When one speaks of a linguistic zone, it is often assumed that the zone in question is likely to display a stronger unity than that of a mere cultural zone.
For example, the Chinese cultural zone includes many peoples and countries that do not share Chinese as their language, and therefore possesses its own potentially divisive sub-zones.
In contrast, the German linguistic zone brings to mind a whole geography, much of which was occupied by the Austrian Empire as well as what would become Germany by way of unification. Politically divided, this zone nevertheless has had a lot in common culturally. If economic thought developed with a strong Historical School accent in Germany while the Austrians launched their own version of the marginal revolution, there was significant interaction, in fact a Methodenstreit across the border. Without one, the other would not have been the same. This is most true when the methodological sophistication of Austrian economists vis-a-vis other neoclassical economists is taken into consideration.This is what we might refer to as the linguistic zone effect in this particular case. If we take the German linguistic zone as a model, we will observe that the Turkic linguistic zone deviates from it significantly. What defines the loose unity of the Turkic linguistic zone are, first, the preponderance of a family of related languages that display important variations, and second, the occasional interaction of physically mobile and ethnically related populations. This zone did not constitute an integrated economic space, even though it had been en route to historic longdistance links that helped diffuse a certain culture of business practices, usually correlated with diaspora ethnic and/or religious communities. As it will become clear from the rest of the discussion, as far as economic thought is concerned, the dissemination and interaction of economic ideas across this geography remained rather limited, and whenever it occurred, far from being direct, it was mediated through a zone of greater influence, be that Russia — with its rich intellectual heritage in general and its experience with the dissemination of European economic ideas in particular (Barnett and Zweynert, 2008) — or the contemporary global political economic order — with its straightjacket.
In other words, either the field of interaction was external or the influence and interaction were indirect. In this sense, here we are faced with a case that does not quite fit. Even so, approaching the issue from this viewpoint casts a different light on the case under study that sharpens certain features that would otherwise have been easily overlooked in a standard national narrative that takes as its geographical reference South Eastern Europe of which Turkey is a natural extension.The Republic of Turkey as a sovereign nation-state was founded in 1923 as the major successor of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman Empire, the foundation of which as an offshoot of a tribal Turkic principality (beylik) bordering the Byzantine Empire is dated back to 1299. It was only after the conquest of Istanbul in 1453, that the imperial status of this formation became incontestable. Before then, it was an heir to both Central Asian nomadic tribal and Middle Eastern Islamic imperial traditions. After 1453, it also became the heir to the Eastern Roman Empire. As such, its ancient and medieval Mediterranean characteristics became all the more pronounced. Its institutions were hybrid in many ways (Koprulu, 1931), and its structure highly complex, not only because it was an heir to variegated imperial traditions, but also because it was territorially much expanded to cover a vast geography. The Roman heritage was also of critical importance for differentiating the Ottoman Empire from the rest of the Turkic zone.
Whereas Central Asia has been home to the successive rise and fall of short-lived tribal nomadic empires, in sharp contrast, the Ottoman Empire changed its character thoroughly after 1453 and persisted well into the twentieth century because of this “Roman” input. The Ottoman Empire was classified as a world power during the latter part of “the long sixteenth century” when it contested its archrival the Habsburg Empire over Mediterranean hegemony. During its classical period, the Ottoman state was relatively strong vis-a-vis society and center (Istanbul) prevailed over the vast periphery.
One could conceive that the Ottoman Empire combined a feudal-like social and economic structure with a centralized and strong state. This meant a primarily feudal-like agrarian economy that was nevertheless monetized in conjunction with a strong long-distance trade. Moreover, this economic system relied on the import of precious metals that served as means of exchange. During this period, economic life was subject to rules and regulations designed according to social and political needs. Economic policy favored longdistance trade over industry, whereas the main source of wealth and political and military power was vested in land. The territorial expansion of the Ottoman Empire brought with it greater economic wealth (Inalcik, 1970; Braudel, 1984). Economy was embedded not only in society but also remained as an ancillary to state's ultimate expansionary ends.