HOBBES’S FOOLE AND THE RATIONAL ACTOR

The contrast between these two opposite interpretations of Hobbes becomes manifestly apparent in the rational choice discussion of Hobbes’s Foole, who cannot see the reason for complying with an agreement after the other agent has already delivered, unless there is a direct reward or penalty forthcoming.

Rational choice theorists see Hobbes’s Foole as the prototypical rational actor because they interpret both the state of nature and life in a civil society to be best modeled by a single-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma among two actors, and therefore they question the logic by which it is best to cooperate if the other person does first.⁵⁰ Game theoretic logic dictates that in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, it is always best to defect, regardless of what the other actor chooses to do. Thus, either Hobbes’s reasoning must be made consistent with prudential considera­tions or it must be admitted that Hobbes transcends strategic logic in making his argument. The standard rational choice strategy is to consider that no one really has any reason to carry through in a single-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma, unless repeated encounters and personal reputation can be invoked. In the absence of either, it would be necessary to invoke either some long-term indirect prudential or moral considerations.⁵¹ Hobbes states his natural laws, which provide the rationale for abiding by promises made in distinction to actors’ pursuit of momentary desire.

Hobbes addresses two cases in which an individual is bound to carry through on a promise made that falls outside the social contract defended by the sovereign. One is the situation of the Foole, in which the other party has already complied with his side of an agreement in a state of nature.⁵² The other is the case of ransom in a state of nature wherein a conquering party releases a captive on the ground of his promising to pay a ransom.⁵³ The two situations are similar in that in each case, one party has already delivered on his side of an agreement. Hobbes thus makes clear that the difficulty of entering into and following through with agreements is the problem of assurance that the other will comply because personal compliance is a product of one’s own discretion. The sover­eign offers a guarantee by backing up others’ commitments with the threat of coercive sanctions. However, Hobbes is equally clear that a person, even the Foole, has a reason to fulfill his part of an agreement if the other party has already done so, independent of the sovereign’s sword. In other words, defer­ring momentarily and anachronistically to the vocabulary of game theory, Hobbes considers agreements to have more in common with an Assurance Game than a Prisoner’s Dilemma. He is explicit that after one’s partner in an

traditional reading of Hobbes is naive; see “Hobbes as Moralist,” Philosophical Studies (1985) 48^, 257-283.

⁵⁰ Russell Hardin, “Hobbesian Political Order,” Political Theory (1991), 19:2, 156-180; Hardin, “Utilitarian Logic of Liberalism,” Ethics (1986), 97:1, 47-74. Skyrms deviates from this con­sensus by viewing the state of nature and the situation of Hobbes’s Foole as an indefinitely repeated PD that has a payoff matrix that can be viewed as a Stag Hunt; Stag Hunt, 2004, 4-5.1 leave the repeated PD for discussion in Chapter ιι and leave aside Skyrms’s treatment of the Foole’s situation as indefinitely repeating because it is clear that according to Hobbes, there is no reason to anticipate that the Foole will indefinitely encounter the same partner in repeating circumstances.

⁵¹ On this point see Hampton, “The Knavish Humean,” 1998.

⁵² Hobbes, Leviathan, 1996, 101-102.

⁵³ Ibid., 98.

exchange has delivered, then it is consistent with reason to follow through on the terms one consented to.^[396]

Rather than presenting the Foole with a calculated tally of why he should obey in the interest of direct gain, Hobbes makes two points. First, although one cannot know whether or not an individual exchange will lead to a longer-term relationship, it is wise to follow through with agreements in case they do. But second, individuals who would make an agreement and not fulfill their part after others have done so are simply not fit for society. Hobbes thus reempha­sizes his points that civil society is far superior to a state of constant insecurity and that the condition for joining into civil society is obeying the requirements for peace by relinquishing the latitude to act on every passion and interest, and carrying out agreements made. The predicament is not a Prisoner’s Dilemma and would only appear to be so in the eyes of the Foole.

Hobbes provides additional reasoning that builds on what one can surmise is the perspective of either long-term prudence or the realization that through social interdependence, actors are better off behaving like the naturally coop­erative creatures that act as though they viewed realizing individual gain as a joint exercise.^[397] Hobbes additionally states his laws of nature, which he offers as an analytic set of truths anchored by empirical facts.^[398] As such, the laws of nature cannot provide a direct motive for action because they more resemble mathematical statements than passions including avarice, ambition, or lust that can animate people^[399]; rather, these laws stipulate the principles individuals should comply with to satisfy their overriding pursuit of secure livelihood.^[400] Any acts in accordance with these laws then, although not following from passionate motives derived from hope for direct gain, fear, or prestige are nonetheless recommended both because they will indirectly satisfy individuals’ goals and because they are consistent with the demands of natural law that stipulate the conditions that must obtain for peace to characterize relations.^[401]

Game theory reasons differently than Hobbes.

Furthermore, being the author of one’s own action - that is, making promises and serving as one’s own guarantor for them - is a key aspect of what distin­guishes a person from the “Children, Fooles, and Mad-Men” who do not have the faculty of reason and cannot serve as their own guardians.^[403] Hobbes admits that making a promise or contract can only provide a weak motive in comparison to the hope for material gain. However, the practice of entering into an agree­ment, once out of the state of nature, signifies having the intention to abide by terms and that one consents that they comport with one’s overarching desire to live in a civil society rather than a state of perpetual war. In taking this step, an individual acknowledges the self-incurred obligation, and thus offers to volunta­rily comply or to face punishment for reneging.^[404] Hobbes builds his argument for the feasibility of civil society up from the plausibility that two people can enter into agreements, so it is crucial for Hobbes that it is rational to carry out one’s own side of an agreement even after the other party has already done so.^[405]

It is radical that rational choice theory departs from Hobbes over the two- person bargain rather than the agents’ consent to absolute allegiance to the sovereign.

However, for the sake of argument, let us accept the rational choice reading of Hobbes that insecurity in a state of nature is best captured by one-play Prisoner’s Dilemmas, and that compliance with the sovereign would similarly resemble a one-play Prisoner’s Dilemma if sanctions were not threatened to alter the payoffs for defection.^[406] Even if agents enter into the terms of a contract, they all have the ever-present incentive to renege on their word. One way to plausibly construct this argument is to view the state of nature as an intense security dilemma in which agents’ security depends on both defensive and offensive acts. Allegiance to an absolute sovereign is the means for everyone to exit this precarious existence.^[407]

Still, once in the commonwealth, there are plenty of opportunities for a paradigmatic utility maximizer to prey on others, both in one-on-one relation­ships and in the relationship to the sovereign’s law.^[408] In rational choice theory, the response to both of these difficulties - that is, of cheating private citizens and breaking public law - is to impose penalties that alter individuals’ evaluation of outcomes. The solution becomes a maximal security state with the power to police all interactions and threaten punishment accordingly.

In articulating a response to the game theoretic, incentive-driven Foole who would “be willing to seize any ‘golden opportunities’ for immoral gain that come one’s way,” Patrick Neal concludes that the only counter is “the existence of a sovereign so powerful that each and every act of injustice could be found out and punished, and every citizen would know this, and hence never consider such an activity.”^[409] The deterrent power necessary to keep Hobbes’s Foole in line, to Neal, resembles the totalitarian regime described by George Orwell in 1984. Gregory Kavka, on the other hand, argues that all that is required to counter the Foole’s hope for illicit gain is sufficient uncertainty that he might be caught and punished. However, Kavka is quick to acknowledge that in the less- populated and non-anonymous British country life of the sixteenth century, this requirement was far less cumbersome than it would be in the faceless mass society of late modernity. He observes,

This is because in the modern world, people can expect to get away with their violations of core moral rules by simply picking up stakes and moving on after a few violations, and before they are likely to get caught. Thus, our mobile modern society is populated by a variety of robbers, scam-artists, and other blue- and white-collar criminals who seem to make a successful living out of exploiting and cheating others. And their conduct, under modern conditions, is perfectly sensible from a prudential perspective. They are living the life of Hobbes’ Foole and getting away with it, using the anonymity of the vast modern city, and the mobility offered by auto, train, bus, and airplane to provide them with an effective cloak of concealment as any offered by Gyges’ ring.^[410]

Kavka, like Neal, accepts that adopting the premise of rational agency in the contemporary world can only result in a peaceful civil society with the introduction of advanced policing technologies. For game theorists, there is no appropriate response to Hobbes’s Foole, or his contemporary counter­parts, besides an effective threat that noncompliance will be detected and punished.^[411]

A minimal security state rests on voluntary compliance with Hobbes’s first three laws of nature as a prudential measure to realize long-term interests. Agents are to cooperate when assured reciprocity, forgo acting on errant desires, and uphold commitments made. However, this type of agency runs counter to the principles of action formalized by noncooperative game theory. Even if we accept that the state of nature is best understood in terms of an Assurance Game, rather than an Assurance Dilemma or Prisoner’s Dilemma, rational choice theorists still tend to interpret living in civil society as a Prisoner’s Dilemma.^[412] Given the Prisoner’s Dilemma structure of cooperation, nothing prevents individuals from calculating that they can take advantage of others and free ride on others’ efforts to maintain a government. As no rational actor will voluntarily comply with the law, the government must threaten sanctions on hopeful predators.

The divergence between rational choice liberalism and the classic liberalism exemplified by Hobbes’s Leviathan over the role of the sword in establishing and maintaining social order becomes evident in John Rawls’s defense of fair play in his Theory of Justice.⁷¹ According to the principle of fair play, people have a duty aligned with their long-term prudential interests to abide by rules of conduct to which they consent ex ante, even if there are occasionally opportu­nities for self-gain by taking advantage of others.⁷² Fair play is similar in form to the commitment to keep one’s promises, especially if the other has already delivered. Rational choice theory and noncooperative game theory, on the other hand, adhere to John Nash’s view that coercive bargaining will necessarily trump so-called gentlemen’s agreements. To John Nash and other game theor­ists, individuals calculate how to maximize expected utility without artificial constraints, such as respect for others. In fact, noncooperative game theory presumes that individuals’ main modus operandi is to maximize expected threatening and maximizing against others when warranted by cost-benefit analysis of the personal consequences. As Don Ross incisively observed, non­cooperative game theory is well suited to tell us how best to kick a person down a hill.⁷³