References and further reading

Anand, P., P.K. Pattanaik and C. Puppe (eds) (2009), The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Arrow, K.J. (1950), ‘A difficulty in the concept of social welfare’, Journal of Political Economy, 58, 328-46.

Arrow, K.J. (1951), Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd edn 1963, New York: Wiley.

Arrow, K.J. and T. Scitovsky (eds) (1969), Readings in Welfare Economics, Homewood, IL: Irwin.

Arrow, K.J., A.K. Sen and K. Suzumura (eds) (2002), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 1, Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Arrow, K.J., A.K. Sen and K. Suzumura (eds) (2010), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 2, Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Austen-Smith, D. and J.S. Banks (1999), Positive Political Theory I, Collective Preference, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Balinski, M. and H.P. Young (1982), Fair Representation. Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Baumol, W.J. and C.A. Wilson (eds) (2001), Welfare Economics, vol. 1, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.

Bentham, J. (1789), An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, reprinted 1970, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bergson, A. (1938), ‘A reformulation of certain aspects of welfare economics’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 52 (3), 310-34, and in K.J. Arrow and T. Scitovsky (eds) (1969), Readings in Welfare Economics, Homewood, IL: Irwin, pp. 7-38.

Black, D. (1948), ‘On the rationale of group decision making’, Journal of Political Economy, 56 (1), 23-34.

Black, D. (1958), The Theory of Committees and Elections, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, revd 2nd edn, I. Mac Lean, A. McMillan and B.L. Monroe (eds), Boston, MA: Kluwer.

Borda, J.-C. de (1784), ‘Memoire sur les elections au scrutin’, in Histoire de l’Academie des Sciences pour 1781, Paris: Imprimerie Royale, pp.

Bru, B. and P. Crepel (eds) (1994), Condorcet. Arithmetique politique: Textes rares et inedits, Paris: Institut National d’Etudes Demographiques.

Condorcet, M.J.A-N. de C., Marquis de (1785), Essai sur l’application de l’analyse a laprobabilite des decisions rendues a la pluralite des voix, Paris: Imprimerie Royale.

Condorcet, M.J.A.-N. de C., Marquis de (1986), Sur les Elections et Autres Textes, Paris: Fayard.

Diamond, P. (1967), ‘Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility: comment’, Journal of Political Economy, 75 (5), 765-6.

Dowding, K. and M. van Hees (2009), ‘Freedom of choice’, in P. Anand, P.K. Pattanaik and C. Puppe (eds), The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 374-92.

Dummett, M. (1984), Voting Procedures, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dummett, M. (1997), Principles of Electoral Reform, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dummett, M. (2005), ‘The work and life of Robin Farquharson’, Social Choice and Welfare, 25 (2-3), 475-83. Dummett, M. and R. Farquharson (1961), ‘Stability in voting’, Econometrica, 29 (1), 33-43.

Emerson, P. (ed.) (2007), Designing an All-Inclusive Democracy, Heidelberg: Springer.

Farquharson, R. (1969), Theory of Voting, Oxford: Blackwell.

Fleurbaey, M., M. Salles and J.A. Weymark (eds) (2008), Justice, Political Liberalism, and Utilitarianism. Themes from Harsanyi and Rawls, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gaertner, W. (2001), Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gaertner, W. (2005), ‘De jure naturae et gentium: Samuel von Pufendorf’s contribution to social choice theory and economics’, Social Choice and Welfare, 25 (2-3), 231-41.

Gaertner, W. (2009), A Primer in Social Choice Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gehrlein, W.V. and D. Lepelley (2011), Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence, Heidelberg: Springer. Gibbard, A. (1973), ‘Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result’, Econometrica, 41 (4), 587-601.

Guilbaud, G.-T. (1952), ‘Les theories de l’interet general et le probleme logique de l’agregation’, Economie Appliquee, 5 (4), 501-51.

Hagele, G. and F. Pukelsheim (2001), ‘Llull’s writings on electoral systems’, Studia Lulliana, 41 (1), 3-38.

Hagele, G. and F. Pukelsheim (2008), ‘The electoral systems of Nicholas of Cusa in the Catholic Concordance and beyond’, in G. Christianson, T.M. Izbicki and C.M. Bellito (eds), The Church, the Councils, & Reform: The Legacy of the Fifteenth Century, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, pp. 229-49.

Harsanyi, J.C. (1953), ‘Cardinal utility in welfare economics and in the theory of risk-taking’, Journal of Political Economy, 61 (5), 434-5.

Harsanyi, J.C. (1955), ‘Cardinal utility, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility’, Journal of Political Economy, 63 (4), 309-21.

Harsanyi, J.C. (1976), Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific Explanation, Dordrecht: Reidel. Jackson, M.O. (2001), ‘A crash course in implementation theory’, Social Choice and Welfare, 18 (4), 655-708. Kolm, S.-C. (1972), Justice et Equite, Paris: Editions du C.N.R.S.

Kolm, S.-C. (1997), Justice and Equity, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Le Breton, M. and J.A. Weymark (2010), ‘Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains’, in K.J. Arrow, A.K. Sen and K. Suzumura (eds), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 2, Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp.191-299.

List, C. and C. Puppe (2009), ‘Judgment aggregation’, in P. Anand, P.K Pattanaik and C. Puppe (eds), The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 457-82.

Mas-Colell, A. and H. Sonnenschein (1972), ‘General possibility theorems for group decisions’, Review of Economic Studies, 39 (2), 185-92.

Maskin, E. and T. Sjδstrδm (2002), ‘Implementation theory’, in K.J. Arrow, A.K. Sen and K. Suzumura (eds), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 1, Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 237-88.

McLean, I.

McLean, I. and A.B. Urken (eds) (1995), Classics of Social Choice, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Mill, J.S. (1859), On Liberty, London: Longman, Roberts and Green, in J. Gray (ed.) (1991), John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 5-128.

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Pliny (1969), Letters, Books VIII-X, Panegyricus, trans. by B. Radice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (Loeb Classical Library).

Pliny (2002), Lettres, Livres I a X, trans. by A. Flaubert, Paris: Flammarion.

Riker, W.H. (1986), The Art of Political Manipulation, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

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Roemer, J.E. (1996), Theories of Distributive Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Saari, D.G. (1995), Basic Geometry of Voting, Heidelberg: Springer.

Saari, D.G. (2006), ‘Which is better: the Condorcet or Borda winner?’, Social Choice and Welfare, 26 (1), 107-29.

Saari, D.G. (2008), Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes: Social Choice Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Salles, M. (2011), ‘On rights and social choice’, in R. Ege and H. Igersheim (eds), Freedom and Happiness in Economic Thought and Philosophy, Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 227-42.

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Sen, A.K. (1970a), ‘The impossibility of a Paretian liberal’, Journal of Political Economy, 78 (1), 152-7.

Sen, A.K. (1970b), Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco, CA: Holden-Day.

Sen, A.K. (1976), ‘Welfare inequalities and Rawlsian axiomatics’, Theory and Decision, 7 (4), 243-62.

Sen, A.K. (2009), The Idea of Justice, London: Allen Lane.

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Weymark, J.A. (1991), ‘A reconsideration of the Harsanyi-Sen debate on utilitarianism’, in J. Elster and J.E. Roemer (eds), Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 255-320.

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