References

Main Works by Paul Klemperer

Baldwin, E. and P Klemperer (2019). ‘Understanding Preferences: “Demand Types”, and the Existence of Equilibrium with Indivisibilities’. Econometrica, 87(3): 867-932.

Beggs, A. and P. Klemperer (1992). ‘Multi-Period Competition with Switching Costs’. Econometrica, 60(3): 651-666.

Binmore, K. and P Klemperer (2002). ‘The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences’. Economic Journal, 112(478): C74-C96.

Bulow, J., J. Geanakoplos and P. Klemperer (1985a). ‘Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements’. Journal of Political Economy, 93(3): 488-511.

Bulow, J., J. Geanakoplos and P. Klemperer (1985b). ‘Holding Idle Capacity to Deter Entry’. Economic Journal, 95(377): 178-182.

Bulow, J., M. Huang and P. Klemperer (1999). ‘Toeholds and Takeovers’. Journal of Political Economy, 107(3): 427-454.

Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer (1994). ‘Rational Frenzies and Crashes’. Journal of Political Economy, 102(1): 1-23.

Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer (1996). ‘Auctions Versus Negotiations’. American Economic Review, 86(1): 180-194.

Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer (1998). ‘The Tobacco Deal’. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 29(Microeconomics): 323-394.

Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer (1999). ‘The Generalized War of Attrition’. American Economic Review, 89(1): 175-189.

Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer (2002). ‘Prices and the Winner’s Curse’. RAND Journal of Economics, 33(1): 1-21.

Bulow, J. and P Klemperer (2009). ‘Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?’. American Economic Review, 99(4): 1,544-1,575.

Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer (2012). ‘Regulated Prices, Rent Seeking, and Consumer Surplus’. Journal of Political Economy, 120(1): 160-186.

Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer (2015). ‘Equity Recourse Notes: Creating Counter­Cyclical Bank Capital’. Economic Journal, 125(586): F131-F157.

Cramton, P., R. Gibbons and P. Klemperer (1987). ‘Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently’. Econometrica, 55(3): 615-632.

Erdil, A. and P. Klemperer (2010). ‘A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions’. Journal of the European Economic Association, 8(2/3): 537-547.

Froot, K. and P. Klemperer (1989). ‘Exchange Rate Pass-Through When Market Share Matters’. American Economic Review, 79(4): 637-654.

Gilbert, R. and P. Klemperer (2000). ‘An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing’. RAND Journal of Economics, 31(1): 1-21.

Klemperer, P (1987a). ‘Markets with Consumer Switching Costs'. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(2): 375—394.

Klemperer, P. (1987b). ‘The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs'. RAND Journal of Economics, 18(1): 138—150.

Klemperer, P (1987c). ‘Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs'. Economic Journal, 97(Supplement): 99—117.

Klemperer, P (1988). ‘Welfare Effects of Entry into Markets with Switching Costs'. Journal of Industrial Economics, 37(2): 159—165.

Klemperer, P. (1989). ‘Price Wars Caused by Switching Costs'. Review of Economic Studies, 56(3): 405-420.

Klemperer, P. (1990). ‘How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?'. RAND Journal of Economics, 21(1): 113-130.

Klemperer, P (1992). ‘Equilibrium Product Lines: Competing Head-to-Head May Be Less Competitive'. American Economic Review, 82(4): 740-755.

Klemperer, P (1995a). ‘Competition When Consumers Have Switching Costs: An Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics, and International Trade'. Review of Economic Studies, 62(4): 515-539.

Klemperer, P (1995b). ‘Comments on “Putting Auction Theory to Work”'. Discussant's comments on Paul Milgrom's 1995 Churchill Lectures, Working Paper, Oxford University.

Klemperer, P. (1998). ‘Auctions With Almost Common Values: The “Wallet Game” and Its Applications'. European Economic Review, 42(3-5): 757-769.

Klemperer, P. (1999). ‘Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature'.

Klemperer, P. (2000). ‘Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory'. Econometric Society World Congress lecture, 11 August. Available at: https:// pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9fec/3d2db6feb81f8bc246fca7598a0aeadab125.pdf.

Klemperer, P (2002a). ‘What Really Matters in Auction Design'. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(1): 169-189.

Klemperer, P. (2002b). ‘The Wrong Culprit for Telecom Trouble'. Financial Times, 26 November: 21.

Klemperer, P. (2002c). ‘How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3G Telecom Auctions'. European Economic Review, 46(4-5): 829-845.

Klemperer, P. (2003). ‘Alfred Marshall Lecture: Using and Abusing Economic Theory'. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(2/3): 272-300.

Klemperer, P. (2004a). ‘America's Patent Protection Has Gone Too Far'. Financial Times, 2 March: 19.

Klemperer, P (2004b). Auctions: Theory and Practice. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Klemperer, P. (2007). ‘What Is the Top Priority on Climate Change?'. 13 December. Available at: https://voxeu.org/article/climate-change-innovation-key.

Klemperer, P (2008). ‘A New Auction for Substitutes: Central-Bank Liquidity Auctions, “Toxic Asset” Auctions, and Variable Product-Mix Auctions'. Working Paper, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.

Klemperer, P (2010a). ‘The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods'. Journal of the European Economic Association, 8(2-3): 526-536.

Klemperer, P (2010b). ‘What Is the Top Priority on Climate Change?'. Chapter 19 in H. Schellnhuber et al. (eds) Global Sustainability: A Nobel Cause. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 233-242.

Klemperer, P. (2018). ‘Product-Mix Auctions'. Working Paper, Nuffield College, Univesity of Oxford.

Klemperer, P. and J. McClenahan (1981). ‘Joint Strategic Planning Between Health and Local Authorities'. Omega, 9(5): 481-491.

Klemperer, P and M. Meyer (1986). ‘Price Competition vs. Quantity Competition: The Role of Uncertainty'.

Klemperer, P and M. Meyer (1988). ‘Consistent Conjectures Equilibria: A Reformulation Showing Non-Uniqueness'. Economics Letters, 27(2): 111-115.

Klemperer, P and M. Meyer (1989). ‘Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly Under Uncertainty'. Econometrica, 57(6): 1,243-1,277.

Klemperer, P. and A. Padilla (1997). ‘Do Firms' Product Lines Include Too Many Varieties?'. RAND Journal of Economics, 28(3): 472-488.

Other Works Referred To

Bresnahan, T. (1981). ‘Duopoly Models with Consistent Conjectures'. American Economic Review, 71(5): 934-945.

Bulow, J. and J. Roberts (1989). ‘The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions'. Journal of Political Economy, 97(5): 1,060-1,090.

Dixit, A. (1980). ‘The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence'. Economic Journal, 90(357): 95-106.

Osborn, A. (2000). ‘Consumers Pay the Price in 3G Auction'. The Guardian, 17 November: 33.

Park, M., S.-W Lee and Y.-J. Choi (2011). ‘Does Spectrum Auctioning Harm Consumers? Lessons from 3G Licensing'. Information Economics and Policy, 23(1): 118-126.

Petropoulos, G. (2015). ‘Product-Mix Auction—How Auction Theory Came to the Rescue During the Banking Crisis: Interview with Paul Klemperer'. The TSEconomist. September. Available at: https://tseconomist.com/archive/septem- ber-2015/production-mix-auction-how-auction-theory-came-to-the-rescue-dur- ing-the-banking-crisis-interview-with-paul-klemperer/.

R.D. (2012). ‘A Golden Age of Micro'. The Economist (online). Available at: https:// www.economist.com/free-exchange/2012/10/19/a-golden-age-of-micro.