Interpretations of power

The simplest, most general, and most intuitively appealing notion of power identifies it with our capacity to accomplish our ends in the world.¹ Power expresses the idea that in order to accomplish our ends, we must do something to affect, and thus change, the world; we must act in and upon the world.

The element of resistance has been important in definitions of power. In Economy and Society, Max Weber defined power as “the probability that an actor in a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” ([1956] 1978:53). Resistance, however, while generally present in power re­lations in politics, is not logically necessary for something to qualify as power. Someone may manipulate the environment of others in such a way as to make it in their interest to behave in conformity to the agent’s wishes, thus removing resistance. Both persuasion and inducement are terms that normally qualify as examples of power.^{[24] [25] And the effort to legitimize power relations - that is, to create structures of political authority, is marked by an attempt to create generalized acceptance of the exercise of state power.}

While the idea of resistance is important in power analysis, it enters in numerous and sometimes subtle ways. It may arise simply because we intend to alter the order of things confronting us with an inherent inertia. We might think of natural resistance in this way. By contrast, the resistance of persons confronts us with competing ends. It thus raises a set of issues having to do with the different ways in which we engage others in our effort to achieve our ends.

In sum, we have three types of power: power to secure ends over nature, power over others, and power with others. We exert power over nature when we accomplish our ends in the face of natural opposition (say ploughing a field or unloading a truck). We exert power either by expending our own physical energies or by devising technologies to accomplish our ends more efficiently. We exert power over others either by altering incentives so that they are positive, in which case we speak of inducement, or by making them negative, in which case we speak of power or coercion. In both cases, we are able to control others by controlling the incentives associated with various courses of action. With both inducement and coercion we make it in the interest of agents to do what we want them to do. In the former case, there is the prospect of improvement; in the latter, the threat of being worse off (both with regard to the status quo as a baseline).

The third type of power, power with others, is more complex. Individuals may not be able to achieve their ends by themselves. The successful pursuit of their goals may require collaboration. This collaboration may be ad hoc, or it may require institutions.

The absence of institutions may impede the pursuit and satisfaction of goals. Suppose that two agents (A and B) desire a certain state of affairs but because of some defect of their situation, cannot achieve it. Examples abound: Two countries prefer not to pursue a costly arms race, yet feel they must, given the decentralized structure of the interstate system.

In these situations, agents can be characterized as having goals that are not fundamentally in opposition to one another and where expected gains exceed expected losses. Yet, because of institutional defects (lack of cen­tralized political authority or well-specified property rights), the aims are not achieved. We can think of the absence of institutions as providing a kind of resistance, or obstacle, to the exercise or power. While treating the absence of something (certain kinds of institutions) as a source of resistance may seem odd, it seems necessary to complete our understanding of power. The capacity to construct institutions that enable us to achieve what we otherwise could not is a distinct component of power.

All conceptions of power rest on some notion of ends or interests. When these interests are clearly within the purview of choosing agents (that is, when they consciously pursue their interests), we speak of wants, preferences, or goals. When agents are not consciously aware of the importance of various outcomes, but where those outcomes can be demonstrated to affect the welfare of persons, we speak of interests. The distinction between preference and interest opens up a number of problems that we attempt to deal with later in the chapter under “conditioned power.”