Families, Gender Inequality, and the State

One can disagree with many of Becker's assumptions and still admire his analytical powers. Unlike his neoclassical predecessors, he brings household decision-making into the purview of economic analysis.

The human capital approach purports to explain why small differences in the comparative advantage of men and women in childbearing and nursing could have large cumulative effects.⁴⁸ Women gain less experience in market work, which reduces their expected wage, which in turn encour­ages further specialization in household production. When they do work outside the home, women may choose occupations where starting salaries are relatively high but gains to labor force experience are relatively low— reducing the cost of taking time out of paid employment to care for family members.⁴⁹ Fertility decline reduces the extent of early specialization, leads to increases in women's participation in market work, which in turn raises their market wages, which induce further shifts in women's allocation of time.

Becker and his fellow-travelers also provide a deft explanation of the role of the state in providing education: parents and children cannot negotiate private binding commitments to exchange resources, but the state can tax one generation of working-age adults to finance education for the younger generation, which can in turn be taxed to provide the older generation with income security in old age. Becker clearly recognizes the role that interest groups play in influencing public policy.⁵⁰ Yet he characterizes marriage as a virtually universal contractual arrangement designed to provide income security for mothers and children. He never examines the contractual asymmetries criticized by feminists since the mid-nineteenth century— legal provisions that accord more legal authority and control over household resources to husbands than to wives.⁵¹ Nor does he explore the ways in which women have organized themselves into ‘‘interest groups'' to challenge patriarchal rules.

Becker's ideas regarding preference formation are also tantalizingly incomplete. On the one hand, he observes that people's experiences can shape their preferences, leading to forms of ‘‘addiction''. On the other hand, he asserts that individuals have sufficient foresight to anticipate these effects, and therefore, in a sense, choose their own preferences. Like­wise, he observes that powerful groups seek to create norms to influence the preferences of others but asserts that individuals being socialized are always aware of the process, explicitly allowing their preferences to be influenced.⁵²

In the end, Becker, like his modern neoclassical colleagues, remains confident that individuals know what they want and can get what they want as long as they are free to choose. What a refreshing change from the double standard of self-interest that Marshall and Jevons applied to men but not to women. But Becker's very confidence in choice helps justify gender inequalities. Women are paid less than men because they choose jobs that pay less.⁵³ Mothers take more responsibility for family care than fathers because they enjoy doing so.⁵⁴ Spending on children, like on pets, is merely a form of discretionary spending.⁵⁵ If people choose to have children, they should pay the costs of rearing and educating them. If work is provided for free, why count its contributions as part of GDP?