Conclusion

The greatest divergence of the early modern era was probably the rise of the upper-income groups of northwest Europe relative to everybody else. The privileged ranks

of the West gained in material well-being relative to the rest of their own societies and to national averages elsewhere.

In terms of what they could purchase in a given year of their life span, the upper-income ranks of northwest Europe were pulling away from others even more clearly than previous estimates have revealed, thanks to trends in relative prices. The eras that stood out as eras in which price trends favoured the rich were also eras in which a rise in nominal inequality also favoured the rich.

The era with the clearest inegalitarian trends seems to have come long before any Industrial Revolution or globalization. It was between 1500 and 1650 that the rich benefited most from the relative cheapening of new luxury goods and of old luxury goods such as domestic servants, while soaring land rents probably also enhanced their nominal incomes. In the same period, the poor faced a trend towards scarcity of food, housing, and land. As far as we can tell, this shift toward dear food and cheap luxuries was experienced throughout most of Europe before 1650.

Inegalitarian trends revisited at different times between 1650 and the turbulent 1790—1815 era. For England and France, at least, one might argue for a second inegalitarian era across the second half of the eighteenth century. For England, this second inegalitarian age probably came between 1740 and 1795—1815. It might have had a similar dating for France, but data limitations allow us to see only a slightly inegalitarian trend change between 1750 and 1790.

The divergence in early modern price trends also carries an implication for trends in international inequality, at least within Europe. To the extent that all countries shared a drift toward scarce grain and cheaper luxuries between 1500 and 1800, the real purchasing power of the richest nations, especially England and Holland, must have risen above other nations' purchasing power even faster than the silver-price or constant-price comparisons could reveal. Real purchasing power must have risen faster, other things equal, in countries where consumption patterns favoured the goods that were falling in relative price. Over most of the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, those falling-price goods tended to be luxuries, giving an extra relative bargain to England and Holland.