References and further reading
Albert, H. (1967), Marktsoziologie und Entscheidungslogik. Zur Kritik der reinen Okonomik, reprinted 1998, Tubingen: Mohr.
Albert, H. (1985), Treatise on Critical Reason, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Alchian, A.A. (1950), ‘Uncertainty, evolution, and economic theory’, Journal of Political Economy, 58, 211-21. Aumann, R.J. (1987), ‘Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality’. Econometrica, 55 (1), 1-18.
Aumann, R. (1998), ‘On the state of the art in game theory: interviewer Eric van Damme’, Games and Economic Behavior, 24, 181-210.
Binmore, K. (1987), ‘Modeling rational players: part I’, Economics and Philosophy, 3 (2), 179-214. Binmore, K. (1988), ‘Modeling rational players: part II’, Economics and Philosophy, 4 (1), 9-55. Broome, J. (1991), Weighing Goods. Equality, Uncertainty and Time, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Buchanan, J.M. (1985), What Should Economists Do?, Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.
Buchanan, J.M., W. Guth, H. Kliemt, G. Schwodiauer and R. Selten (2001), John von Neumanns und Oskar Morgensterns “Theory of Games and Economic Behavior”, Dusseldorf: Verlag die Wirtschaft.
Dacey, R. (1976), ‘Theory absorption and the testability of economic theory’, Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, 36 (3-4), 247-67.
Debreu, G. (1959), The Theory of Value: An Axiomatic Analysis Of Economic Equilibrium, Cowles Commission Monograph 17, New Haven, CT.
Fagin, R., J.Y. Halpern, Y. Moses and M.Y. Vardi (1995), Reasoning About Knowledge, Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press.
Gintis, H. (2000), Game Theory Evolving, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Guth, W. and H. Kliemt (2004), ‘Bounded rationality and theory absorption’, Homo Oeconomicus, 21 (3-4), 521-40.
Gul, F. and W. Pesendorfer (2008), ‘The case for mindless economics’, in A. Caplin and A. Schotter (eds), The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics: A Handbook, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, pp.
3-43.Hahn, F. (1973), On the Notion of Equilibrium in Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Harsanyi, J.C. and R.A. Selten (1988), General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hazlitt, H. (1964), The Foundations of Morality, Princeton, NJ: University Press of America.
Hicks, J. (1979), Causality in Economics, Oxford: Blackwell.
Hobbes, T. (1651), Leviathan, reprinted 1968, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Hume, D. (1739), A Treatise of Human Nature, reprinted 1978, Oxford: Clarendon.
Kagel, J.H. (1995), Economic Choice Theory: An Experimental Analysis of Animal Behavior, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kliemt, H. (2009), Philosophy and Economics I, Munich: Oldenbourg.
Koopmans, T.C. (1951), Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation, Cowles Commission Monograph 13, New Haven, CT.
MacKay, A.F. (1980), Arrow’s Theorem. The Paradox of Social Choice. A Case Study in the Philosophy of Economics, New Haven, CT.
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Morgenstern, O. and G. Schwodiauer (1976), ‘Competition and collusion in bilateral markets’, Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, 36 (3-4), 217-45.
Neumann, J. von and O. Morgenstern (1944), Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Parsons, T. (1968), ‘Utilitarianism: sociological thought’, in D. Sils and R.K. Merton (eds), International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, New York and London.
Raiffa, H. (1968), Decision Analysis, Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Robbins, L. (1935), An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, London: Macmillan.
Savage, L. (1954), The Foundations of Statistics, New York: Dover.
Schlick, M. (1986), Die Probleme der Philosophie in ihrem Zusammenhang, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag. Schumpeter, J.A. (1959), The Theory of Economic Development, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Simon, H.A. (1957), Models of Man, New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Smith, A. (1759), The Theory of Moral Sentiments, in D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie (eds), The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, reprinted 1982, Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Classics.
Smith, A. (1776), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, vol. 1, Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Press.
Spinoza, B. de (1670), A Theologico-Political Treatise. A Political Treatise, reprinted 1951, New York: Dover. Strawson, P.F. (1962), ‘Freedom and resentment’, Proceedings of the British Academy, 48, 187-211.
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Walsh, V. and H. Gram (1980), Classical and Neoclassical Theories of General Equilibrium, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Whately, R. (1832), Introductory Lectures on Political Economy, delivered in Easter Term, 2nd and enlarged edn, London: B. Fellowes.