References and further reading

Alchian, A.A. (1950), ‘Uncertainty, evolution and economic theory’, Journal of Political Economy, 58 (3), 211-12.

Alchian, A.A. and H. Demsetz (1972), ‘Production, information costs, and economic organization’, American Economic Review, 62 (5), 777-95.

Baumol, W.J. (1959), Business Behavior, Value and Growth, New York: Macmillan.

Berle, A.A. and G.C. Means (1932), The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York: Macmillan. Cantillon, R. (1755), Essai sur la Nature du Commerce en General, reprinted 1931, H. Higgs (ed.), London: Macmillan.

Chamberlin, E.H. (1933), The Theory of Monopolistic Competition; A Re-Orientation of the Theory of Value, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Chandler, A. (1962), Strategy and Structure, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Coase, R.H. (1937), ‘The nature of the firm’, Economica, 4 (16), 386-405.

Coase, R.H. (1960), ‘The problem of social cost’, Journal of Law and Economics, 3 (October), 1-44.

Coase, R.H. (1988), ‘The nature of the firm: origin, meaning, influence’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 4 (1), 3-47.

Commons, J.R. (1934), Institutional Economics. Its Place in Political Economy, New York: Macmillan.

Cyert, R.M. and J.G. March (1963), A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Dosi, G., D.J. Teece and S.G. Winter (1992), ‘Towards a theory of corporate coherence: preliminary remarks’, in G. Dosi, R. Giannetti and P.A. Toninelli (eds), Technology and Enterprise in a Historical Perspective, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 185-211.

Fama, E.F. (1980), ‘Agency problems and the theory of the firm’, Journal of Political Economy, 88 (2), 288-307.

Fama, E.F. and M.C. Jensen (1983), ‘Separation of ownership and control’, Journal of Law and Economics, 26 (2), 301-25.

Foss, N.J. (1994), ‘The two Coasian traditions’, Review of Political Economy, 6 (1), 37-61.

Friedman, M. (1953), ‘The methodology of positive economics’, Essays in Positive Economics, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 3-43.

Grossman, S.J. and O.D. Hart (1986), ‘The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical and lateral integration’, Journal of Political Economy, 94 (4), 691-719.

Hall, R.L. and C.J. Hitch (1939), ‘Price theory and business behaviour’, Oxford Economic Papers, 2 (1), 12-45. Hart, O. and J. Moore (1990), ‘Property rights and the nature of the firm,’ Journal of Political Economy, 98 (6), 1119-58.

Hicks, J.R. and R.G.D. Allen (1934), ‘A reconsideration of the theory of value’, Economica, 1 (1), 52-76.

Hodgson, G.M. (1988), Economics and Institutions: A Manifesto for a Modern Institutional Economics, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hodgson, G.M. (1998), ‘Competence and contract in the theory of the firm’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 35 (2), 179-201.

Jensen, M.C. and W.H. Meckling (1976), ‘Theory of the firm: managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (4), 305-60.

Klein, B., R.A. Crawford and A.A. Alchian (1978), ‘Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process’, Journal of Law and Economics, 21 (2), 297-326.

Knight, F.H. (1921), Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, New York: August M. Kelley.

Langlois, R. (1992), ‘External economies and economic progress: the case of the microcomputer industry’, Business History Review, 66 (1), 1-50.

Leibenstein, H. (1987), Inside the Firm, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Lester, R.A. (1946), ‘Shortcomings of marginal analysis for wage-employment problems’, American Economic Review, 36 (1), 63-82.

Loasby, B.J. (1999), ‘Marshall’s theory of the firm’, in R.E. Backhouse and J. Creedy (eds), From Classical Economics to the Theory of the Firm: Essays in Honour of D.P. O’Brien, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, pp.175-93.

Machlup, F.

Machlup, F. (1967), ‘Theories of the firm: marginalist, behavioral, managerial’, American Economic Review, 57 (1), 1-33.

March, J.G. and H.A. Simon (1958), Organizations, New York: Wiley.

Marglin, S. (1974), ‘What do bosses do? The origins and functions of hierarchy in capitalist production’, Review of Radical Political Economics, 6 (2), 60-112.

Marris, R. (1964), The Economic Theory of‘Managerial’ Capitalism, London: Macmillan.

Marshall, A. (1890), Principles of Economics, 9th edn 1961, G.W. Guillebaud (ed.), London: Macmillan. Marshall, A. (1919), Industry and Trade, 4th edn 1923, London: Macmillan.

Mill, J.S. (1848), Principles of Political Economy, 7th edn 1909, W.J. Ashley (ed.), London: Longmans, 1909. Mongin, P. (1997), ‘The marginalist controversy’, in J. Davis, W. Hands and U. Maki (eds), Handbook of Economic Methodology, Cheltenham, UK and Lyme, NH, USA: Edward Elgar, pp. 558-62.

Nelson, R.R. and S.G. Winter (1982), An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Penrose, E.T. (1959), The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Oxford: Blackwell.

Pigou, A.C. (1912), Wealth and Welfare, London: Macmillan.

Pigou, A.C. (1932), The Economics of Welfare, 4th edn, London: Macmillan.

Powell, W.W. (1990), ‘Neither market nor hierarchy: network forms of organization’, Research in Organizational Behavior, 12, 295-336.

Richardson, G.B. (1972), ‘The organisation of industry’, Economic Journal, 82 (327), 883-96.

Robinson, E.A.G. (1931), The Structure of Competitive Industry, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Robinson, J. (1933), The Economics of Imperfect Competition, 2nd edn 1969, London: Macmillan.

Say, J.-B. (1803), Traitc d’Economie Politique ou Simple Exposition de la Manicre dont se Forment, se Distribuent ou se Consomment les Richesses, English trans. 1964, A Treatise on Political Economy: or the Production, Distribution and Consumption of Wealth, New York: A.M.

Schumpeter, J.A. (1911), The Theory of Economic Development, trans. R. Opie (1934), Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Schumpeter, J.A. (1942), Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York: Harper.

Simon, H.A. (1955), ‘A behavioral model of rational choice’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69 (1), 99-118.

Simon, H.A. (1991), ‘Organization and markets’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5 (2), 25-44.

Smith, A. (1776), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 2 vols, reprinted 1976, R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner and W.B. Todd (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stiglitz, J.E. (1974), ‘Incentives and risk sharing in sharecropping’, Review of Economic Studies, 41 (2), 219-55.

Teece, D.J. (1982), ‘Towards an economic theory of the multi-product firm’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3 (1), 39-64.

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Veblen, T.B. (1923), Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in Recent Times: The Case of America, New York: Huebsch.

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Williamson, O.E. (1964), The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Williamson, O.E. (1975), Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York: Free Press.

Williamson, O.E. (1979), ‘Transaction-cost economics: the governance of contractual relations’, Journal of Law and Economics, 22 (2), 233-61.

Williamson, O.E. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: Free Press.