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Dissemination of national traditions overseas

As the Qing Dynasty crumbled under the weight of misguided policies and European colonial expansion, many Chinese emigrated. They sought better opportunities and reacted to greater despotism among ruling elites who had abandoned Confucian values.

The Chinese used familial connections to create an insular network that gave them an advantage in business dealings. They were hated for their successes and were stereotyped as being greedy and having little allegiance to their new countries. Later, overseas Chinese lost their connection to their homeland when, in the 1960s, China revoked their ability to hold two passports, and in 1980 the right to immigrate back to China for overseas Chinese descendants was removed.

Despite this, the Chinese continue to be determined not to assimilate on anything other than their own terms. There are three main reasons why the Chinese remain Chinese and succeed regardless of where they go: education, cultural acceptance and the huis.

There is a Confucian saying on a banner in our family's Chinese ancestral home: ‘All other occupations are ordinary; only scholarly pursuits are held in high regard'. The Confucian philosophical belief that education is of primary importance has led to success around the world and the Chinese tend to concentrate their endeavours in subjects leading to well-paying jobs (business, economics, engineering, sciences). This is less evident in mainland China due to the Cultural Revolution (1966—77) where all schools closed from June 1966 to February 1967 (and in the case of urban schools and universities even longer), and educational attainment was interrupted for millions, sometimes as long as five years. There is still a pronounced reduction in educational attainment for those who came of age during that time (Guo, 2010).

Cultural acceptance is high among the Chinese, who incorporate ‘Chinese characteristics' into foreign ways.

It is not merely for public consumption that the Chinese describe their economy as ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics', or perhaps more appropriately ‘capitalism with Chinese characteristics'. The Chinese may dress in Western clothes and use English in business dealings but they do so without abandoning traditional culture or their use of their native tongue at home and with other Chinese.

The huis, small credit associations organised under the term ‘family association' and found in almost all overseas Chinese enclaves, are, in theory, merely social clubs where those with the same family name can congregate and receive assistance. In reality, they serve as a back­channel banking system that provides credit to Chinese who are often discriminated against (at least the Chinese perceive themselves to be discriminated against) by local banks. Monetary obligation serves to bind the community together and reinforce their identification with other Chinese.

The Chinese have always given their host countries a blend of Chinese and local culture. Fortune cookies (authentic Chinese restaurants would serve oranges as an after-dinner treat instead) and chop suey are unheard of in China, but have made an indelible mark in Western countries. Confucianism and Taoism are studied, as are ancient Chinese classics such as the Art of War, in universities around the globe. Still, the biggest influence of Chinese culture on other lands (other than through the emigration of Chinese citizens) is the Chinese written language and the Chinese philosophies sent to other Asian countries, specifically Korea, Vietnam and Japan.

Chinese characters, called Hanja in Korean, Han tu in Vietnamese and Kanji in Japanese, served as the basis for literate society in those three countries for millennia. They came by way of trade and conquest. Buddhism, with its various Chinese literary texts, was incorporated into the cultures of these countries. Legalism and Confucianism in its more state-oriented configura­tion bridged the gap to Korea and Japan.

Taoism influenced ordinary ethnic Chinese rather than elites and there was a great deal of intermarriage between Vietnamese and Chinese due to a long history of rule by China of Vietnam. Taoism, though present in both Japan and Korea for 1,400 years, never became a major philosophical influence and was relegated to folk religion status in Korea and Japan.

Korean and Japanese society ended up with a corporatist form of governance giving rise to Japanese zaibatsu and keritsu and Korean chaebols, the large interlocking industrial conglomerates that control much of the Korean and Japanese economies. Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong tend to have smaller companies more focused on single industries, greater emphasis on equity financing due to negative Confucian attitudes towards debt and more economic freedom. It is nonetheless a mistake to regard the Chinese experience as a model for the world stage. Even within Chinese society, the blend of legalist, Confucian, Taoist and Maoist elements causes friction and disagreement. To the extent it works, it relies upon human nature transformed by centuries of philosophy, and it cannot be wholly lifted into another context without considering the cultural foundations upon which it lies.

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Source: Barnett Vincent (ed.). Routledge Handbook of the History of Global Economic Thought. Routledge,2015. — 359 p. 2015

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