Court and Counsel
There are therefore three main phases to the story of cameralism, to which must also be added a very substantial practical literature upon mines, forestry, agriculture, money, finance and commerce from which it drew.
It is generally accepted that its origins lie in the mid-seventeenth century, following the devastation to land and people brought about by the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48). This was mirrored in the reduced circumstances of the rulers of German territorial states. Their fiscal base eroded, and their own domainal lands laid waste, if nothing else the experience of war had taught them that the road to power and plenty certainly did not lead directly through conquest or annexation. As the political history of eighteenth century Europe was to demonstrate, the idea that the strength of a ruler was augmented by judicious marriages, shifting alliances and recurrent warfare still prevailed. It nevertheless became widely accepted during the second half of the seventeenth century that the foundation for this necessarily lay in sound finances and a flourishing population. Quite how this foundation might be created became the theme of a new kind of writing, presented to dukes and princes by “practical men” who sold themselves on their knowledge, not of politics and diplomacy, but of the means to wealth.The addressee of these “practical men” was the ruler of the territorial state who, if his lands were to flourish, had much to do. The state was for them conceived in neo-Aristotelian terms as a giant household; at its head, the ruler overseeing the wise
disposition of resources and the proper conduct of affairs. The subjects of this ruler were, they argued, his means to wealth, and hence power: the greater the number of subjects and the wealthier they became, the more powerful the ruler. This is a post-Machiavellian conception of power: the ruler becomes powerful not through the exercise of guile, but by promoting the welfare of his subjects.
The ruler becomes wealthier with the increase in number and well-being of his subjects, for these provide him both with an army and with revenues. Even though there developed a problem with the latter, as the Stande (the various orders and ranks) contested the ruler’s right to extend the taxation of his subjects, the ruler still possessed substantial territories in his own right, which with improved management were likewise an important source of revenue to the Court.The Furstenspiegel, a “mirror for princes” representing an ideal, virtuous and righteous ruler, was already well established in courtly discourse by the seventeenth century. The precepts for such an ideal were contained in Politica, a genre of writing comprehending proper action for a ruler, as well as for the citizens and subject (Sellin 1978: 815). Brought together as a system of virtues or a Tugendlehre, to act in accordance with these doctrines was to show Klugheit, prudence, in Latin prudentia civilis orprudentiapolitica - in this context then Regierkunst, the art of ruling. At this time Politicus as a substantive was linked both to writers of Klugheitslehre and to the active statesman, whether ruler or counsellor. The Germanisation of this term did not take it directly to the modern conception of Politik, but instead to the early modern conception of Polizei, a conception of social order as derivative of good and vigilant government (Knemeyer 1980). The rules of right conduct in this social order were anchored in a natural law tradition capable of countering the Machiavellian idea of reason of state. In this way natural law could become the basis for good government, its principles ensuring the harmony between the actions of the ruler and the will of God.
During the course of the seventeenth century a shift took place in the relationship between the state and the work of government. Hitherto traditional teaching had dealt with the state as a given and then inquired how this state should be governed.
In the latter half of the century there was a reversal, so that the state became a construction built according to the rules of good government; the ruler became a technical planner pursuing the increase of his powers. No longer was the common good the point of departure, but rather the welfare of the ruler. This did not however mean that the ideal of the common good was abandoned; instead it shifted position, so that the welfare of the ruler became indissolubly linked to the welfare of his subjects. This worked both ways: without a gluckliche population, a “happy” population, the ruler could not become powerful, while without power the ruler was not in a position to secure the welfare of his subjects. So economic advice became of importance in the Courts of later seventeenthcentury Central Europe.A leading example of this genre is Hornigk’s Osterreich uber alles, wann es nur will (1684). The novelty of this and similar contemporary texts lies in the manner in which a specific form of economic management is recommended as the path to wealth and hence power. Hornigk emphasised the importance of money as a means of circulation that promoted activity, and so the augmentation of the money supply results in an expansion of activity in general. Other measures which Hornigk suggests increase the level of economic activity by stimulating marginal areas of production, and hence consumption. However, in the absence, or shortage, of money, this linkage of money, production and circulation will not enhance the wealth of the territory. His recommendations remain strictly limited to those areas over which a ruler could exercise command. The manufacturing activity which he identifies is closely linked to existing domestic agricultural production; there is no suggestion that we might here have an expansion programme for manufacturing instead of agriculture. Trading is said to be beneficial only so long as it serves the existing domestic economy. Central to his thinking is the general stimulation of the existing range of economic activity in Austria through the securing of an adequate money supply; and so attracting money (bullion) is a means to the stimulation of this activity, and not in itself the means to wealth and power.
This linkage of wealth to power was perhaps expressed most pithily in Schroder’s affirmation that there were just two key principles that a ruler had to observe: the maintenance of a standing army and the knowledge that there was “viel geld im kasten”, that the treasury was well-stocked with money (Schroder 1686 [1752]: Vorrede s.
9) How the ruler might come by the required hoard of money was what Schroder set out to describe, just as von Hornigk seeks to persuade the Austrian emperor that the country can be made wealthy and strong, and a model to all other territories. The addressee in this mode of argument was the ruler and his Court; and coupled with the explicit concern for the ruler’s well-being was an implicit concern with personal advancement. Those who live by proffering advice require clients who will become their patrons; and all these writings betray an interest in gaining entry to Court, or securing preferment at Court, or, as is evident in the second edition of Becher’s treatise, constructing a defence against the machinations of detractors (Becher 1688: “Vorrede an den Leser”).Cameralist discourse through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries places very little emphasis on trade and exchange; it argues instead for the proper use of resources in the production and consumption of goods. However, one of the more disconcerting features of cameralistic writings is the resolute manner in which the human subject is constructed as a work of administrative activity. The wealth of the ruler depends upon the happiness and welfare of his subjects, so the argument goes; but these subjects cannot find their own way to such happiness, they require deliberate, external guidance. It is this which distinguishes German writing from the contemporary political discourse of France, England and Scotland, where the contraposition of state and civil society involved a conception, however constructed, of a distinct human nature whose qualities were relevant to the conduct of state affairs. In the German language, however, the distinction of a burgerliche Gesellschaft from that of the Staat was purely nominal; both terms were in use, but were used interchangeably to denote political order. The Burger lived therefore indifferently in civil society and the state - and hence is no citizen in the sense developed from the French citoyen.
This political order underlying cameralism was nonetheless conceived as natural, but its character required that it be in a permanent condition of construction - practically in the Polizeiordnungen of principality and town, discursively in the burgeoning literature of the Polizei- und Staatswissenschaften, the sciences of police and state.The fiscal structure of the territorial state was also important to this mode of thinking, for the ability of a ruler to increase his revenue through increases of taxation was severely limited by the power of the estates, the Stande. The early literature of economic advice to a ruler consequently directed his attention elsewhere, to those areas more directly under his control: to agricultural management, manufacture and mining, since improvement of the ruler’s own domain land or the creation of new forms of economic activity would augment his income without the need to negotiate new taxes with the Stande. In time, however, the expanding financial needs of the territorial states propelled a transformation of its fiscal base from the ruler’s own domainal resources to the entire territory and its population. The transition from cameralism as a literature of counsel to a pedagogic regime implied therefore the eclipse of the political power of the Stande and the assumption of a general right of taxation on the part of the territorial ruler.
The foundations for this conception of natural order and good government can be found in Wolffian philosophy, where we find “general welfare” identified as the highest good attainable on earth, with happiness as it corollary, thus linking welfare and happiness together as the chief objectives of wise administration. It was the action of government that promoted or hindered the achievement of a state of happiness; and in the absence of such activity no good could be achieved.
By contrast one can easily see that this salutary objective cannot be attained if everybody, the populace (Pobel) as a whole, need to agree with what has been decided.
For the understanding of the common man is inadequate to judge what is useful or harmful, being insufficiently farsighted; and neither is he steady enough in virtue or the love of others to find his own intended advantage for any eventuality in that of the common good... (Wolff 1736 [1975]: 190, s. 253)There are, consequently, a number of factors which have to be taken into account if the ruler and his people are to flourish: the state should be populous with means sufficient for the maintenance of its inhabitants; there should be adequate schools and academies; the prices of goods bought and sold should be regulated; wages should likewise be controlled; the cheapest possible food, drink and clothing should be available, commensurate with the social standing of the person concerned; poorhouses should be made available to the unemployed, and begging outlawed; not to mention the need to punish drunkenness, the need for clean air, the harmfulness of duelling, the plague and of infectious diseases in general. Quite evidently this list is long, and perpetually open to extension, so that the conclusion could well be drawn that this endless task of regulation represents simply a relentless pragmatism concerning all the things which might go wrong in a well-ordered polity. However, underlying this diffuse endlessness there lies a fundamental conception of human nature: that human capacities, if they were to achieve the maximum of perfectibility attainable on earth, had to be deliberately guided there by a prudent and wise ruler.