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New Directions in Development Economics

These challenges were interpreted by some as reflecting a decline in the discipline of development economics (Hirschman 1981). However, from the middle and late 1980s there has occurred a revival of interest in development economics, which may be inter­preted as ushering in a fourth phase in the history of the discipline.

This phase continues to be dominated by the neoclassical approach which emphasizes the policies of liberalization, privatization and globalization - the so-called Washington Consensus view - and locates the problems of development in the allegedly misguided policies of interventionist and protectionist governments (see Meier 2005). According to this approach, the solution lies in rolling back the state by reducing government regulation of the economy and privatizing state-owned enterprises, reducing restric­tions on trade, reducing financial regulation and reducing restrictions on international capital movements. These policies coupled with those which impose austerity measures involving fiscal and monetary contraction continue to be enthusiastically and vigorously supported by the International Monetary Fund when it provides external financing to countries with payments problems, and by the World Bank, as part of its structural adjustment programs when it provides development assistance to LDCs. The World Trade Organization has also promoted free trade, in addition to reducing regulations that LDCs can impose on the activities of transnational corporations and imposing intel­lectual property rights protections internationally. Even when policies of this type have had disastrous consequences, the policy of getting the prices right through such measures has not lost favour. Rather, the sequencing of reforms, the incompleteness of reforms (for instance, not liberalizing labour markets), and not having proper institutions in place have taken the blame.

Some shifts in emphasis - such as increasing attention to poverty alleviation, governance and democracy - have occurred, arguably without changing the basic approach. Despite the dominance of this approach in policy circles, development economics during this most recent phase actually reflects a rich variety of approaches of which six strands may be usefully distinguished.

The first strand refers to new neoclassical approaches that examine issues such as agrarian relations, income distribution, the causes of poverty, and general institu­tional issues. While applications of neoclassical microeconomic theory to development economics - with its ubiquitous optimization agent - have a long history, the recent flowering in this literature applying the tools of industrial organization, game theory and information economics - reviewed, among others, by Ray (1998) - is unprecedented in volume and scope. A flavour of the analysis can be gleaned from the following examples. First, if an economy with imperfect competition in goods markets has different produc­tion technologies available to it, it can be caught in a low-level equilibrium trap using constant returns to scale technology rather than using the increasing returns technology which requires a higher level of production. This analysis uses neoclassical methodol­ogy to formalize Rosenstein-Rodan’s argument for a big push. Second, in the presence of asymmetric information in which lenders possess incomplete information about the actions of borrowers, it is argued that credit is rationed to poor borrowers with smaller endowments of wealth and collateral, resulting in an inefficient allocation of resources and the perpetuation of inequality. A similar logic explains why capital, rather than flowing from rich to poor countries with an allegedly higher marginal productivity of capital and profitability, can flow the other way, implying growth divergence. Third, in agricultural sectors with sharecropping tenure systems, land reforms granting tenants greater security of tenure and regulating the tenant share can strengthen the bargaining position of tenants, increase their share of output, increase their incentives and effort and thereby improve efficiency.

Fourth, if there are search costs in labour markets which prevent workers and firms from finding suitable matches after they are separated due to exogenous shocks, and firms can choose to incur the cost of adopting new technol­ogy and workers can choose to acquire training to productively use new technology, the economy can be trapped at an equilibrium without training and innovation, despite the existence of an equilibrium in which all firms innovate and all workers train; with imperfect competition in the labour market the worker’s return to training is lower, which further reduces incentives for training. Fifth, if information problems in choosing technologies and network externalities are present, the benefits to economic agents of choosing a technology depend positively on the number who have already adopted that technology, and multiple equilibria are possible, some in which the economy is locked into choosing inefficient technologies. Finally, in the presence of increasing returns to scale and learning by doing, new neoclassical models of international trade theory imply that import protection which expands scale and results in greater efficiency can subsequently expand exports.

Two, in the macroeconomic sphere, an empirical and theoretical literature on long-term growth has expanded rapidly, triggered in the late 1980s by the revival of neoclassical growth economics in the form of new growth theories. Cross-country and panel growth regressions have examined factors explaining variations in growth rates across countries (Temple 1999). The role of numerous variables, including the rates of investment and saving, the level of human capital formation, research and devel­opment expenditures, political stability, financial variables, inequality, the extent of openness to international trade, and foreign direct capital inflows, have been explored. The robustness of these results, however, has been called into question, with only a few variables - such as investment rates - being found to have a positive and significant effect.

Questions have also been raised about the way in which different independ­ent variables (such as economic openness) have been measured, and about whether cross-country methods, which assume that countries have a basically similar structure (apart from those which are captured using country dummies in panel equations), are useful for understanding growth dynamics over time. There has also been an attempt to distinguish between what have been referred to as proximate and fundamental (or ultimate) determinants of growth, with geography and institutions, being singled out as fundamental determinants, with a consensus forming around the notion that institutions - understood to include not only legal frameworks and organizations but also social norms - are the key (Rodrik 2007). Aside from the fact that it is not clear why institutions, which have been found to depend endogenously on other supposedly proximate factors (like saving and investment rates) which affect growth, are consid­ered to be fundamental determinants, the literature is not very persuasive about what institutions work best, the excessive and simplistic focus on private property rights and market freedoms appearing to be unwarranted. Although cultural norms and political organizations as stressed, they are not as resilient in the face of economic and policy changes as sometimes believed (Chang 2008). Despite the problems with the empiri­cal literature, it does suggest that long-run growth seems to depend on economic and other determinants, rather than on exogenous factors as implied by the old neoclassi­cal models such as Solow’s (1956) with diminishing returns to capital. The so-called “new” neoclassical growth models, which typically assume away diminishing returns to capital by introducing learning by doing, profit-seeking research and development expenditures and education, are better placed to examine the role of endogenous eco­nomic and policy-related determinants of long-run economic growth (see Romer 1988).
While these models raise important issues related to externalities, scale economies, the division of labour, and imperfect information, and imply a role for government policies for economic growth and development, their ability to explain actual develop­ment successes and make specific policy recommendations can be questioned (Pack 1994). Moreover, while this literature runs parallel to - rather than being closely inte­grated with - development economics, it has recently emphasized some classic themes in development theory such as the role of income inequality, natural resources and increasing returns in the process of economic growth (for a review and evaluation of this literature, see Ros 2000).

Three, also in the macroeconomic sphere, there has developed what can be called the neo-structuralist approach, which blends macroeconomic approaches drawn from the classical economists, Marx, Keynes and Kalecki, with early structuralist contributions from the second phase described above, to analyse the determinants of growth and income distribution (see, especially, Taylor 1983). This approach uses mathematical methods involving accounting identities and behavioural and equilibrium equations, and uses dynamic equations to examine the time path of the economy. Several features of this approach can be noted. First, aggregate demand determines capacity utiliza­tion and the rate of growth with the price level determined by a fixed money wage and a given mark-up set by firms. While early development economists argued that LDCs were mainly constrained by saving, foreign exchange and other supply-side bottlenecks, this approach places aggregate demand issues at centre stage, given the many sources of uncertainty present in the economy (see Dutt 1996). Second, the approach examines how the distribution of income between wages and profits affects capacity utilization and growth. Growth can be wage-led - because a redistribution of income towards wage earners from profit recipients who save a higher fraction of their income increases consumption demand, capacity utilization, and investment, which depends positively on capacity utilization - thereby formalizing a long tradition which argues that inequality causes economic stagnation.

However, this is not a necessary outcome, if the economy is close to full capacity, in which case increases in growth require higher savings through income distributional shifts towards profits, or if investment depends positively on the profit share; in these cases growth is profit-led as in classical growth theory. Third, the approach has been extended to introduce asset market complications and interest rates, and inflation owing to conflicting claims. An important implication is that monetary contraction, which raises the interest rate, can reduce investment demand by increasing the cost of borrowing, and increase the mark-up of firms which try to pass on higher interest costs to higher prices, which shifts income distribution away from wages and increases inflation; thus macroeconomic austerity as recommended by the IMF can be stagflationary as well as inequalizing. The approach is also able to integrate the analysis of what is generally considered short-run economic phenomena, such as financial crises, with long-run analysis of growth and distribution. Fourth, since LDCs usually have large agricultural sectors, the approach has been extended to have two sectors, an indus­trial fixprice sector and an agricultural sector with a flexible market-clearing price; it has been used to show how the economy experiences balanced growth in the long run with different assumptions about agricultural growth such as, for instance, growth depending on the terms of trade or growth being determined by exogenous institutional factors. The models show how the agricultural sector can provide a market for industrial goods, and how agricultural stagnation, by turning the terms of trade against industry, can reduce industrial growth. Fifth, although aggregate demand plays a major role, the models introduce other constraints on growth, including foreign exchange constraints and fiscal constraints. Finally, the approach has been used to develop models of the global economy to analyse the interaction between the North and the South, at times taking into account structural differences between the two economies. These models examine conditions under which uneven development and North-South terms of trade changes occur, confirming - though not in all cases - the informal analyses of earlier structuralist and dependency writers.

Four, less formal literatures have re-examined the actual experience of developing economies, especially the successful East Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs) and, more recently, China, and drawn broad general conclusions from this analysis. Going beyond the boundaries of economics narrowly defined to incorporate and develop ideas from sociology, political science, and other disciplines, this study of the NICs experiences has shown that the success of these countries cannot be interpreted as an accomplishment of free market economics, and that the state played an active role in the development process (see Wade 1990; Amsden 1991; Stiglitz 2002; Chang 2008). The experience of these countries seems to be no different from those of late develop­ment in backward countries of the past, as argued in the early historical analysis of Gerschenkron (1962). In countries such as Korea and Taiwan, the state intervened in the economy, established state-owned enterprises, provided import protection, and allocated credit to particular sectors and firms. However, when it provided protection and credit it demanded that the recipients meet performance criteria in terms of eventual export success, without which the help they received was withdrawn. The recent interdiscipli­nary work suggests that markets and states can play a synergistic role in the development process, and that the nature of markets and of the state are more important than whether the state or the market is allowed a greater role. Markets push producers to become more competitive, but only after they have overcome initial handicaps against more techno­logically advanced foreign producers, as stressed earlier by List. The state can guide the market to get the best out of firms, playing a strategic role. Successful developmental states which have promoted economic development have been relatively autonomous from civil society and not become captive to powerful groups who act in their narrow self-interest, but have also been embedded within society - through Weberian bureauc­racies and political parties - to obtain appropriate information and develop trust with private partners (see Evans 1995).

Five, also using an empirical approach, several mainstream economists are looking carefully at institutions and behaviours, and designing policies, that affect develop­ment and poverty (see, for instance, Banerjee and Duflo 2011). This approach exam­ines historical evidence, econometric studies often using survey data, and randomized experiments to study how people actually behave, how norms and other institutions affect their behaviour and how their behaviour reacts to policy interventions. Although this approach generally takes a microeconomic perspective, it draws on the ideas of behavioural economics rather than using the neoclassical optimizing agent.

Six, following the early focus on growth in per capita income and the criticisms which gave rise to the interest in poverty and basic needs, a strand in development economics focuses on the meaning and measurement of economic development. Sen (1999) distinguishes between opulence (or income and production), utility and func­tionings and capabilities. While opulence - for countries as a whole or for individuals, for instance, in the measurement of poverty - refers to the means of development, it cannot be considered an end. Utility - which is now measured in happiness studies by surveys of subjective well-being - can be considered an end, but is subjective because it depends on individual feelings, and may reflect the fact that people adapt to changes in their circumstance; thus, for instance, the poor may get used to their impoverished conditions and not feel too unhappy. Thus, Sen prefers to emphasize functionings - the extent to which people are obtaining and achieving goods that they justifiably value, such as nutrition, healthy lives, education and dignity - and even more, capabilities, that is, whether people have the ability to achieve these valued goods (without neces­sarily achieving them). Despite the difficulties in compiling lists of such goods and of measuring and aggregating over them, there have been attempts to construct such measures of development, including the Human Development Index which takes into account achievements in education and health in addition to income. While many of these concepts examine how individuals are doing, others may refer to overall societies, for instance, regarding environmental issues, which have received increasing attention not just because of what it does for growth and health, but also as an end. Aside from the fact that this strand clarifies the meaning of development, it also leads to an exami­nation of how different people in an economy are doing relative to each other - for instance, people of different genders and ethnic groups - and how the different elements of development affect each other - for instance, how growth and poverty, and the envi­ronment and poverty, interact. On the last issue, although it is possible to have growth without improvements in distribution and average levels of functionings, the experience of LDCs analysed in the previous strand, suggests that sustained growth seems to be required for such improvements.

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Source: Faccarello G., Kurz H.-D.. Handbook on the history of economic analysis. Volume III, Developments in major fields of economics. Edward Elgar,2016. — 659 p. 2016

More on the topic New Directions in Development Economics:

  1. References and further reading
  2. Faccarello G., Kurz H.-D.. Handbook on the history of economic analysis. Volume III, Developments in major fields of economics. Edward Elgar,2016. — 659 p, 2016