resisting neoliberal subjectivity

There are three ways to respond to the standardized application of game theory. First, one could accept the paradigm and strive to identify means within it to construct institutions that will best approximate the classical liberal vision of mutual prosperity under limited government.

1 ⁹ Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 2nd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2013); and John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1971) are both classical liberal texts. Nozick invokes side constraints, and Rawls relies on fair play.

²⁰ Gary Becker, Economic Approach to Human Behavior (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Nicolas Stern, Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, available online, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ 20100407172811/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/stern_review_report.htm, accessed July 21, 2015.

²¹ David Lewis, Convention, 1969; von Neumann and Morgenstern, Theory of Games, 1944/ 2004, 31.

imposed de facto as a fait accompli. Perhaps, as some rational choice theorists have surmised, the rationality paradigm cannot surpass the Hobbesian Leviathan state and in fact must be even more invasive than Hobbes’s early modern commonwealth to achieve the necessary means to leverage compliance.

Second, those who are dissatisfied with the implications of strategic ration­ality may expand the bases of rational choice to permit sufficient leeway to exit the Prisoner’s Dilemma gracefully.

Alternatively, an individual could superimpose a personal subjective evalua­tion on a tangible resource dilemma so that mutual cooperation registers a higher value than unilateral gain. This is a less tractable resolution because instrumental rationality typically tracks actors’ obtainment of tangible out­comes. A new value metric would need to be devised to reflect payoffs in terms other than cash rewards, or any other such interpersonally transferable scarce resource. However, regardless of how game theory may be augmented to accommodate an individual’s subjective predilection for mutually cooperative outcomes over unilateral success, the litmus test for determining if one is unwil­lingly and unnecessarily trapped in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game is what one would do if one were assured of the other’s cooperation in a tangible resource dilemma. If one defects, then one’s choice conforms to Prisoner’s Dilemma logic of seeking self-advancement despite others. If one cooperates, then the Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrix does not apply to one’s choice in the first place. Thus, this individual is not and never was in a Prisoner’s Dilemma, but was instead in an Assurance Dilemma or Assurance Game. Individuals cannot be trapped in a Prisoner’s Dilemma against their will. Although alleviating an Assurance Dilemma may not be trivial, it is logically surmountable unlike the PD (in which actors hope to sucker others) and is amenable to concrete solutions.^[711]

Third, and finally, actors may conclude that strategic rationality is too constraining to offer guidance in all, many, or even just some choice situations.

encourages substituting coercive bargaining, or pressing one’s threat advantage, for normative bargaining that respects the no-harm principle because the for­mer is consistent with noncooperative behavior. Game theory’s strict denial of the meaningfulness of self-determined normativity replaces self-governance by participation and consent with governance by incentives. Neoliberal institu­tions reframe trust, loyalty, and commitment as practices that must be forma­lized in systems of rewards and sanctions that rely on institutional means to monitor and record individuals’ actions.

The following considerations offer ways to resist neoliberal subjectivity:

1. Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs - physiological, safety, love and belonging, esteem, and self-actualization - reminds us that many, if not most, human aspirations are inherently unbounded in their potential for satisfaction. Even elementary physiological needs for food, clothing, shelter, transportation and sanitation may be more constructively envisioned in line with the Epicurean ethic of ataraxia, or tranquility in sufficiency and affi­nity, rather than with bottomless consumption and ceaseless competition.^[712]

2. Psychologists have revealed the transformative power of the belief in volition and free will against the view of biological destiny or physical determinism.^[713]

3. We may consider that democracy is participatory and relational, as opposed to perfunctory and irrational, drawing on experiences from the developing world.^[714] Against the moral of narrow self-interest, we may perceive generosity and sharing abundance to be the hallmarks of inde­pendence and freedom from constraint.^[715]

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93-98

game theory as rational deterrence, 76-79 history of game theory and, 73-76 Kahn's defense of NUTS, 79-84 literature review, 76

Nuclear Chicken Game Diagram, 81-83 Nuclear Chicken Game Matrix, 81-83 preemption, 91-93

Schelling's defense of MAD, 84-93 Stag Hunt (assurance) game, 87-89 summary conclusion, 98, 289 see also Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) assured destruction doctrine. see McNamara,

Robert S.; Mutual Assured Destruction

(MAD); Schelling, Thomas

Aumann, RobertJ., 11, 51

Auten, Brian, 105

Axelrod, Robert M., 24, 68, 143, 250-251

The Evolution of Cooperation, 144-146, 269, 272, 276

see also Tit for Tat cooperation

Bacharach, Michael, xviii Baldwin, David A., xxii

bargaining. see coercive bargaining; Nash, John Forbes, Jr.

Becker, Gary, 146-147

Bentham, Jeremy, 59

Berlin, Isaiah, 15-16

Bernoulli, Daniel, 35

Binmore, Ken, 46, 68, 278-279

Brams, StevenJ., 136

A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Harvey), 5-6

Brodie, Bernard, 78-79, 86

Brown, Harold, 104, 108-109, 120-121 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 108-109, 120-121 Buchanan, James M., 146-147, 175

coercive bargaining, 200-203

Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan, xxvii, 177-179, 180-184, 186-187

on neoliberalism and social order, 182-184 Posner, comparison of views to, 205, 206-207, 208, 213, 216-220

public choice theory, 176

Rawls, comparison of views to, 202-203. see also social contract

see also unanimity

Bull, Hedley, 77

Calculus of Consent (Buchanan and Tullock), 177

Campbell, Richmond, 44-49

Carter, Jimmy, 81

Brown and, 104, 108-109, 120-121

Brzezinski and, 108-109, 120-121 conversion to pro-nuclear war fighting strategy, xxvi, 102, 105-109

3²5

Carter, Jimmy (cont.) deregulation policy, 6 escalation dominance, 85, 102-105 Kavka on MAD/NUTS dilemma, 143-144 MAD/NUTS dilemma, 67-68, 71, 96,

111-121, 122-125 moral principles of, 122-123 Presidential Directive 18, 109, 113 Presidential Directive 59, 100, 108-109, 120-121

Red Integrated Strategic Offensive Plan

Version-5C (RISOP), 106

Schlesinger on, 107-108

Carter's Conversion: The Hardening of US

Defense Policy (Auten), 105 causal negligibility. see negligibility chess, 74

Chicago School of economics, 8

Chicken game, 81-83, 87, 103-105, 117-118,

119-120, 136, 146

“Class of Simple Deterrence Games” (Selten and Tietz), 51-52

classical liberalism

Berlin and, 15-16

Doyle and, xxii-xxiii game theory and, 46-47, 51 Hayek and, 8, 12-13, 15, 179 Kant and, 12-13, 15, 59, 187 MAD/NUTS and, 73 neoliberalism, distinguished from, 11-17, 18 political theories of, 12-13 response to neoliberalism, 294-296 self-preservation principle, 118-119, 127-128, 185

source of power to act in world, 128, 131-135

Tuck and, xxii-xxiii, 9, 14, 236

value enabling purposive agency, 128-131 see also defensive realism and game theory;

game theory; Hobbes, Thomas; no-harm principle; Nozick, Robert; Rawls, John; Smith, Adam

Coase, Ronald, 207, 209-210

Coase theorem, 208-210, 212 coercive bargaining, 86-87, 166, 170, 179, 185, 200-203

Cold War bipolarity, 18, 84-86, 93-98 see also Soviet Union, former; United

States (US)

Coleman, Jules analysis of Buchanan/Wicksell, 196-200 on Coase theorem, 208, 212

on consent/agreement, 193, 205, 213-214

on Posner’s wealth creation, 211

on property rules vs. liability rules, 216-217

on unanimity rule, 200-201, 202 collective action

overview, xxviii, 151, 224-225, 290-291

G. Hardin’s “The Tragedy ofthe Commons,” 228-230

from liberal invisible hand to neoliberal malevolent back-hand, 236-241

Olson’s Logic of Collective Action, xxviii, 232-236, 237-240, 242

PD and global warming, 225-228, 236-237, 271

perfect competition, xxviii, 240-241 strategic rational failures of, 228-232 summary conclusion, 242

Collective Action (R. Hardin), 237-238 Committee on Present Danger, 107, 113-114 consent, xxiii-xxiv

overview, xxviii, 10, 151, 205-206, 294

Coase theorem, 208-210

ex ante vs. ex post consent, 216-220

Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, 207-208, 210-216 PD, social contract and exchange, 214 summary conclusion, 220-222, 290 as wealth-maximization, 207-212 cooperation and game theory. see Tit for Tat cooperation

Copeland, Dale, 95-96

countervailing strategy. see Brown, Harold; Nuclear Utilization Targeting Selection (NUTS); Presidential Directive 59 (Carter); Schlesinger, James R.

Craig, Campbell, 166 cynicism, 286

Dawkins, Richard

The God Delusion, 262

The Selfish Gene, 252-257, 263, 269, 276 see also selfish gene theory default point. see threat point (Nash) defensive realism and game theory

defensive realism, contrasted with, 125-127

Kavka and, 136-138

offensive realism, contrasted with, 125-127, 133-134

reciprocal respect, 133-134

security of possession, 137

see also Jervis, Robert; Tang, Shiping defensive realism and game theory (Jervis and Tang), 128

“Delicate Balance of Terror” (Wohlstetter), 8ι Deng Xaioping, 6

“Designing a Social Mechanism” (Binmore), 278-279

deterrence, in nuclear policy debate overview, xxvi, 67-68, 99-102, 289

Brams on, 136

Carter’s conversion to pro-nuclear war fighting strategy, xxvi, 102, 105-109

Carter’s security dilemma, 111-121 Chicken game and, 117-118, 119-120 Freedman on, 119-120

Glaser on PD logic and, 115 inescapable irrationality of MAD, 122-125 Kavka on, 135-138

NUTS and triumph of PD logic, 102-105 offensive realism and game theory, 125-127 self-preservation principle, 127-128 source of power to act in world, 131-135 value enabling purposive agency, 128-131 see also Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD);

Nuclear Utilization Targeting Selection (NUTS); nuclearism

“Deterrence, Maximization, and Rationality” (Gauthier), 147-151

Dewey, John, 12-13

“Diplomacy of Violence” (Schelling), 86 Donninger, Christian, 24

Doyle, Michael W., xxii-xxiii

Dresher, Melvin, 24, 75, 76

Eisenhower, Dwight, 80, 84-85, 92

Ellsberg, Daniel, 78-79

end of history (Fukuyama), xv, xvi, 4 equilibrium of mutual-best-reply (Nash). see

Nash, John Forbes, Jr.

Escalation Control, defined, 103-104, 118 escalation dominance, 83-84, 85, 102-105, 112-113

see also Carter, Jimmy; Nuclear Utilization Targeting Selection (NUTS); Schlesinger, James R.

ESS (evolutionary stability strategy), 247, 258-259, 260, 263, 265-266

see also Axelrod, Robert M.; Dawkins, Richard; Tit for Tat cooperation evolution and game theory, xxviii, 250-251, 291

see also selfish gene theory; Tit for Tat cooperation

The Evolution of Cooperation (Axelrod), 144-146, 269, 272, 276 expected utility theory, 4, 31-40, 46, 171-172, 213, 215, 294

externalities, defined, 17

fair play (Rawls), 133, 170, 182-184, ¹88 Fifth Amendment, 211-212

financial crisis (2008), 175-176, 241, 278 finite deterrence policy, 91-93

flexible response doctrine, 21, 67, 80-83, 84-86, 103-105, 107, 118, 121 see also Schlesinger, James R.

Flood, Merrill, 24, 75

Ford, Gerald, 81

Foucault, Michel, 18

Free Riding (Tuck), xxiii, 9, 236

Freedman, Lawrence, 81, 84, 119-120 freedom, 12-13, 14

Friedman, Milton, 12-13

Fukuyama, Francis, xv, xvi, 4 fungibility, xvii-xviii, 18-20, 30-31, 33, 46, 129-130, 288-289

Gaither Report (1957), 81

game theory

overview, xv-xxiv

arguments, xvii-xix

emergence of, xvi-xvii

fungibility, xvii-xviii, 18-20, 30-31, 33, 46, 129-130, 288-289

history of, 73-76

neoliberal subjectivity, xvii-xix, xxiv, xxv, 47, 61, 228-232, 288-291, 293-294 neoliberalism, 288-291

organization of chapters, xxiv-xxix

as rational deterrence, 76-79

response to neoliberalism, 294-296 retrospective and prospective, 291-294 summary conclusion, xxix, 285-287 von Neumann on, xxiv

Games and Decisions (Raiffa and Luce), 32, 4^1-44

Games of Strategy (Dresher), 76

Gauthier, David, i2-i3, i46-i5i, i54-i55 Gelman, Andrew, 276

Gintis, Herbert, i95, 247, 260-26i, 266 Giocoli, Nicola, 32, 38, 42, i47

Glaser, Charles L., ii5

global warming and game theory, 225-228, 236-237, 242, 27i

The God Delusion (Dawkins), 262

Godel, Kurt, 74

Golden Rule, xxviii-xxix, 279, 29i

Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Ostrom), 225, 238

government and game theory, introduction, 143^-15²

overview, 68, 289

Gauthier on, 146-151 neoliberal political economy and, 17 sanctions/incentives/rewards, 151, 153-156, 157^,15^8-159

see also collective action; consent; Hobbesian anarchy; social contract; unanimity Gradual Reduction of Arms (Aumann, Harsanyi, and Selten), 51

Gray, Colin, 107

Green, T.H., 12-13

Grotius, Hugo, 12-13, 14

Habermas, Jurgen, 266-267

Hardin, Garrett, 228-230

Hardin, Russell, 224, 237-238, 278

Hargreaves Heap, Shaun, 3-4, 24, 34, 143, 158,181

harm, neoliberal power to overview, xxiv-xxv Dawkins on, 60-61 as element of game theory pedagogy, 61 Mayberry on, 57-58 offensive realism and, 125-127 Schelling and G. Snyder on, 98 side constraints and, 23 see also coercive bargaining; Nash bargaining solution; no-harm principle; selfish gene theory

Harsanyi, John C., 11, 51

Harvey, David, 5-6, 8

Hausman, Daniel, 50-51, 172

Hayek, Friedrich, 8, 12-13, 15, 179

Herken, Gregg, 103

Hilbert, David, 74

Hilgers, Mathieu, 8

Hippocratic Oath for humankind, vi

Hoag, Malcolm, 78-79

Hobbes, Thomas, 12-13

Hobbesian anarchy

overview, xxvii, 151, 153-156, 289-290 Foole, as rational actor of game theory, 164-170

Gauthier on, 147-151

Hobbes’ Leviathan threatens people with jail (fig.), 159

Leviathan and PD, 156-161

Rational Choice Concept of Hobbes’ State of Nature (fig.), 159

summary conclusion, 170-173

traditional Hobbes, 161-164

Wendt on, 153-154

see also Buchanan, James M.

“A Hobbesian Interpretation of the Rawlsian Difference Principle” (Buchanan), 189-191

Homo strategicus, 4, 172

see also Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)

instrumental rationality (Weber), xvi intention/means/ends (Nye), 22-23 internality/externality (Schelling), 231 international relations theory

neoliberal institutionalism, xviii-xix, xxi-xxix, 8, 66, 128

rational choice assessment and, xxi-xxii,

realism school, 18-20. see also defensive realism and game theory; offensive realism and game theory (Mearsheimer) interpersonally transferable utility, 4, 27, 146, 230, 231, 265

invisible hand. see Smith, Adam

Jasanoff, Sheila, xxiv

Jervis, Robert

on MAD/NUTS debate, 71, 96, 112, 121

on Prisoner’s Dilemma, 114

rational deterrence theory, 78-79, 112, 116 on subjective expected utility theories, 125-126

Johnson, Lyndon, 81, 91-93 justice equals wealth maximization (Posner). see consent

Kahn, Herman, xxvi, 72, 76, 78-79, 93, 112 defense of NUTS, 79-84

On Escalation, 83-84

Freedman on, 81

Lackey on, 85

spasm warfare, 80-83, 84

on stable balance of terror, 91

On Thermonuclear War, 80-83, 84-85

see also Nuclear Utilization Targeting Selection (NUTS)

Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, 207-208, 210-216 Kant, Immanuel, 12-13, 15, 59, 187

Kaplan, Fred, 80-81, 103

Kaplan, Morton, 78-79

Kaufman, Walter, 78-79

Kavka, Gregory S., 146-147

on Carter’s MAD/NUTS dilemma, 143-144

on enforced taxation, 159

on Hobbes’s Foole, 168-169

Lackey on, 125

on morality of deterrence, 122-123, 124-125, 136-138, 150

Kelo v. City of New London, 211-212, 218 Kennan, George, 112

Kennedy, John F., 285

Keohane, Robert O., 66, 145

Kissinger, Henry, 78-79

Kuhn, Steven, 24, 272

Kuhn, Thomas S., 136

Lackey, Douglas, 95, 125

Lasker, Emanuel, 74

law and economics school. see consent; Posner, Richard A.

Lawrence, Philip K., 65

LeMay, Curtis, 80

Leonard, Robert J., 75-76

Leviathan (Hobbes), xxvii, 156-161

Lewis, David, 266

limited nuclear options (LNOs), 112-113

Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan (Buchanan), xxvii, 177-179, 180-184, 186-187

Lindahl, Erik, 196-200 Locke, John, 12-13, 14, 15

see also no-harm principle

Logic of Collective Action (Olson), xxviii, 232-236, 237-240, 242

Luce, Duncan, 32, 41-44, 146-147 Lynne-Jones, Sean M., 69

Manhattan Project, xxiv, 65, 73-74

Marx, Karl, xviii, 265

Maslow, Abraham, 60 massive retaliation policy (Eisenhower), 80, 84-85, 92

Mayberry, John, 52, 57-58, 69-70 McNamara, Robert S., 81, 112

assured destruction doctrine, 78-79, 94 finite deterrence policy, 91-93

flexible response doctrine, 85-86

G. Snyder on, 96-98

as Secretary of Defense, 71, 72, 77

Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), 92

WSEG-50 study, 91-93

see also Schelling, Thomas

McPherson, Michael, 50-51, 172

The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution

(Jervis), 112

Mearsheimer, John, 95-96, 127 meme (Dawkins), 262, 263

Mill, John Stuart, 12-13, 15-16

minimal deterrence. see McNamara, Robert S.; Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD); Schelling, Thomas

minimal liberal condition (Sen), 13 minmax rule (von Neumann), 32, 38, 69-70, 74-75, 87-89

Models of Gradual Reduction of Arms (Harsanyi, Selten, and Aumann), 11

Moehler, Michael, 159

Mont Pelerin Society, 8

Morgan, Patrick, 92, 116 Morgenstern, Oskar, 74, 78-79

expected utility theory, 31-40

Posner, comparison of views to, 210

Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 8, 9, 19, 31-40, 74, 129

Morse, Philip, 75

Mueller, Dennis, 236-237

Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)

overview, xxvi, 67-68, 69-73

classical liberalism and, 20

rational deterrence theory and, xxvi

Ross on, 69

see also deterrence, in nuclear policy debate; Polaris; Schelling, Thomas; submarine based missiles

Myerson, Roger B., xv, 33, 38-39, 55, 288

Nash, John Forbes, Jr.

bargaining solution, 49-58

coercive bargaining, 166, 170, 179, 185 equilibrium of mutual-best-reply, 4, 32, 214, 253, 257, 258-259, 265-266, 293

individualist maximization, 37

threat point, 54-56

see also “The Notion of ‘Threat’ and its Relation to Bargaining Theories” (Mayberry); Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) Nash bargaining solution, 49-58 National Security Defense Memorandum 242, 103-105

see also flexible response doctrine; limited nuclear options (LNOs); Schlesinger, James R.

Neal, Patrick, 168

negative liberty. see no-harm principle negative virtue. see no-harm principle negligibility, 151, 224-225, 232-236, 240, 242 neoclassical economics, 9, 46-47 neoconservatism, defined, 6

neoliberal capitalism and PD game, 61 neoliberal cynicism, 286 neoliberal institutionalism, xxi-xxii absolute vs. relative gains, 128 cooperation and game theory, xxii,

xxviii-xxix

Hilgers on, 8

neoliberalism, distinguished from, xxiv-xxv Nye’s soft power, 66 use of term, xviii-xix

see also Axelrod, Robert M.; Keohane,

Robert O.; Schelling, Thomas neoliberalism

overview, xxiv-xxv, 5-11, 288 classical liberalism, distinguished from,

11-17, 18

facets of, 7

Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis on, 3-4 Harvey on, 5-6, 8

Hilgers on, 8 literature review, 9 nuclearism and, 17-23 Nye on neoliberal institutionalism, 3, 19,

20-23, 66

origins of, 8

Rodgers on, 8-9

Ross on, 3

Sandel on, 6-7

use of term, xviii

neorealism, use of term, 105

Neorealism and Neoliberalism (Baldwin), xxii Newcomb’s Problem, 172

Nitze, Paul, 93, 107, 112 Nixon, Richard M., 78-79, 81, 85, 103-105,

286

no-harm principle

Berlin on, 15-16

in classical liberalism, xvi, 5, 59, 60-61,

135^,17⁸ non-interference of personhood and

property, 11-17, 84, 178

Scarry on, xxiii-xxiv side constraints and, 23, 133 see also harm, neoliberal power to non-cooperative game theory. see Nash, John

Forbes, Jr.; Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD); selfish gene theory non-interference, in classical liberalism.

see no-harm principle

norms and game theory, xxix

“The Notion of ‘Threat’ and its Relation to

Bargaining Theories” (Mayberry), 52 Nozick, Robert, 12-13, 15, 59, 187, 201, 207,

217-218

NSDM-242. See National Security Defense

Memorandum 242

Nuclear Ethics (Nye), 19, 21-23 nuclear security consensus, 65 nuclear security debate, xxvi, 17-23 see also assurance, in nuclear policy debate;

deterrence, in nuclear policy debate;

Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD);

Nuclear Utilization Targeting Selection (NUTS)

nuclear sovereignty, xxiii-xxiv

Nuclear Utilization Targeting Selection (NUTS) overview, xxvi, 67, 69-73, 117-118 coercive bargaining, 86-87, 166, 170, 179,

185, 200-203

escalation dominance, 83-84, 85, 102-105,

112-113

Kahn’s defense of, 79-84

rational deterrence theory and, xxvi, 20 as triumph of PD logic, 102-105 see also deterrence, in nuclear policy debate;

flexible response doctrine; Presidential

Directive 59 (Carter); Schlesinger, James R. nuclearism

defined, 20

neoliberalism and, 17-23

Nye on, 20-23

Schelling on, 21

Nye, Joseph S., Jr., 3, 19, 20-23, 66, 69

Odom, William, 108-109 offensive realism and game theory

(Mearsheimer), 95-96, 125-127 defensive realism, contrasted with, 133-134 self-preservation principle, 127-128 source of power to act in world, 131-135 value enabling purposive agency, 128-131 Olson, Mancur

Logic of Collective Action, xxviii, 232-236,

237-240, 242

On Escalation (Kahn), 83-84

On Thermonuclear War (Kahn), 80-83,

84-85 orthodox game theory assumptions.

see fungibility; game theory;

interpersonally transferable utility Ostrom, Elinor, 225, 238

Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation

(Campbell and Snowden), 44-49 parametric decision theory, 46 Pareto principle, 13, 14-15, 186-187 payoff. see prize/payoff, in game theory perfect competition, xxviii, 240-241 perfect duty. see no-harm principle Pettit, Philip, 153, 236-237, 264-265, 266, 293 Pigou, Arthur, 209-210

Pipes, Richard, 107

Polaris, 96-97

Posner, Richard A., xxviii, 146-147, 151, 200 see also consent

preemption. see assurance, in nuclear policy debate

Presidential Directive 18 (Carter), 109, 113 see also Carter, Jimmy

Presidential Directive 59 (Carter), 100,

108-109, 120-121

see also Carter, Jimmy

pricing, 10-11

“‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ and ‘Chicken’ Models in

International Politics” (Snyder), 96-98 Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)

overview, xxv, 25-28, 288-289

the narrative, 28-31

Campbell and Snowden on, 44-49

Cold War Arms Race as Stag Hunt (table), 34 expected utility theory, 4, 31-40, 46,

171-172, 213, 294

Game “G” (table) (Luce and Raiffa), 41, 42 Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis on, 24 High Stakes Game (table) (Campbell), 44 Iconic Cold War Arms Race Game (table)

(Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis), 34 Matrix Representation (table), 30 Mayberry on, 52, 57-58

Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) Model

(table) (Schelling), 49

Nash bargaining solution, 49-58 Neoliberal Car Sale/Exchange (table), 50 OngoingEngagementwith (1950-2) (fig.), 25 pedagogical reform, 41-49

Raiffa and Luce on, 41-44

S. Kuhn on, 24

summary conclusion, 58-61, 69-70 threat point (Nash), 54-56

prize/payoff, in game theory, 10, 81-83, 87-89,

95, 231

see also deterrence, in nuclear policy debate; government and game theory, introduction; Hobbesian anarchy; interpersonally transferable utility; Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD); selfish gene theory; Tit for Tat cooperation

“The Problem of Social Cost” (Coase), 209-210

Project Vista, 80

property rights. see Buchanan, James M.; consent; unanimity

prospect theory, 130

public choice theory, 6, 176, 206, 220-222 see also social contract

Raiffa, Howard, 32, 41-44, 146-147

RAND Corporation, 24, 75-76, 80-81 Rapoport, Anatol, 13, 274

rational choice theory, 72, 127-128, 159

see also consent; game theory; Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD); Nuclear Utilization Targeting Selection (NUTS); nuclearism

rational deterrence theory, xxvi, 11, 20, 67-68, 72, 78-79, 99, 112, 116

see also deterrence, in nuclear policy debate Rationalizing Capitalism Democracy (Amadae), 177

Rawls, John, 12-13, 15, 59, 201

Buchanan, comparison of views to, 202-203. see also social contract

difference principle, 189-191

on equality, 13

fair play, 133, 170, 182-184, 188

Theory of Justice, 170, 176, 182-184

Reagan, Ronald, 6, 81, 85

realism, 18-20, 105

see also defensive realism and game theory; offensive realism and game theory (Mearsheimer)

Realist-Cosmopolitan hybrid (Nye), 22 reciprocal altruism. see Tit for Tat cooperation “Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack”

(Schelling), 79, 86, 87-89, 96-98

Red Integrated Strategic Offensive Plan Version-5C (RISOP), 106, 109

rights of personhood. see no-harm principle

Rodgers, Daniel T., 8-9

Ross, Don, 3, 61, 69

Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 186

Russell, Bertrand, 74, 82

SALT treaties, 94, 95, 102-105

sanctity of person (Berlin), 15-16

Sandel, Michael, 6-7

Scarry, Elaine, xxii-xxiv

Schelling, Thomas, 112, 236-237

background of, 11

on collective action and reward, 231 defense of MAD, 69-73, 84-93, ⁱⁱ5-ⁱⁱ7 “Diplomacy of Violence,” 86 internality/externality, 231 legacy of, 96, 100-101

Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) Model (table), 49

on nuclearism, 21

preemption, 91

receives Nobel Prize for economics,

78-79

“Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack,” 79, 86, 87-89, 96-98

security dilemma model, 67-68

selection of Hiroshima/Nagasaki as target cities, 74, 76-79, 80

Stag Hunt (assurance) game, 114-115, 129-130, 134

submarine based missiles, 67, 116

“Surprise Attack and Disarmament,” 86, 87-89, 91

Vietnam War strategies and, 92-93 see also assurance, in nuclear policy debate Scherer, F.M., 79

Schlesinger, James R., 78-79, 81

on Carter, 107-108

under Carter presidency, 105-108, 112-113, 123-124

escalation dominance, 85, 112-113

flexible response doctrine, 21, 67, 80-83, 84-86, 103-105, 107, 118, 121

limited nuclear options (LNOs), 112-113

NSDM-242, 103-105

security of possession. see defensive realism and game theory

The Selfish Gene (Dawkins), 247, 252-257, 263, 269, 276

selfish gene theory

overview, 252-254, 291

Dawkins’ theory, 61, 252-263

ESS (evolutionary stability strategy), 247, 258-259, 260, 263, 265-266

game theory and, 257-263

Hawk-Dove (Chicken) game, 259-260 social implications of, 263-267 self-preservation principle, 118-119, 127-128,

ⁱ⁸5

Selten, Reinhard, 11, 51

Sen, Amartya K., 13, 128, 171-172

Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP),

84-85, 92, 103-105, 109, 121

Skyrms, Brian, 146

Smith, Adam, 8, 12-13, 15-16, 59

fair play, 133

invisible hand, 25, 239

minimal security state/night watchman state, 187, 220-222

neoliberalism, contrasted with, 241 no-harm principle/non-interference with personhood and property, 11-17, 84, 178

Posner, comparison of views to, 216

Smith, John Maynard, 259

Snidal, Duncan, 99

Snowden, Lanning, 44-49

Snyder, Glenn H., 78-79, 96-98

Snyder, Jack L., 77

social contract

overview, xxvii, 151, 175-176

Buchanan’s derivation of, from PD, 177-182 Buchanan’s Limits of Liberty and, 182-191 neoliberal vs. liberal social order, 182-191 summary conclusion, 290

soft power (Nye), 66

“Some Paradoxes of Deterrence” (Kavka), 136-138

Soviet Union, former

during Cold War bipolarity, 18, 84-86, 93-98

SALT treaties, 94, 95, 102-103

spasm warfare (Kahn), 80-83, 84

Stag Hunt (assurance) game, 34, 87-89, 114-115, 129-130, 134, 146, 161

States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and Social Order (Jasanoff), xxiv status quo point. see threat point (Nash) Stern, Nicholas H., 225-228

Steinbruner, John, 77

Stern Review Report on the Economics of Climate Change (2006), 225-228, 236-237, 242, 271

“Strategic Studies and its Critics” (Bull), 77 submarine based missiles, 67, 75, 91, 92-93, 94-95, 96-97, 116

Sugden, Robert, xviii

Summers, Lawrence, 207, 219, 241

“Surprise Attack and Disarmament” (Schelling), 86, 87-89, 91

Tang, Shiping, 95-96, 126, 127, 131

Taylor, Michael, 236-237

team reasoning, xviii, 19, 37-38, 126

Teller, Edward, 112

Thatcher, Margaret, 6

Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (von Neumann and Morgenstern), 8, 9, 19, 31-40^, 74^,ι29

Theory of Justice (Rawls), 170, 176, 182-184 Thermonuclear Monarchy: Choosing Between

DemocracyandDoom (Scarry), xxiii-xxiv threat point (Nash), 54-56

Thurow, Lester, 241

Tietz, Reinhard, 51-52

Tit for Tat cooperation

overview, xxviii-xxix, 27, 269-272, 291

ESS (evolutionary stability strategy), 247,

258-259, 260, 263, 265-266

The Evolution of Cooperation (Axelrod),

144-146, 269, 272, 276

PD indefinitely repeated game and, 272-279 Rapoport and, 274 rule following and, 279-280

Tit for Tat retaliation (Kahn), 79-84

Toxin Puzzle, 172

tragedy of the commons. see collective action “The Tragedy of the Commons” (G. Hardin), 228-230

Tuck, Richard, xxii-xxiii, 9, 14, 236

Tucker, Albert, 24

Tullock, Gordon, 177

unanimity

overview, xxvii-xxviii, 151, 193, 290 Buchanan’s defense of property rights and,

194-195

coercive bargaining and, 200-203 Coleman’s analysis of Buchanan/Wicksell, 196-200

summary conclusion, 203

unanimous agreement to terms, distinguished from, 194-195

United States (US)

during Cold War bipolarity, 18, 84-86,

93-98

nuclearized form of sovereignty, 98 Presidential Directive 18 (Carter), 109, 113 Presidential Directive 59 (Carter), 100,

108-109, 120-121

rational deterrence theory, xxvi

SALT treaties, 94, 95, 102-103

Vietnam War, 92-93

see also specific presidents, leaders and theorists

Varoufakis, Yanis, 3-4, 24, 34, 143, 158, 181 Vietnam War, 92-93

Volcker, Paul, 6

von Neumann, John

background of, xxiv

expected utility theory, 31-40

game theory legacy of, 73-76, 129 interpersonally transferable utility, 4, 27, 146, 230, 231, 265

Manhattan Project, xxiv, 65, 73-74 minimax rule, 126-127

minmax rule, 32, 38, 69-70, 74-75, 87-89

Posner, comparison of views to, 210

Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 8, 9, 19, 31-40, 74, 129

see also Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)

Wald, Abraham, 75

Wall Street Journal Republicanism, 6

war, introduction, 65-68

see also assurance, in nuclear policy debate; deterrence, in nuclear policy debate Washington Consensus, 6

Ways of War and Peace (Doyle, Tuck, and Scarry), xxii-xxiii

wealth maximization. see consent

Wealth of Nations (Smith), 241

Weber, Max, xvi

Wendt, Alexander, 153-154

What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (Sandel), 6-7

Wicksell, Knut, 196-200

Wicksell-Lindahl tax scheme, 196-200 Williamson, John, 6

Wohlstetter, Albert, 78-79, 81, 93, 107, 112 WSEG-50 study, 91-93

Zagare, Frank, 78-79

Zero Sum Society (Thurow), 241

1^{1 * 3 * *} With respect to the former point, a clear treatment is found in the “ 14 Indefinite Iteration,” entry

on “Prisoner’s Dilemma,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stephen Kuhn, 2014, accessed

January 5, 2015; on the second point, see Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games, and Debates (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), 184-185; the Prisoner’s Dilemma game does not necessarily have a symmetric payoff.

¹⁴ See, e.g., R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York: Wiley, 1958), 94-95; Luce and Raiffa wrote the early definitive text on game theory, and it retains its insightfulness today; see also Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis, Game Theory, 2004, 172-173.

¹⁵ Michael Bacharach investigates this manner of reasoning, which is distinct from the premise of individualistic maximization assumed in orthodox game theory, Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory, ed. by Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).

1 ⁶ Reasoning by symmetry is widely dismissed by game theorists, see Lawrence H. Davis, “Is the Symmetry Argument Valid?” in Campbell and Sowden, eds., Paradoxes of Rationality, 1985, 255-263; Ken Binmore views Kant’s categorical imperative as a variant on symmetrical reason­ing, which he refers to as magical thinking, Natural Justice, 2005, 63.

1^{1 2 * *}6 Mayberry, “The Notion of ‘Threat,’” 1967, 46.

12 ⁷ Luce and Raiffa provide an effective discussion of this material, Games and Decisions, 1957,

106-109.

¹²⁸ Mayberry, “The Notion of ‘Threat,’” 1967, 43.

1^{1 * 3}6 In axiomatizing quantum thermodynamics before axiomatizing strategic rationality, John von Neumann used the same symbolic designation for both the expected energy of quantum particles and for individuals expected utility, “EU”; see his Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).

1 ³⁷ Abraham H. Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Psychological Review (1943) 50:4, 370-396; George Simmel, The Philosophy of Money (London: Routledge Classics, 2011), 291.

¹³⁸ Bacharach, Beyond Individual Choice, 2006.

¹³⁹ Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982), VI.conl.2; for discussion, see Amadae, Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy, 2003, 215-216; see also Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, andMorality,” PhilosophyandPublicAffairs (1972) 1:1, 229-243, to see how the classical liberal approach to justice and political economy lingers into the neoliberal era.

1^{1 * 3} Max Horkheimer and Theodore W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York: Continuum Press, 1969). For discussion of the relationship between modernity and German National Socialism, see Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and

Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

1 ^{4 * *} This theme is central to S. M. Amadae, Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

¹⁵ See John Gaddis for a comprehensive history of the Cold War followed hard on the heels of

World War II; The Cold War: A New History (London: Penguin, 2006).

¹⁶ Robert Leonard, Von Neumann, Morgenstern, and the Creation of Game Theory: From Chess to Social Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

1 ⁷ See Leonard, “Mathematics and Social Order,” in ibid., 185-223.

1⁰⁸ Jervis, “Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence,” World Politics (1989), 41:2, 183-207, at 188.

¹⁰⁹ In his Nuclear Ethics (1986), Nye argues that a “realist-Cosmopolitian” synthesis is necessary to ensure the incorporation of humane values into international relations beyond pure instru­mental means, 34-41; see also Michale W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace 1997, 205-300.

¹¹⁰ Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive Realism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 50.

¹¹¹ Nye argues that to be effective nuclear deterrence should encompass both a purely rational set of considerations and nonrational considerations that provide the overall significance of national identity and existential ethos; Nuclear Ethics, 1986, 106-107.

11 ^{1 2} On realism's deferral to fungible value, see Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, 1997, 47.

¹¹³ Tuck argues that this concern was fundamental for the originators of classical liberalism; see The Rights of War and Peace, 1999, especially 1-15.

1^{1 2} Brian Skyrms reviews Hobbes’s state of nature in terms of a Stag Hunt, but he derives this view from a repeating Prisoner’s Dilemma (discussed in Chapter 11, “Tit for Tat”) and moreover reinforces a limited view on human agency discussed later in this chapter; Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1-6.

1 ³ See Jean Hampton, “The Knavish Humean,” in Rational Commitment and Social Justice, ed.

Jules L. Coleman, Christopher W. Morris, and Gregory S. Kavka (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 150-167; Gauthier, Logic of Leviathan, 1969, 79, 97.

1 ⁴ The best known are Gauthier, Logic ofLeviathan, 1969; Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, 1987; Gregory S. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Daniel Farrell, “Hobbes as Moralist,” Philosophical Studies (1985), 48, 257-283; Daniel Farrell, “Reason and Right in Hobbes’ Leviathan,” History of Philosophy Quarterly (1984), 1:3, 293-314; see also Taylor, Possibility of Cooperation, 1987.

1 ⁵ Chapter in The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960).

1^{1 * * * * 6} Hobbes, Leviathan, 1996, 88; Taylor explains his transferal of Hobbes’s fundamental motives of

human agents into the single criterion metric; Possibility of Cooperation, 1987, 138-144, note

that he argues that Hobbes’s motive of glory can be captured by relative versus absolute gains,

whereas others might attempt to capture it by reputation (viewing actors’ past performance as indications of their future performance, disregarding the fact that past correlation between a situation and an outcome cannot prove or guarantee future correlation).

¹⁷ Hobbes, Leviathan, 1996, 199; this passage is quoted by David Gauthier, Logic of Leviathan, 1969; Gauthier goes on to observe that this passage is as relevant to “nations as to individual men” because “agreement requires enforcement; enforcement requires power,” 210.

¹⁸ Recall that this preference matrix is considered characteristic of an intense security dilemma, arms races, disarmament, social trust, free riding, domestic labor, public goods, market exchange, bargaining, joining a trade union, corruption, the increasing inefficacy of antibiotics, and deciding to stand in a crowded stadium Shaun Hargreaves Heap and Yanis Varoufakis, Game Theory: A Critical Introduction, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2004), 175-180.

1^{1 * 3 * * *} Dawkins, “Introduction to the 30th Anniversary Edition,” 2009, ix. Note that the science of

evolution, often referred to as Darwinism, has dovetailed with theories of social progress or development from the time of Thomas R. Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population, 1798. See also Joseph Schumpeter, who coined the now popular neoliberal phrase “creative destruction” to refer to capitalist production; “Capitalism,” Encyclopaedia Britannica (London: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1946).

¹⁴ Philip Pettit provides sophisticated discussion of the analogous structure of explanation operating at the level of genes, physical bodies, individuals, and social groups; see “Functional Explanation and

Virtual Selection,” in his Rules, Reasons, and Norms (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 245-256.

¹⁵ For discussion of the pressures of individualistic selection toward narrow self-interest, and the attempt to investigate the possibility of group selection, see Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis, Game Theory, 2004, 248-249.

¹⁶ Dawkins, “Preface to the First Edition,” 1976/2009, xxi.

1 ⁷ Dawkins, Selfish Gene, 1976/2009, 4.