Epistemological divergences

In the entry “Evidence” published in Denis Diderot’s Encyclopedie, ou Diction- naire raisonne des sciences, des arts et des metiers (1756), Quesnay argues that our knowledge comes from senses and that while we are looking for pleasant sensations we try to avoid painful ones.

These views were developed by Lemercier de la Riviere in L ^,ordre naturel et essentiel des societes politiques (1767). According to Lemercier, when societies began, we were feeble and isolated creatures, but

pressed by the attraction of physical pleasure to satisfy needs essential to our existence, and being able to obtain only by means of society the things that relate to those very needs, it is evident that our gathering together in society is a natural and necessary consequence of the appetite for pleasures.

(Lemercier de la Riviere 1767, I, 10)

As a fair consequence of different physical and intellectual faculties and efforts, “great differences in the status of men joined in society must necessarily be introduced. Therefore the inequality of conditions must not be seen as an abuse” (I, 25-26). Despite these inequalities, the physiocrat put forward the hypothesis that there exists a common interest in the growth of the agricultural “net product” (the revenu disponible created by large farmers) for all classes of society: accord­ingly, politics was no longer an issue of virtue or honour, but of material interest. Protecting properties and increasing (farmers’) wealth became the all and end all of politics.

Turgot and Condorcet shared many of these principles. From an epistemological point of view, their “[s]entationism established fundamental natural rights which human beings can enjoy - liberty, security, property - and of which free trade is the main aspect” (Faccarello and Steiner 2008, 15). Competition and self-interest were for them driving forces to equilibrium and prosperity. Concerning grain, Turgot called for an indefinite freedom to import and export (Faccarello 1998) as the only means to increase agricultural incomes (Kaplan 2017, 489). Supporter of large- scale farms and promoter of the growth of the “net product”, Turgot approved Quesnay’s exclusive productivity of agriculture theory. Allies of the physiocrats but not worshippers of the sect, Turgot and Condorcet were less willing to sanctify private property than Quesnay or Mirabeau, and they clearly rejected the very idea of “legal despotism” (Faccarello 1998). These two elements create interesting rela­tionships with anti-physiocrats.

Some of the assumptions and principles of political economists fit the epistemo­logical positions of Rousseau, Mably and Linguet. All of them put forward, in vari­ous versions, a sensationist theory of knowledge; moreover, the first two believe, together with the physiocrats, that at first societies were a coalition of weak indi­viduals grouped in order to satisfy their needs and ensure their self-preservation (Rousseau 1762, I.6) (Mably 1776, 321) (Ferrand and Orain 2019).

Differences with the physiocrats went deeper on the issue of inequality. Accord­ing to Rousseau and Mably, property was in common in the first ages, and problems began when some individuals decided to enclose lands. Private property led to a thirst for increasing possessions, and the inequalities that followed were viewed by both authors as the very beginning of all issues and conflicts among men. By establish­ing laws, the rich tried to ensure their property rights and prevent a civil war. They “transformed adroit usurpation into irrevocable right, and for the benefit of a few ambitious men subjected the human race thenceforth to labour, servitude and mis­ery” (Rousseau 1755a, 286). With this unequal distribution of fortune, “men who gathered in society in order to be happy, [were] driven by degrees deeper and deeper into misfortune” (Mably 1778, 50). However, if Rousseau and Mably challenged the idea of a peaceful and natural development of inequalities after the social pact, they were not favourable to the destruction of private property once it was established. “It is certain”, wrote Rousseau in 1755, “that the right of property is the most sacred of all the rights of citizens” (Rousseau 1755b [1997], 23) and he added in 1762 that “[w]hat man loses by the social contract is his natural freedom and an unlimited right to everything that tempts him and he can reach; what he gains is civil freedom and property in everything he possesses” (Rousseau 1762, 53-4).

would be very upset if [one] could suspect me of jeopardising the citizen’s property. Once the community of property no longer subsists, and men agreed to a division, I know there is no law more sacred than that of property.

(Mably 1775, 272)

The true divergence between Rousseau and Mably on the one hand, and the physi­ocrats on the other, lies in the naturalisation of the inequalities by the latter, and by consequence in the degree of respect due to private property. According to Quesnay or Lemercier de la Riviere, there are neither circumstances nor reasons that are able to justify a violation of property rights. Turgot and Condorcet were less categori­cal. If they shared with physiocrats the idea that the right of property is a natural right - since public expenditure is necessary, especially with regard to what we now call market failures (such as externalities) and amenities - the legislator can regulate and even restrict ownership rights. When it is possible to increase the net product and the circulation of goods by changing misuses of land, draining infected marshes or building infrastructure, local authorities are entitled to regulate private property (Faccarello 2006, 11-12) (Moyer 2016). Rousseau and Mably criticise private ownership at another level. They put forward that since individuals gather in order to be better after their association than before, extreme inequalities, espe­cially the misery of the poor, are in contradiction with the conditions of the social contract. Rousseau explains that

the fundamental pact, rather than destroying natural equality, on the contrary substitutes a moral and legitimate equality for whatever physical inequality nature may have placed between men... the social state is advantageous for men only insofar as all have something and none has too much of anything.

(Rousseau 1762, 56)

Not only the civil equality but also the equality of wealth, “the force of legislation ought always to tend to maintain it” against the usurpations and oppressions of the rich (1762, 79).

Linguet shares the idea of a “primitive confederation” that resulted from the common need of “hunters”. They gathered in order to be more efficient during their hunts, but envious of the ease with which agriculturists fed themselves, they decided to organise in war bands and conquered the workers of the land. By creating pastoral and agricultural communities subjected to them, hunters began wanton appropriation of animals and foodstuffs. And to avoid the destruction of these “resources”, the ruling class of hunters decided to share them: private property was introduced (Linguet 1767, II:10). From this first act of usurpation, society was divided into two irreconcilable social classes: the rich, who had seized all possessions, and the poor, who were no more independent and free. This master-slave dichotomy and these inequalities resulting from force were a radicalisation of Rousseau’s perspective. However, Linguet did not want to destroy private property. He was a resigned theoretician for whom the poor must accept inequalities and submission, because seeking to modify such established order would lead to even worse chaos (Linguet 1767, I, 1; II, 10) (Orain 2019, 474-5). That does not mean that property rights cannot be subject to limitation or restriction during extreme circumstances, such as famine or shortage. And it is precisely when they deal with the grain trade that Rousseau, Linguet and Mably put forward different ideas from those of political economists concerning private ownership.

2.