Conclusion
Regarding Arrovian social choice, and given the limited space, the results that were selected are results which are well established and had an important descent. More recent major trends such as judgement aggregation (see List and Puppe 2009), freedom of choice, or empirical social choice have not been taken into account.
John Nash’s epoch-making contribution to bargaining theory (1950) and voting games, in particular Nakamura’s theorem (1979), were left out. The real difficulty is that social choice has some rather fuzzy boundaries. The overlap with political economy, public economics, game theory, political philosophy, formal political science, welfare economics, normative economics, social ethics, and some other areas is quite large, as exemplified by Sen’s book (2009) as far as social justice is concerned. To get a good view of the present stateof the subject, see Arrow et al. (2002, 2010), Anand et al. (2009) and the introductory text by Gaertner (2009).
Maurice Salles