Rawls and Sen on formal and real freedom
On the same path as that paved by Rousseau, Kant and Hegel, some contemporary philosophers and economists have succeeded in defining the most advanced theories regarding the concept of freedom for all.
These last philosophical developments correspond to a specific kind of liberalism called by Rawls “liberalism of freedom”. According to him, the first principles of this kind of liberalism are “principles of political and civic freedoms, and these principles have a priority over other principles that may also be invoked” (Rawls 2000: 330). Rawls does not hesitate to stress also: “I see [Hegel] as an important exemplar in the history of moral and political philosophy of the liberalism offreedom. Other such exemplars are Kant and, less obviously, J.S. Mill. (A Theory of Justice is also a liberalism of freedom and learns much from them)” (ibid., fn. 3, original emphasis). According to Rawls, this new concept, the liberalism of freedom, contrasts with the liberalism of the classic utilitarians (Bentham, James Mill and Sidgwick) which he calls liberalism of happiness. This entry focuses on the way Rawls and another modern thinker, Amartya Sen, consider the effectiveness of the concept of freedom for all, that is, real freedom. Rawls in particular concurs with Hegel on this subject since both authors attempt to understand freedom together with its conditions: their works are more focused on the concrete meaning of freedom (Ege and Igersheim 2008). Hence, Rawls deals with an ambitious objective: to propose a theory which makes it possible to reconcile in a concrete way freedom, that is, the rational, the freedom of the moderns and Locke’s tradition, with equality, that is, the reasonable, the freedom of the ancients and Rousseau’s tradition. He claims that the conflict between the two types of traditions is solved within his “second” theory: political liberalism (Rawls 1993).The reconciliation is ensured by the fact that the principles of justice apply to the basic structure of society and promote real freedoms, not just formal ones. The two principles of justice are described as follows (Rawls 1993: 291):
(1) each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all. (2) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. First, they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.
The first principle has priority over the second (equal basic rights and liberties) and the first part of the second principle (fair equality of opportunity) has priority over the second part (difference principle). It must be stressed that there is a change in the first principle of justice compared with what Rawls stated in A Theory of Justice (1971 [1999]): the phrase “a fully adequate scheme” replaces “the most extensive total system”. What is the significance of this “new” first principle of justice? In the first place, the priority of liberties and of the first principle means that a basic liberty can be limited only for the sake of another basic liberty, but for no other kind of considerations. In the second place, granting a particular position to political liberties allows the basic liberties to be not merely formal. Indeed, if social and economic inequalities are too large, “those with greater responsibility and wealth can control the course of legislation to their advantage” (Rawls 1993: 325). Therefore, Rawls distinguishes basic liberties and their worth or usefulness. Thus, ignorance and poverty are not regarded as elements which limit individual freedom, but the worth of this liberty. Rawls moves from the opposition between formal freedom and effective or real freedom to the opposition between freedom and worth of freedom. The effective freedom or the worth of liberty of an individual can be “specified in terms of an index of the primary goods regulated by the second principle of justice” (ibid.: 326).
Its effect is strengthened by a “fair value” of the political liberties for all: “this guarantee means that the worth of the political liberties to all citizens, whatever their social or economic positions, must be approximately equal, or at least sufficiently equal, in the sense that everyone has a fair opportunity to hold public office and to influence the outcome of political decisions” (ibid.: 327). In order to achieve such an aim, Rawls pleads in favour of a propertyowning democracy. According to him, such an economic system is able to guarantee basic equal rights and liberties, fair value of political liberties as well as fair equality of opportunity. Indeed, “property-owning democracy avoids this, not by redistribution of income to those with less at the end of each period, so to speak, but rather by ensuring the widespread ownership of productive assets and human capital (that is, education and trained skills) at the beginning of each period, all this against a background of fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls 2001 [2003]: 139).This clearly shows the Rawlsian theory is based on the idea that members of society have notably to work in a context of free choice of occupations to be able to fully cooperate. Therefore, it can be claimed that, according to Rawls, labour is one of the conditions of the emergence of real freedom.
Amartya Sen proposes to go one step further through appeal to the concept of capability. In some respects, Sen’s capability approach attempts to answer a question raised by him in 1980: “equality of what?” (Sen 1980 [1982]). This question is central because of human diversity which leads to welfare inequalities. The capability approach combines many elements which seem essential to Sen: it takes into account some objective information regarding human beings’ positions, human diversity and real freedom. The progressive development of his capability approach reflects these three afore-mentioned concerns. The set of opportunities of a person, that is his capability, corresponds to a choice set of different kinds of lives.
A specific life is defined by a combination of functionings - “a functioning is an achievement of a person: what he or she manages to do or to be” (Sen 1985: 10) - which can be either basic (to be well-nourished, to be healthy, and so on) or complex (to be happy, to have a satisfying social life, and so on). Individual welfare is thus represented by a combination of functionings, while the capability of a person is the set of combinations of functionings he can reach depending on his personal circumstances (revenue, sex, health, skills, handicaps, and so on). Therefore, capabilities reflect the real freedoms that people might enjoy. If one must acknowledge that Sen’s capability approach is subject to some limits (open-ended list of functionings, intrinsic value of freedom and so on), it sheds light on a central issue for economics and political philosophy: how to define a consistent concept of freedom for all, which encompasses both freedom and its conditions of exercise.In this context, and even if the concept of labour is not deeply examined in Sen’s theory, it is essential to ensure the promotion of extended capabilities: “the labour market can be a liberator in many different contexts” (Sen 1999: 116). Besides, “the development of free markets in general and of free seeking of employment in particular is a much appreciated fact in historical studies. Even that great critic of capitalism Karl Marx saw the emergence of freedom of employment as momentous progress” (ibid.: 113). As for Rawls, labour is thus understood by Sen as an indispensable way to promote freedom for all.
Ragip Ege and Herrade Igersheim