Contents
List of Tables page x
ListofFigures xi
Acknowledgments xiii
Prologue xv
PRELIMINARIES
1 Neoliberalism 3
Defining Neoliberalism 5
RecallingciassicalLiberalism ii
Neoliberalism and Nuclearized Sovereignty 17
2 Prisoner’s Dilemma 24
The Standard Narrative 28
A More Formal Presentation 31
Prisoner’s Dilemma Pedagogy and Neoliberal Subjectivity 41
Noncooperative Game Theory and the Shift to Coercive Bargaining 49 conclusion 58
PART I: WAR
Introduction 65
3 Assurance 69
Brief History of Game Theory 73
Rational Deterrence and Game Theory’s Ascendance 76
Kahn’s Defense of Nuclear Use Theory (NUTS) 79
Schelling’s Defense of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) 84
Early US Responses to Strategic Nuclear Parity 93
Conclusion 96
4 Deterrence 99
NUTS and the Triumph of Prisoner’s Dilemma Logic 102
Carter’s Conversion from MAD to NUTS 105
Carter’s Nuclear Security Dilemma 111
The Inescapable Irrationality of MAD 122
The Tacit Alliance between Offensive Realism and Game Theory 125 TheRoadNotTaken 135
Conclusion 138
vii
PART II: GOVERNMENT
Introduction 143
5 HobbesianAnarchy 153
Hobbes’s Leviathan and the Prisoner’s Dilemma 156
TraditionalHobbes i6i
Hobbes’s Foole and the Rational Actor 164
Conclusion 170
6 Social Contract 175
Buchanan’s Social Contract and the Prisoner’s Dilemma 177
Buchanan’s Neoliberalism vs.
Rawls’s Classical Liberalism 182Coercion vs. Inclusion 188
Conclusion 192
7 Unanimity 193
Unanimity vs. Unanimous Agreement to Terms 194
Unanimity Scrutinized 196
Coercive Bargaining and Unanimity 200
Conclusion 203
8 Consent 205
Consent in Posner’s System of Justice as Wealth Maximization 207
Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency: No Need to Compensate Losers 212
Neoliberalism’s Equation of Ex Ante and Ex Post Consent 216
Conclusion 220
9 Collective Action 224
A Planetary Prisoner’s Dilemma: Game Theory Meets Global
Warming 225
The Strategically Rational Failures of Collective Action 228
The Imperceptibility of Mancur Olson’s Logic
of Collective Action 232
The Malevolent Backhand of Neoliberal Governance 236
Conclusion 242
PART III: EVOluTION
Introduction 247
10 Selfish Gene 252
Dawkins’s Selfish Gene Theory 254
Selfish Gene Theory and Game Theory 257
Social Implications of Selfish Gene Theory 263
Conclusion 267
it TitforTat 269
Almost Unlocking the Repeating Prisoner’s Dilemma 272
Tit for Tat and Rule Following 279
Conclusion 280
CONCLUSION
12 PaxAmericana 285
Neoliberal Political Philosophy 288
RetrospectiveandProspective 291
Resisting Neoliberal Subjectivity 294
Bibliography 297
Index 325
Tables
1 Matrix Representation of Prisoner’s Dilemma page 30
2 Iconic Cold War Arms Race Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 34
3 Cold War Arms Race Modeled as Stag Hunt 34
4 Prisoner’s Dilemma Game “G” 41
5 Prisoner’s Dilemma Game “H” 42
6 High-Stakes Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 44
7 Nuclear Security Dilemma Modeled as Prisoner’s Dilemma 49
8 Neoliberal Car Sale: Exchange Modeled as Prisoner’s Dilemma 50
9 Tragedy of the Commons Modeled as Prisoner’s Dilemma 230
Figures
1 Ongoing Engagement with Prisoner’s Dilemma, 1950-2010 page 25
2 Nash Bargaining Solution as Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 53
3 NuclearChickenGameMatrix 82
4 NuclearChickenGameDiagram 83
5 Stag Hunt Game Matrix 88
6 Stag Hunt Game Diagram 88
7 Schelling’s Prisoner’s Dilemma Payoff Matrix Derived
from Stag Hunt 89
8 MAD Payoff Matrix 90
9 MAD Payoff Diagram 90
10 Rational Choice Concept of Hobbes’s State of Nature 160
11 Neoliberal Governance 160
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