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References and further reading

Binet, A. (1894), Psychologie des grands calculateurs et des joueurs d’echecs, republished in 1981 with an introduction by F. Le Lionnais, Paris and Geneva: Slatkin.

Borel, E.

(1921), ‘La theorie du jeu et les equations integrates a noyau symetrique’, Comptes Rendus, Academie des Sciences, 173 (25), 1304-8, trans. in M. Frechet (1953), ‘Emile Borel, initiator of the theory of psychologi­cal games and its application’, Econometrica, 21 (January), 95-127.

Borel, E. (1924), ‘Sur les jeux ou l’hasard se combine avec l’habilite des joueurs’, Comptes Rendus, Academie des Sciences, 178, 24-5.

Borel, E. (1927), ‘Sur le systeme de formes lineaires a determinant symetrique gauche et la theorie generale du jeu’, Comptes Rendus de l’Academie des Sciences, 184.2 (10 January), pp. 52-4, trans. L.J. Savage, ‘On systems of linear forms of skew symmetric determinants and the general theory of play’, Econometrica, 21 (January), pp. 116-17.

Borel, E. and J. Ville (1938), Traite du Calcul des Probabilites et de ses Applications, vol. 4, fasc. 2, Applications aux Jeux de Hasard, Paris: Gauthier-Villars.

Debreu, G. (1954), Theory of Value: an Axiomatic Analysis of Economic Equilibrium, a Cowles Foundation Monograph, New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press.

Djakow, I.N., N.W. Petrowski and P.A. Rudik (1927), Psychologie des Schachspiels, Berlin and Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter & Co.

Giocoli, N. (2003), Modeling Rational Agents: From Interwar Economics to Early Modern Game Theory, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.

Kahn, H. (1962), Thinking about the Unthinkable, New York: Avon.

Kalisch, G., J.W. Milnor, J. Nash and E.D. Nering (1954), ‘Some experimental n-person games’, in R.M. Thrall, C.H. Coombs and R.L. Davis (eds), Decision Processes, New York: Wiley, pp. 301-27, originally RAND report, RAND RM-948, 25 August.

Kalmar, L. (1928-29), ‘Zur Theorie der abstrakten Spiele’ (‘On the theory of abstract games’), Acta Litterarum ac Scientiarum, Regiae Universitatis Hungaricae Francisco-Josephinae, s. Scientiarum Mathematicarum, Szeged, 4, 65-85.

Kirzner, I. (ed.) (1994), Classics in Austrian Economics: A Sampling in the History of a Tradition, London: W. Pickering.

Konig, D. (1927), ‘Uber eine Schlussweise aus dem Endlichen ins Unendliche’ (‘On a method of conclusion from the finite to the infinite’), Acta Litterarum ac Scientiarum, Regiae Universitatis Hungaricae Francisco- Josephinae, s. Scientiarum Mathematicarum, Szeged, 3, 121-30.

Lasker, E. (1907), Kampf, New York: Lasker’s Publishing Co.; reprinted 2001 with foreword by Lothar Schmidt, Potsdam: Verlag fur Berlin-Brandenburg.

Leonard, R. (1994), ‘Reading Cournot, reading Nash: the creation and stabilization of the Nash equilibrium’, Economic Journal, 104 (May), 492-511.

Leonard, R. (1995), ‘From parlor games to social science: von Neumann, Morgenstern, and the creation of game theory, 1928-1944’, Journal of Economic Literature, 33 (June), 730-61.

Leonard, R. (1998), ‘Ethics and the excluded middle: Karl Menger and social science in interwar Vienna’, Isis, 89 (1), 1-26.

Leonard, R. (2010), Von Neumann, Morgenstern and the Creation of Game Theory: From Chess to Social Science, 1900-1960, New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mayer, H. (1932), ‘Der Erkenntniswert der funktionellen Preistheorien’, in H. Mayer (ed.), Die Wirtschaftstheorie der Gegenwart, vol. 2, Vienna, pp. 14 239b, English trans. and reprint 1994, ‘The cogni­tive value of functional theories of price, critical and positive investigations concerning the price problem’, in I. Kirzner (ed.), Classics in Austrian Economics: A Sampling in the History of a Tradition, London: W. Pickering, pp. 55-168.

Maynard Smith, J. (1988), Games, Sex and Evolution, New York and Toronto: Harvester-Wheatsheaf.

Menger, K. (1934), Moral, Wille und Weltgestaltung.

Grundlegung zur Logik der Sitten. Vienna: Julius Springer, English trans. 1974, Morality, Decision and Social Organization. Towards a Logic of Ethics, Dordrecht: Reidel.

Mirowski, P. (2002), Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science, New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mises, L. von (1960), Epistemological Problems of Economics, Princeton, NJ: van Nostrand, first published 1933.

Morgenstern, O., Diary, Oskar Morgenstern Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University, Durham, NC.

Morgenstern, O. (1934a), Die Grenzen der Wirtschaftspolitik, Vienna: Julius Springer, English trans. V. Smith and revised (1937), The Limits of Economics, London: Hodge, pp. v, 151.

Morgenstern, O. (1934b), ‘Das Zeitmoment in der Wertlehre’, Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, 5 (4), 433-58, English trans. ‘The time moment in economic theory’, in A. Schotter (ed.) (1976), Selected Economic Writings of Oskar Morgenstern, New York: New York University Press, pp. 151-67.

Morgenstern, O. (1935), ‘Vollkommene Voraussicht und wirtschaftliches Gleichgewicht’, Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, 6 (3), 337-57, English trans. F. Knight, mimeo, University of Chicago, IL, reprinted in A. Schotter (ed.) (1976), Selected Economic Writings of Oskar Morgenstern, New York: New York University Press, pp. 169-83.

Morgenstern, O. (1941a), ‘Professor Hicks on value and capital’, Journal of Political Economy, 49 (3), 361-93. Morgenstern, O. (1941b), ‘Quantitative implications of maxims of behavior’, unpublished manuscript, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.

Nabokov, V. (1930), Zaschchita Luzhina, Berlin: Slovo, English trans. 1964, The Defense, New York: G.P. Putnam’s and Sons.

Nash, J. (1950a), ‘Equilibrium points in n-person games’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 36 (1), 48-9.

Nash, J. (1950b), ‘Non-cooperative games’, PhD dissertation, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.

Nash, J. (1951), ‘Non-cooperative games’, Annals of Mathematics, 54 (2), pp.

286-95.

Neumann, J. von (1928a), ‘Calcul des Probabilities - Sur la Theorie des Jeux’ presented by E. Borel, Comptes Rendus Hebdomadaires des Seances de l’Academie des Sciences, 186 (25), 1689-91.

Neumann, J. von (1928b), ‘Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele’, Mathematische Annalen, 100, 295-320, English trans. S. Bargmann (1959), ‘On the theory of games of strategy’, in A.W. Tucker and R.D. Luce (eds), Contributions to the Theory of Games, vol. 4, Princeton, NJ: University Press, pp. 13-42.

Neumann, J. von (1932), Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik, Berlin: J. Springer, English trans. R. Beyer (1955), Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Neumann, J. von and O. Morgenstern (1944), Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, reprinted 1947, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Schelling, T. (1960), The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Schotter, A. (ed.) (1976), Selected Economic Writings of Oskar Morgenstern, New York: New York University Press.

Schwalbe, U. and P. Walker (2001), ‘Zermelo and the early history of game theory’, Games and Economic Behavior, 34 (1), 123-37.

Wolfe, P. (ed.) (1955), ‘Report of an informal conference on recent developments in the theory of games’, mimeo, Logistics Research Project, Department of Mathematics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.

Zermelo, E. (1913), ‘Uber eine Anwendung der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie des Schachspiels’, Proceedings of the 5th International Congress of Mathematicians, 22-28 August 1912, Cambridge, vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 501-4, English trans. U. Schwalbe and P. Walker (2001), ‘On an application of set theory to the theory of the game of chess’, U. Schwalbe and P. Walker (2001), ‘Zermelo and the early history of game theory’, Games and Economic Behavior, 34 (1), 133-6.

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Source: Faccarello G., Kurz H.-D.. Handbook on the history of economic analysis. Volume III, Developments in major fields of economics. Edward Elgar,2016. — 659 p. 2016

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