Economics as study of catallaxy
It seems that some economists believe that rational individuals must conceive of themselves as living in a world of “Crusoes” who all pursue what they desire “against” other “Crusoes” rather than as part of a community of individuals.
Then, according to the Hobbesian hypothetical “means to given ends” imperatives, rational individuals should treat other individuals always as means and not as “purposes in themselves”. However, it should be noted well that this imperative of prudent behaviour is based on an empirical thesis about which ways of world making as a matter of fact prevail among humans. As a matter of fact human actors need not conceive of their interaction with other human actors as a so-called game against nature. The presence of human minds who are aware of the presence of other human minds may be “a game changer” (see more extensively Kliemt 2009).Perhaps, humans naturally perceive themselves as not involved in a game against other “parts of nature” but rather as “members of a community of rational beings” who look at the world primarily in terms of mutual rather than of their unilateral advantage.
Man might be defined, “An animal that makes Exchanges”: no other, even of those animals which in other points make the nearest approach to rationality, having, to all appearance, the least notion of bartering, or in any way exchanging one thing for another.... For, the things themselves of which the science treats, are immediately removed from its province, if we remove the possibility, or the intention, of making them the subjects of exchange; and this, though they may conduce, in the highest degree, to happiness, which is the ultimate object for the sake of which wealth is sought. A man, for instance, in a desert island, like Alex. Selkirke, or the personage his adventures are supposed to have suggested, Robinson Crusoe, is in a situation of which Political-Economy takes no cognizance; though he might figuratively be called rich, if abundantly provided with food, raiment, and various comforts; and though he might have many commodities at hand, which would become exchangeable, and would constitute him, strictly speaking, rich, as soon as fresh settlers should arrive.
(Whately 1831: 7-10, original emphases)The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Memory of Alfred Nobel laureate, James M. Buchanan (like Rutledge Vining, student of Frank Knight) has been, arguably, the most prominent modern economist endorsing the norm that economists should restrict their policy advice to what furthers mutual advantage (as opposed to getting their way). In his essay on “what economists should do”, Buchanan (acknowledging Whately) says:
Crusoe’s problem is, as I have said, essentially a computational one, and all that he needs to do to solve it is to program the built-in computer that he has in his mind. The uniquely symbiotic aspects of behavior, of human choice, arise only when Friday steps on the island, and Crusoe is forced into association with another human being. The fact of association requires that a wholly different,... behavior take place, that of “exchange”, “trade”, or “agreement”. Crusoe may, of course, fail to recognize this new fact. He may treat Friday simply as a means to his own ends, as a part of “nature”, so to speak. (Buchanan 1985: 35, original emphasis) Crusoe, after the arrival of Friday, should and as a rule will perceive of interaction with another human being in terms other than those he would apply to the interaction with a distant relation in the animal kingdom like a chimpanzee. Crusoe would adopt what the philosopher Frederick Strawson (see Strawson 1962) called a participant’s point of view to the interaction with Friday. He would therefore naturally be inclined to perceive the interaction in an other-respecting way (see MacKabe et al. 2001 for experimental evidence on the empirical presence of the participant’s point of view in the human psyche).
The nature and significance as an advice-giving, as a prudentially prescribing rather than merely describing, discipline are deeply influenced by non-Hobbesian background intuitions concerning a community of rational beings. That economists such as, in particular, Buchanan think that economists should regard such a framing of interaction as constitutive for their discipline may on the whole be a good thing.
Yet it must be clearly admitted that the restriction of (constitutional political economy) policy advice by uni- versalistic - contractarian - principles of mutual respect, mutual agreement and mutual advantage is based on a value judgement itself (see on mutualism as an ethical principle, Hazlitt 1964).To promote some conception of general rather than particular interests is in itself expressive of an ethical rather than an epistemic ideal. As long as it is clearly understood that the underlying value judgement does not influence what is regarded as a fact but only fixes which kind of questions are asked in a regular fact-finding mission, it is as innocuous a value judgement as can be found in any discipline. It determines which kinds of social technologies - namely, those involving mutual advantage - are explored. It is not by chance that Buchanan was also a driving force of the non-normative public choice movement that tried to understand the actual workings of politics in the Hobbesian/ Robbinsian tradition. It should, however, also be acknowledged that Buchanan himself rather unashamedly and rightly saw himself as being a contractarian ally of John Rawls.