarly moves in the 1940s, both beginning his “Abuse of reason” project critical of the underlying philosophical and methodologi­cal underpinnings of modern social science, and an “institutional turn” in his research to draw attention to the institutional framework within which economic activity takes place. Both new directions are interrelated, and deeply connected to his analytical per­spective as a technical economist. As I have argued elsewhere, “the most productive reading of Hayek is one which sees the common thread in his work from psychology to economics to the philosophy of science to political science to law and finally to philo­sophical anthropology and social theory. The common thread is decisive epistemic turn to comparative institutional analysis” (Boettke 1999: xv, original emphasis).

The Road to Serfdom

In response to the debate first with Keynes and then with the market socialists, Hayek kept refining the argument for economic liberalism. The problems of socialism that he had observed in Nazi Germany and that he saw beginning in Britain led him to write The Road to Serfdom (1944). If socialism required the replacement of the market with a central plan, then, Hayek pointed out, an institution must be established that would be responsible for formulating this plan, which Hayek referred to as the Central Planning Bureau. To implement the plan and to control the flow of resources, the bureau would have to exercise broad discretionary power in economic affairs. Yet the Central Planning Bureau in a socialist society would have no market prices to serve as guides. It would have no means of knowing which production possibilities were economically feasible. The absence of a pricing system, Hayek said, would prove to be socialism’s fatal flaw. Mises’s essential criticisms were correct and had to be the starting point of any discussion of the economic problems of socialism.

In The Road to Serfdom, Hayek argued that since the Central Planning Bureau could not base decisions on economic criterion, those in positions of power would base deci­sions on some other basis. The economic logic of the situation would give rise to the organizational logic of socialist planning. Thus, there was good reason to suspect that those who would rise to the top in a socialistic regime would be those who had a compar­ative advantage in exercising discretionary power and were willing to make unpleasant decisions. Also it was inevitable that these powerful men would run the system to their own personal advantage. The economic problem with socialism led directly to the politi­cal problem of socialism. The Road to Serfdom thus presented to advocates of socialism an additional problem beyond that of the technical economic problem, the political reali­ties inherent in granting a single institution these kinds of powers over economic affairs.

Totalitarianism is not a historical accident that emerges solely because of a poor choice of leaders under a socialist regime. Totalitarianism, Hayek shows, is the logical outcome of the institutional order of socialist planning.

Why was it so hard to penetrate not only the popular imagination with this message, but more importantly for him the intellectual imagination of professional economists who he thought would be his ally in the battle of ideas against historicism and collectiv­ism? To answer this question Hayek turned his attention away from technical economics and concentrated on restating the principles of classical liberalism. Hayek had pointed out the need for market prices as conveyors of dispersed economic information. He showed that attempts to replace or control the market lead to a knowledge problem. Hayek also described the totalitarian problem associated with placing discretionary power in the hands of a few. This led him to examine the intellectual prejudices that blind men from seeing the problems of government economic planning.

During the 1940s, Hayek published a series of essays in professional journals examin­ing the dominant philosophical trends that prejudiced intellectuals in a way that did not allow them to recognize the systemic problems that economic planners would confront. These essays were later collected and published as The Counter-Revolution of Science (1952a). It provides a detailed intellectual history of “rational constructivism” and the problems of “scientism” in the social sciences. It is in this work that Hayek articulates his version of the Scottish Enlightenment project of David Hume and Adam Smith of “using reason to whittle down the claims of Reason”. Modern civilization was not only threat­ened by irrational zealots hell-bent on destroying the world, but was also threatened by the abuse of reason by rational constructivists trying to consciously design the modern world that had placed mankind in chains of its own making.

In 1950, Hayek moved to the University of Chicago, where he taught until 1962 in the Committee on Social Thought. While there, he wrote The Constitution of Liberty (1960). This work represented Hayek’s first systemic treatise on classical liberal political economy. Beginning with the work that had resulted in The Road to Serfdom, Hayek had wanted to call attention to the framework assumed in economic analysis and highlight its importance. Basic economics begins with the assumption of clearly defined and strictly enforced private property rights which forms the basis of mutually beneficial exchange between parties. Private property and freedom of contract embodied in the rule of law is the assumed background. However, it was so far in the background of analysis by the 1930s and 1940s that it was easy for thinkers to forget. They proceeded as if economic relationships were merely technical optimality conditions and could be determined under a variety of institutional settings. In fact, institutional differences did not matter as the explicit goal of mid-twentieth century theorists was to derive a pure institutionally anti­septic theory of economic optimality.

What Hayek had accomplished in The Road to Serfdom was to demonstrate the incompatibility of socialist planning with democracy and the rule of law. What he sought to derive in The Constitution of Liberty was a historical explanation for co-evolution of Western civilization and the rule of law, and then to develop an approach to contempo­rary public policy grounded in the generality norm upon which the rule of law is based. It is important to stress that for Hayek, the rule of law was not merely rule by laws, but had specific content associated with the generality norm that bound not only the actors within the system but the governors that were called to provide oversight of the system. Hayek’s conception of the “good society” was one that exhibited neither dominion nor discrimination.

In 1962, Hayek moved to Germany, where he had obtained a position at the University of Freiburg. He then increasingly centred his efforts on examining and elaborating the “spontaneous” ordering of economic and social activity. Hayek set about reconstructing liberal social theory and providing a vision of peaceful social cooperation and productive specialization among free individuals.

With his three-volume study, Law, Legislation and Liberty (1979a) and his final book The Fatal Conceit (1988), Hayek extended his analysis of society to an examination of the “spontaneous” emergence of legal and moral rules. His political and legal theory emphasized that the rule of law was the necessary foundation for peaceful coexistence. He contrasted the tradition of the common law with that of statute law, that is, legisla­tive decrees. He showed how the common law emerges, case by case, as judges apply to particular cases general rules that are themselves products of cultural evolution. Thus, he explained that embedded within the common law is knowledge gained through a long history of trial and error. This insight led Hayek to the conclusion that law, like the market, is a “spontaneous” order - the result of human action, but not of human design. (Hayek 1967)

Conclusion

Hayek had a long and productive career. He had to endure the curse of achieving fame at a young age and then having that fame turn to ridicule as the intellectual and politi­cal world moved away from his ideas. However, he lived long enough to see his original ideas recognized again. In many ways all his intellectual opponents at a methodological, analytical and, dare we say, ideological level were eventually challenged by the tide of events and the penetrating logic of Hayek’s analysis. At the time of his death, classical liberalism was once again a vibrant body of thought. The Austrian school of economics had re-emerged as a major school of economic thought, and younger scholars in law, history, economics, politics, and philosophy are pursuing Hayekian themes. Since his death, these trends have grown in momentum. Consider the renewed interest in Hayek’s work in monetary theory and the trade cycle in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, or the critique of development planning found in works such as William Easterly (2014), or the focus on the institutional infrastructure in the development of the West found in such works at North et al. (2009).

Finally, any discussion of Hayek for contemporary readers would be incomplete if the work by Bruce Caldwell, both in terms of his own scholarship on Hayek (for example, Hayek’s Challenge, 2004) but also in editing the Collected Works of F.A. Hayek, was not mentioned. This ongoing project is estimated to be 19 volumes with some supple­mental material, and there is also the extensive oral history interviews that Hayek did at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) that are available now online at the Universidad Francisco Marroquin digital resources. Scholars are judged not only by the answers they provided to the problems they tackled during their careers, but the questions they motivate others to ask and the avenues of new lines of inquiry their work opens up. Hayek’s work continues to serve as the basis for a progressive research pro­gramme in the social sciences from technical economics to social philosophy.

Peter Bθettke

See also:

Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk (I); Business cycles and growth (III); Capital theory (III); Economics and philosophy (III); German and Austrian schools (II); John Maynard Keynes (I); Abba Ptachya Lerner (I); Carl Menger (I); Ludwig Heinrich von Mises (I); Money and banking (III); Political philosophy and economics: freedom and labour (III); Lionel Charles Robbins (I); Joseph Alois Schumpeter (I); Piero Sraffa (I).

References and further reading

Blaug, M. (1997), Economic Theory in Retrospect, 5th edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Boettke, P. (1999), ‘Which enlightenment, whose liberalism: F.A. Hayek’s research program for understanding the liberal society’, in P.J. Boettke (ed.), The Legacy of F.A. Hayek: Politics, Philosophy, Economics, vol. 1, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, pp. xi-lv.

Boettke, P.J. and K.W. O’Donnell (2013), ‘The failed appropriation of F.A. Hayek by formalist economics’, Critical Review, 25 (3-4), 305-41.

Caldwell, B. (2004), Hayek’s Challenge: An Intellectual Biography of F.A. Hayek, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Easterly, W. (2014), The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor, New York: Basic Books.

Hayek, F.A. (1925), ‘The monetary policy of the United States after the recovery from the 1920 crisis’, reprinted in R. McCloughry (ed.) (1984), F.A. Hayek: Money, Capital and Fluctuations: Early Essays, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Hayek, F.A. (1929), Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle, reprinted 1975, New York: Augustus M. Kelley.

Hayek, F.A. (1931), Prices and Production, reprinted 1967, New York: Augustus M. Kelley.

Hayek, F.A. (1932), ‘Money and capital: a reply’, Economic Journal, 42 (166), 237-49.

Hayek, F.A. (1933), ‘The trend of economic thinking’, Economica (May), 121-37.

Hayek, F.A. (1935), Collectivist Economic Planning, London: Routledge.

Hayek, F.A. (1937), ‘Economics and knowledge’, reprinted in F.A. Hayek (1948), Individualism and Economic Order, reprinted 1996, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 33-56.

Hayek, F.A. (1941), The Pure Theory of Capital, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Hayek, F.A. (1944), The Road to Serfdom, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Hayek, F.A. (1945), ‘The use of knowledge in society’, reprinted in F.A. Hayek (1996), Individualism and Economic Order, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp 77-91.

Hayek, F.A. (1948), Individualism and Economic Order, reprinted 1996, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Hayek, F.A. (1952a), The Counter-Revolution of Science, Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, reprinted 1979.

Hayek, F.A. (1952b), The Sensory Order, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Hayek, F.A. (1956), ‘The dilemma of specialization’, reprinted in F.A. Hayek (ed.) (1967), Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 122-32.

Hayek, F.A. (1960), The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Hayek, F.A. (1967), ‘The results of human action but not of human design’, in F.A. Hayek (ed.), Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 95-105.

Hayek, F.A. (1978), ‘Coping with ignorance’, in F.A. Hayek (ed.) (1983), Knowledge, Evolution, and Society, London: Adam Smith Institute, pp. 1-6.

Hayek, F.A. (1979a), Law, Legislation, and Liberty, 3 vols, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Hayek, F.A. (1979b), Interview with Axel Leijonhuvfud, accessed 19 May 2015 at http://hayek.ufm.edu/index. php/Axel_Leijonhufvud.

Hayek, F.A. (1988), The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, in F.A. Hayek, Collected Works, vol. 1, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Keynes, J.M. (1926), The End of Laissez-Faire, London: Hogarth Press.

Keynes, J.M. (1930), A Treatise on Money, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.

Keynes, J.M. (1931), ‘The pure theory of money: a reply to Dr. Hayek’, Econometrica, 11 (November), 387-97.

Keynes, J.M. (1936), The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kurz, H.D. (2000), ‘The Hayek-Keynes-Sraffa controversy reconsidered’, in H.D. Kurz (ed.), Critical Essays on Piero Sraffa’s Legacy in Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kurz, H.D. (2015), ‘Keynes, Sraffa, and the latter’s “secret scepticism”’ in H.D. Kurz and Neri Salvadori (eds), Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long- Period Analysis, New York: Routledge, pp. 102-22.

Lachmann, L. (1986), ‘Austrian economics under fire: the Hayek-Sraffa duel in retrospect’, in D. Lavoie (ed.) (1994), Expectations and the Meaning of Institutions: Essays in Economics by Ludwig Lachmann, London: Routledge.

Lavoie, D. (1985), Rivalry and Central Planning: The Socialist Calculation Debate Reconsidered, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Menger, C. (1871), Principles of Economics, reprinted 1950, New York: Free Press.

Mises, L. von (1912), The Theory of Money and Credit, reprinted 1953, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Mises, L. von (1922), Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis reprinted 1951, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Myrdal, G. (1929), The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory, translated 1953, London: Routledge.

North, D.C., J.J. Wallis and B. Weingast (2009), Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Robbins, L. (1937), Economic Planning and International Order, London: Macmillan.

Skarbek, D. (2009), ‘F.A. Hayek’s influence on Nobel prize winners’, Review of Austrian Economics, 22 (1), 109-12.

Sraffa, P. (1932a), ‘Dr. Hayek on money and capital’, Economic Journal, 42 (165), 42-53.

Sraffa, P. (1932b), ‘A rejoinder’, Economic Journal, 42 (166), 249-51.