Глава 1. Выгоды финансовой системы: только для богатых?

1 Tom Wolfe, The Bonfire of the Vanities. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1987. P. 229. [Вулф Т. Костры амбиций: Роман. Кн. 1. М.: Иностранка: Б.С.Г.-Пресс, 2001. С. 351—352.]

2. Цит.
   по: Louis D. Brandeis, Other People's Money. Washington, DC: National Home Library Foundation, 1933. P. 1.
3. Cm.: J. Stiglitz and A. Weiss, “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information”, American Economic Review 71 (1981): 393 — 410.
4. О залоге см.: Yuk Shee Chan, Ajan V. Thakor, “Collateral and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Private Information”, Journal of Finance 42 (1987): 345 — 364 и D. Besanko, A. Thakor, “Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets”, International Economic Review 28 (1987): 671—689.
5. Важно то, что Шейлок ненавидит купца, в противном случае он бы не захотел забрать фунт его плоти, и сама эта угроза была бы неправдоподобной.
6. Jappelli Т., Pagano М., Bianco М. “Courts and Banks: Effects of Judicial Enforcement of Credit Markets”, CEPR working paper no. 3347, April 2002. Среди схожих исследований: M. Chiuri and T. Jappelli, “Credit Market Imperfections and Home Ownership: A Comparative Study”, CEPR discussion paper no. 2717, 2001; D. Fabbri and Mario Padula, “Judicial Costs and Household Debt”, working paper, Center for Studies in Economics and Finance, University of Salerno, Italy, 2001; Lee Alston, “Farm Foreclosure Moratorium Legislation: A Lesson from the Past”, American Economic Review 74, no. 3 (1984): 445- 458; R. Gropp, J. Scholz, and M. White, “Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and Demand”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112

1997. : 217-251.

7. Gropp, Scholz, and White, “Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and Demand”, 217 — 251.
8. Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else.
   New York: Basic Books, 2000. [Сото Э. де. Загадка капитала: почему капитализм торжествует на Западе и терпит поражение во всем остальном мире. М.: Олимп- бизнес, 2001.]
9. См., например: М. Petersen and R. Rajan, “The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data”, Journal of Finance 49 (1994): 3 — 37.
10. Luigi Guiso and Luigi Zingales, “The Rise of Bank Relationships”, University of Chicago, working paper, 1999.
11. Naomi Lamoreaux, Insider Lending: Banks, Personal Connections and Economic Development in Industrial New England. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
12. Cm.: Rajan R.G. “Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's Length Debt,” Journal of Finance 47 (1992): 1367 —

1400.

13. Доклад комиссии Пуджо, цит. по: Brandeis, Other People's Money. P. 31.
14. E.J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 1848 — 1885. New York: New American Library, 1979. P. 242.
15. Cm.: Harris Corporation, Business History Review, “Founding Dates of the 1994 Fortune 500 U.S. Companies”, spring 1996, 69 — 90.
16. Cm.: J. Fear, “German Capitalism”, in: Creating Modern Capitalism: How Entrepreneurs, Companies, and Countries Triumphed in Three Industrial Revolutions, ed, T. McCraw. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997. P. 181.
17. Cm.: R.W. Fogel, The Fourth Great Awakening and the Future of Egalitarianism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. P. 112. См. также ссылки в данной работе.
18. Т. McCraw, “American Capitalism”, in: Creating Modern Capitalism. P. 320.
19. A. Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1990. P. 18.
20. R. Chernow, Titan: The Life of John D. Rockefeller. New York: Random House, 1998. P. 226.
21. Chandler. Scale and Scope. P. 25.
22. Chernow. Titan. P. 288.
23. Chandler. Scale and Scope. P. 25.
24. Chernow.
    Titan. P. 265.
25. David Blau, “A Time Series Analysis of Self-Employment in the United States”, Journal of Political Economy 95, no. 3 (1987): 445 — 468.
26. Модель данного явления см.: R. Rajan, L. Zingales, “The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origins and Growth of Firms”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 (2001): 805 — 852.
27. Chandler. Scale and Scope. P. 598.
28. Описание модели раздувания штата владельцами компаний с целью не допустить роста заработной платы см.: L. Stole and J. Zwic- bel, “Organizational Design and Technology Choice under Intra-Firm Bargaining”, American Economic Review 86 (1996): 195 — 223.
29. Вкратце, вертикально интегрированные компании используют несколько источников мотивации. Внутренняя конкуренция и бюрократизация гарантировала, что работники не станут незаменимыми, в то время как возможность продвижения по служебной лестнице не давала им утратить мотивацию. См.: Rajan and Zingales, “The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy”.
30. Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz, “The Returns to Skill in the United States across the Twentieth Century”, NBER working paper 7126,1999.

3! Dani Rodrik. “Democracies Pay Higher Wages”, NBER working paper 6364, 1998.