carter’s conversion from mad to NUTS
Carter’s presidency offers a pivotal case study of how the NUTS military stance came to win the intellectual and policy debate. Of all presidents, we would expect Carter to maintain a deterrent posture consistent with the classical liberal stance of peace for peace and war for war, defying the Prisoner’s Dilemma model of the nuclear security dilemma.
In the PD model of the security dilemma, each actor assures the other of his intention to pursue dominance even if guaranteed the other’s peaceful cooperation. In his monograph Carter’s Conversion: The Hardening of US Defense Policy, Brian Auten investigates Carter’s transformation from being opposed to fighting the Cold War via military might to openly embracing this hard-line position.[260] Auten argues that Carter’s defense team members came to appreciate the wisdom of NUTS and a combative defense policy because, over their time in office, they learned to grasp the strategic realities validating the offensive neorealist approach to international relations.[261] According to Auten, Carter’s team came to comprehend the actual constellation of power dynamics and material facts comprising global security and shifted its defensive posture accordingly. Although Auten is correct that an offensive realist perspective came to dominate Carter’s White House, the source of this transformation was not factual and logical truths but rather James R. Schlesinger’s doctrine, as his flexible response, escalation control, approach is referred to.As a seasoned chief executive officer with prior experience leading the US Department of Defense, Schlesinger had the ability get his perspective heard and implemented.[262] Schlesinger’s approach has signature features consistent with strategic rationality. In 1967, he argued that the United States must assert hegemony over its allies.
17 Of course he had already played the pivotal role in implementing the flexible response nuclear posture as President Nixon’s Secretary of Defense. He advocated the single criterion means of appraising value consistent with rational choice theory and was well aware of how it departed from the constrained maximization characterizing neoclassical economic theory.[263] [264] And as a RAND analyst, he was thoroughly familiar with wargaming simulations that applied strategic rationality in the way anticipated to guide actual decision making in time of war. The simulated war game buttressing the Carter administration’s rationale for moving decisively beyond MAD to NUTS, called the “Red Integrated Strategic Offensive Plan Version-5 C, ” stated this claim outright: “The RISOP is built on an annual basis as a hypothetical Soviet counterpart to the SIOP... The RISOP is not a lightly disguised version of the real thing. It is the result of an operational planning exercise in which we apply capabilities in ways in which we believe to be in their best interests.”[265] The memorandum putting forward the implications of this simulation demonstrates the need for a new, land-based ICBM system, states that assured destruction is equivalent to a “1914 war plan,” calls for war-fighting capability in case deterrence fails, and demands crisis bargaining capability.[266] In preparing to engage in nuclear warfare, the simulations provided the basis for the actual strategies that would be implemented.Archival documents reveal Schlesinger to be a key figure in Carter’s administration. Corroborating the view that Schlesinger’s strategic perspicacity was only possibly eclipsed by his administrative acumen, President Carter had initially hoped to appoint Schlesinger to be his incoming Secretary of Defense. However, he soon realized that Schlesinger would not pass muster among his more liberal cabinet nominees and advisors.
He thus chose to appoint Schlesinger to head the Department of Energy (DOE), which he created in August 1977. Like the Department of Defense, the DOE was responsible for managing atomic secrets and materials. Regarding the DOE’s role, despite any congressional attempts to limit it, Schlesinger observes, “They are going to continue to produce nuclear fuel, and only the government can do that. They are going to produce a hell of a lot of nuclear weapons and do the research and development on nuclear weapons and the national labs are going to stay within the Department of Energy.”[267]Whereas Carter was attracted to Schlesinger because of his former tenure under President Nixon as Secretary of Defense and had a general idea of his strategic view of international affairs and military security, he was likely unaware that Schlesinger had been a virtual fellow traveler with the ultra-hawks of the Committee on Present Danger (CPD): Paul Nitze, Albert Wohlstetter, Richard Pipes, and Colin Gray.[268] This privately organized circle of defense analysts would burden Carter’s attention throughout his term in office. In 1976, Schlesinger had ties to this pro-nuclear-use advocacy alliance, yet he determined that maintaining his distance from this organization gave him more independence as a government official and freedom from branding that could compromise his effectiveness by mere association.[269] Schlesinger’s particular form of pro-nuclear strategy took the linguistic form of escalation control, instead of escalation dominance, although the two positions are indistinguishable once implemented.[270]
Thus, close inspection thus verifies that a prominent member of Carter’s cabinet with extraordinary bureaucratic sagacity was a leading proponent of flexible response.[271] Schlesinger noted that “unlike most of the people in the Cabinet,” he had a relationship with Carter characterized by a “degree of intimacy...
and rapport” and that the president “tended to regard [him] as a universal authority.”[272] Indeed, on exiting Carter’s administration, Schlesinger openly expressed both his incredulity at the “weak and parochial” nature of Carter’s incoming White House staff and his assessment that he stood head and shoulders above everyone with respect to his own experience, knowledge, and Washington connections.[273]Additional archival evidence further suggests that Schlesinger’s fingerprints are on the contents of PD 59. Carter’s closest cabinet confidant and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski relied on his military assistant and crisis coordinator, General William Odom, to consult with Schlesinger as a “source of support.”28 Brzezinski personally wrote to Carter stating, “The basic direction toward more flexibility was set by the Schlesinger effort in 1974 which led to NSDM-242.”29 And perhaps the most telling archival evidence is that not only did Brzezinski’s staff denigrate Secretary of Defense Brown, but that it was the National Security Advisor who drafted PD 59, and not Secretary Brown as is typically assumed because of the auspices of his office.30 The internal Carter administration documents reveal that behind Carter’s back, Brzezinski “dragged Brown along on this PD [ 59']-”3' Brzezinski’s team referred to
view early on, and it did not change in the... let’s say, for the first six or seven months that I knew him. After a while it became clear to me, regrettably, that the lack of experience that I had initially undervalued just was very important, and could not be rapidly repaired even in the Presidency,” p. 9.
28 E.g., William Odom, March 17, 1978, NLC-12-53-5-12-2, JCPL; see mention about “kibitzed with Jim on PRM-38”; Fritz Ermarth’s report to Brzezinski, October 5, 1978, NLC-17-51-1-7- 9, JCPL, p. 2 of 4, note this memorandum covers a lot of key areas of nuclear policy; another memorandum from David Aaron to Brzezinski, July 25, 1978, reports “Hunter consulted with Vic and Jim on PRM-38,” p.
1 of 1, NLC-10-13-6-9-1, JCPL. Schlesinger, “Interview with Dr. James R. Schlesinger,” 1984, 58.29 Brzezinski’s memorandum to President Carter urging him to endorse PD 59 makes clear that this directive is directly continuous with NSDM-242, July 24, 1980, subject “Nuclear Targeting Policy,” “5/80-1/81,” Box 35, Brzezinski Collection, JCPL.
30 This attribution acknowledges that it seems inconsistent with Brown’s views stated throughout his role in Carter’s administration, Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, 1983, 382-386; Herken, Counsels of War, 1985, 298-302. Regarding Brzezinski’s hands-on involvement with crafting PD 59, see Memo, Harold Brown, to the President, Subject: “Nuclear Targeting Policy Review,” date unclear, pp. 1-4; “8/78-4/79,” Box 35, Brzezinski Collection, JCPL; Special Coordination Committee Meeting Notes, April 4, 1979, pp. 1-9, “8/78-4/79,” Box 35, Brzezinski Collection, JCPL; and Brzezinski’s memorandum to the President, date unclear, but providing a synopsis and action plan based on the Special Coordination Committee, with specific reference to “(1) stable deterrence? (2) stable crisis bargaining? And (3) effective war management?” “8/78-4/79,” Box 35, Brzezinski Collection, JCPL; a memorandum from Vic Utgoff to Brzezinski, April 5, 1979, “8/78-4/79,” Box 35, Brzezinski Collection, JCPL, makes clear what guidance Brzezinski’s team was providing to Harold Brown. As well, Brzezinski had discussions among his staff on drafts of PD 59 on how to proceed with winning its acceptance by Carter as well as the specific wording to be used in the text of the presidential directive; see William E. Odom to Brzezinski, March 22, 1980, “5/80-1/81,” Box 35; note also strategy document by Fritz Ermarth to Jasper Welch and Victor Utgoff, on the subject, “Countervailing Strategy and the Targeting Problem,” March 20, 1980, seeking “a concept for dealing with its [strategic competition] worst contingency,” with respect to how to get PD-59 past Brown and signed by Carter, “In my view, this more comprehensive approach would move the doctrinal process across a broad front at a time when we are unlikely to get Harold Brown or the President to sign on to a directive that is broad enough and innovative enough to generate real progress.
If we take this comprehensive approach now, then we may be ready for a real PD in early 1981.” Page 1 of 2, “3/80-4/80,” Box 35, Brzezinski collection, JCPL.31 Memo from William E. Odom to Brzezinski, July 24, 1980, “Targeting PD Briefing for the President,” notes that “flexibility,” “targeting categories,” and “acquisition policy” sections reflect Brzezinski’s nuclear strategy perspectives and not Brown’s.
“Brown’s view of our defense posture a rudderless ship piloted by a bland [sic] man.”32 Brzezinski’s staff clearly drafted PD 59 and strategized to gain Secretary Brown’s and the President’s final approval for the directive.33 By the end of Carter's term, offensive realism, in the form of NUTS, would become official policy.34
The differences between Secretary of Defense Brown's strategic stance and that of Secretary of Energy Schlesinger and National Security Advisor Brzezinski are vivid and apparent in drafts of the ensuing presidential directive and the US nuclear targeting policy. Brown held that “a full-scale thermonuclear exchange would constitute an unprecedented disaster for the Soviet Union and for the United States,” and that there could be no guarantee whatsoever that even a “tightly controlled use of the strategic forces for larger purposes could be kept from escalating to a full-scale nuclear war.”35 Brzezinski’s team redrafts the presidential directive to further its goals. It seeks the flexibility and “ability to design nuclear employment plans on short notice in response to the latest and changing circumstances” not limited by (1) stipulated “pre-planned options,” (2) prior attack, or (3) potential collateral damage.36 Thus, it views engaging in nuclear conflict as thinkable and winnable, retains the first-right to engage in nuclear warfare, and seeks leverage to bargain acceptable terms in favor of the United States. It rejects Thomas Schelling's limited nuclear option
32 The entire section reads, “Today I saw for the first time a copy ofBrown’s posture statement in its final form. I was staggered by it. Last year it marched to the tune of PD-18. From this year’s version it is impossible to infer the existence of PD-18. Not only does it lack a coherence which only a national and military strategic [stet] can import, but many of its meandering sections are anti-strategy and anti-doctrine musings. I don't know who cleared the thing on our staff but he did not bring the outlines of PD-18 to bear on it. If I were a member of Congress, I would call Brown’s view...,” memo, William E. Odom, to Brzezinski, Jan. 29, 1979, NLC-12-21-9-11-4, JCPL, p. 2 of 2. See also, memo, from William E. Odom to Brzezinski, July 24, 1980, “5/80-1/ 81,” Box 35,Brzezinski Collection, JCPL; note that Odom states that Brown’s reticence was not revealed to Carter. Furthermore, it is clear that Brzezinski had Odom working on a draft of PD 59; memo from William E. Odom to Brzezinski, March 22, 1980, subject “Draft PD on Nuclear Targeting,” see p. 3 of 5 with additional discussion of strategy to bring Brown on board the directive, at p. 5, “3/80-4/80,” Box 35, Brzezinski Collection, JCPL.
33 See Memo from William E. Odom and Jasper Welch to Brzezinski, March 25, 1980, subject, “Nuclear Targeting Policy,” and follow-up memorandum by same authors to Bzezinski, March 26, 1980, subject, “Targeting Policy”; “3/80-4/80,” Box 35, Brzezinski Collection, JCPL. Indeed, Brown's role was merely to suggest some revisions on Brzezinski's draft of PD 59; see memo from William Odom and Jasper Welch to Brzezinski, April 17, 1980, Subject, “Draft PD on Nuclear Employment Policy,” one-page memo, with nine pages of draft and commentary; “3/80-4/80,” Box 35, Brzezinski Collection, JCPL.
34 Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, 1983, 384-385.
35 Chapter 5, “The Nuclear Capabilities,” draft of “Targeting Policy,” p. 69, attached to memo from Brzezinski to the Secretary of Defense, undated, but requests a response by April 4, 1980, and a cover memorandum is dated April 9, 1980, “3/80-4/80,” Box 35, Brzezinski Collection, JCPL.
36 These three points are numbered 3, and 6, 10, pages hand labeled 7E 1 and 2, attached to memo from William E. Odom and Jasper Welch to Brzezinski, dated March 25, 1980, “3/80-4/80,” Box 35, Brzezinski Collection, JCPL; April 4, 1980, “3/80-4/80,” Box 35, Brzezinski Collection, JCPL. of achieving controlled escalation through “psycho-political effects,” which in its view characterized NSDM-242 rather than to uphold “the First Principle of War... that is, destroy the enemy’s army or its ability to fight” in view of our “scarce [and vulnerable]... nuclear weapons” over “days, and weeks... or months” to ensure destruction of our opponent and vie to secure US survivability and recovery.”[274] Additionally, whereas the benefit of NUTS, at least from the perspective of prospective public evaluation, had been to take innocent populations out of harm’s way, the Brzezinski plan clearly “retain[s] this citybusting opinion in the pre-planned options section,” which was intentionally redacted from PD 59’s release to make it more palatable for those who would question its superiority to assured destruction.[275]
Carter’s indefinite postponement of the neutron bomb project in March 1978 further substantiates the narrative that he came into office supporting Schelling's nuclear strategy of assured destruction relying on retaining counterstrike capability through submarine-based missiles.[276] This action makes obvious Carter's aversion to the militant hard-line position consistent with NUTS strategic doctrine of flexible response, which treats nuclear weapons as conventional weapons and seeks to maintain escalation control by exerting asymmetric advantage. Carter's action went against the advice of all his national security advisors, individually and collectively.[277] Carter shocked and dismayed his national security team by standing against this anti-populace, building-preserving, nuclear warhead. The president's national security corps thought that Carter had no grasp of military strategy, and they felt disrupted, stymied, and embarrassed by what to them seemed to be his uncomprehending and solo intervention.[278] The neutron bomb was integral to Schlesinger's strategy of flexible response that treated nuclear weapons as conventional arms, and it was particularly suited to achieve extended nuclear deterrence to afford Europe protection from a potential Soviet invasion. Here the concepts underlying MAD and NUTS differ on how to maintain effective deterrence, with the former looking to manipulating the risk of engaging in nuclear war, and the latter treating force as well calibrated with predictable consequences.[279]
Schlesinger referred to this as “the neutron bomb fiasco” and stated that the president was “kind of blind on natural security problems.”[280] Clear about his impact on Carter’s administration, Schlesinger states that in his role overseeing the Department of Energy, “ultimately, in November of ’78, I got presidential approval - it was announced - of the production of the components of the neutron bomb,” meaning that in fact “although you don’t have a prompt neutron bomb capability, you are six hours away from having neutron bomb capability.”[281] Schlesinger was well aware of his active perpetuation of flexible response, which this enhanced radiation weapon exemplified. He further observes,
I have been a patron of enhanced radiation warheads since my days at RAND, subsequently my days at the Atomic Energy Commission, and I called for deployment when I was Secretary of Defense, and ultimately produced the components as Secretary of Energy, so I have a consistent, although in the eyes of some, a somewhat checkered career on this subject.[282]
Even after Schlesinger left Carter’s administration in August 1979, he “worked with [Senator] Sam Nunn to put to use the President’s expenditures from the administration on national security.”[283]