References and further reading
Alchian, A.A. (1961), Some Economics of Property, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
Alchian, A.A. (1965), ‘Some economics of property rights’, IIPolitico, 30 (4), 816-29.
Alchian, A.A.
and H. Demsetz (1972), ‘Production, information costs, and economic organization’, American Economic Review, 62 (5), 777-95.Ayres, C.E. (1944), The Theory of Economic Progress, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. Becker, G. (1968), ‘Crime and punishment: an economic approach’, Journal of Political Economy, 76 (2), 169-217.
Bromley, D. (1989), Economic Interests and Institutions, New York: Basil Blackwell.
Calabresi, G. (1961), ‘Some thoughts on risk distribution and the law of torts’, Yale Law Journal, 70 (4), 499-553.
Calabresi, G. (1970), The Cost of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Coase, R.H. (1937), ‘The nature of the firm’, Economica, New Series, 4 (16), 386-405.
Coase, R.H. (1960), ‘The problem of social cost’, Journal of Law and Economics, 3 (October), 1-44.
Coase, R.H. (1988), The Firm, the Market and the Law, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Commons, J.R. (1934), Institutional Economics. Its Place in Political Economy, New York: Macmillan.
Davis, L. and D.C. North (1971), Institutional Change and American Economic Growth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Demsetz, H. (1964), ‘The exchange and enforcement of property rights’, Journal of Law and Economics, 7 (October), 11-26.
Demsetz, H. (1967), ‘Toward a theory of property rights’, American Economic Review, 57 (2), 347-59.
Ellickson, R.C. (1991), Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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Galbraith, J.K. (1952), American Capitalism, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
Galbraith, J.K. (1955), The Affluent Society, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
Galbraith, J.K. (1967), The New Industrial State, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
Goldberg, V.P. (1980), ‘Relational exchange: economics and complex contracts’, American Behavioral Scientist, 23 (3), 337-52.
Greif, A. (1989), ‘Reputation and coalitions in medieval trade: evidence on the Maghribi traders’, Journal of Economic History, 49 (4), 857-82.
Hale, R.L. (1952), Freedom Through Law, New York: Columbia University Press.
Hodgson, G.M. (1988), Economics and Institutions: A Manifesto for a Modern Institutional Economics, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hodgson, G.M. (2000), ‘What is the essence of institutional economics?’, Journal of Economic Issues, 34 (2), 317-29.
Hodgson, G.M. (2008), ‘Markets’, in S.N. Durlauf and L.E. Blume (eds), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, vol. 5, 2nd edn, London: Palgrave Macmillan, accessed 27 January 2016 at http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_M000402.
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Liebhafsky, H.H. (1976), ‘Price theory as jurisprudence: law and economics, Chicago style’, Journal of Economic Issues, 10 (1), 23-43.
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Macneil, I.R., (1974), ‘The many futures of contracts’, Southern California Law Review, 47 (3), 691-816.
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Metcalfe, J.S. (1994), ‘Competition, Fisher’s principle and increasing returns in the selection process’, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 4 (4), 327-46.
Nelson, R.R. and S.G. Winter (1982), An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
North, D.C. (1981), Structure and Change in Economic History, New York: Norton.
North, D.C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
North, D.C. and R.P. Thomas (1973), The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Posner, R.A. (1972), Economic Analysis of Law, Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
Samuels, Warren J. (1971), ‘Interrelations between legal and economic processes’, Journal of Law and Economics, 14 (2), 435-50.
Samuels, W.J. (1972), ‘Welfare economics, power and property’, in G. Wunderlich and W.L. Gibson Jr (eds), Perspectives of Property, University Park, PA: Institute for Research on Land and Water Resources, Pennsylvania State University, pp. 61-127.
Samuels, W.J. (1974), ‘The Coase theorem and the study of law and economics’, Natural Resources Journal, 14 (1), 1-33.
Samuels, W.J. (1981), ‘Maximization of wealth as justice: an essay on Posnerian law and economics as policy analysis’, Texas Law Review, 60 (1), 147-72.
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Samuels, W.J. and A.A. Schmid (1981), Law and Economics: An Institutional Perspective, Boston, MA: Kluwer-Nijhoff.
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(1911), Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung: eine Untersuchung uber Unternehmergewinn,Kapital, Kredit, Zins und den Konjunkturzyklus, Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, English trans. R. Opie (1934), The Theory of Economic Development, An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, London: Transaction.
Simon, H.A. (1955), ‘A behavioral model of rational choice’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69 (1), 99-118.
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