Concluding remarks
The expression “political commerce” used by Forbonnais suggests a dual imperative: that, for a State which has in mind the general interest, to base its power on its foreign trade and that, for the legislator of this State, to have an enlightened knowledge of this unstable and uncertain field, if it wants to achieve a high degree of power and, above all, to keep it.
Indeed, Melon (1736, 394-6) notes that, although the legislator possesses knowledge of domestic trade - he can in particular remedy food shortages by freeing the corn market, preventing the depopulation of the countryside, facilitating the circulation of commodities in the nation, etc. - he does not necessarily have that of foreign trade: in this field “the Legislator can never, with the greatest lights, ensure success.” Melon (1736, 75) sees the instability and uncertainty of foreign trade as an effect of the “jealousy of nations”. Forbonnais (1754, II, 123, 1755b, 4) interprets these as a consequence of “human vices” and the “passions” which divide individuals as well as nations, while Cantillon ([1755] 1931, 47-51; 29) relates them to the activities of entrepreneurs who behave “at a risk”, without knowing if they will derive a profit from their undertaking, but mainly to the “Humours and Fancies of men”, particularly those of the prince and landowners.Melon distinguishes three subjects of the legislation on trade: the land that must be made more productive; the population that must be employed, in proportion to the progress of agriculture, to make constantly new manufactured goods; finally, the money that must be adjusted to the circulation of goods. Cantillon ([1755] 1931, 201) also recognises that land is productive “according to the fertility of the soil and the industry of the inhabitants” and makes the product of land and labour the source of the wealth of a nation.
It is even this product or its equivalent in precious metals that, through its trade in works and in manufactures, a nation seeks to obtain from abroad. Forbonnais (1755b, 14) also observes that “a fertile country will be all the less cultivated and populated as it will sell less of the products of its land to Foreigners.”The amount of fertile land, the amount of workers and the amount of money which flows in make it possible to distinguish two types of States in their power relations: on the one hand, the large territorial States, such as the island of corn described by Melon, or England which, according to Forbonnais, has been the most successful in turning its agriculture and its industry towards foreign trade; on the other hand, small States which also seek power without possessing sufficient land and the necessary population.
Can all nations benefit from foreign trade? Montesquieu gives a negative response: those who lack everything are too poor and too dependent to enter this trade. Melon argues that large, populous and fertile States naturally claim superior power, because they are the masters of the subsistence of small States, on condition, of course, that they are well administered. However, Cantillon ([1755] 1931, 85; 233) observes that the naval superiority of the small Dutch State, its fishing and its manufacturing, gave it a commercial advantage and allowed a larger population to live comfortably “at the expense of Foreigners”, namely, large States. However, no position is taken for granted. As power relations are unstable, any State must know with which State to trade and how to avoid being “the dupe of another in Trade” (Cantillon [1755] 1931, 233). In the same way, Forbonnais (1754, I, 252) emphasised the necessary political acumen of the legislator consisting in seeking superiority of power without attracting reprisals from these rivals.
Although all agree on the more favourable situation of a large State, Montesquieu’s position is specific.
By associating the luxury trade with the large monarchical States and the economical trade with the small republics, the philosopher is led to argue that monarchical France has a vested interest in obtaining supplies from the Dutch “general store”, rather than going to find what it needs itself in distant countries (Montesquieu 1964, 889). Melon, Cantillon, Gournay and Forbonnais were opposed to this policy, which, according to them, made France dependent on foreign shipping.Does the superiority of power last? All authors have in mind the decadence of the Roman Empire, that of the Spanish Empire, and that of the trading republics in the modern era. All are aware, to varying degrees, of the difficulty of sustainably maintaining the high level of power acquired by foreign trade and all have a cyclical view of enrichment. Montesquieu (1964, 193) wrote that “in Europe, prosperity cannot be permanent anywhere... there must be a continual variation in power.” Cantillon also thought that decline is inevitable, but he pointed out that large, well- administered States are more likely to regain their lost power than trading republics. Likewise, Forbonnais suggests that a large State that has achieved the highest level of prosperity has the means to delay its decline in the long term.
The authors more or less share the idea that, in a world that has become commercial, international markets have their own movement and their “altercations” (Cantillon [1755] 1931, 163), which the legislator must take into account if he wants to avoid his decisions being futile or disastrous and that the “legal constraint... only embarrasses trade” (Cantillon [1755] 1931, 221). Montesquieu describes these markets as so many forces capable of limiting the sovereign’s acts of authority and moderating his interventions. It follows that commerce is generally presented as a world where liberty should prevail, but a liberty accompanied by protection, because absolute liberty is impracticable when the degree of industry is not equal in nations. For Forbonnais (1755b, 53), foreign trade is undoubtedly an expression of the rivalry of nations, but it can also be considered as a “union of governments”, namely as a conjunction of nations agreeing to trade without despotism. In the same spirit as Melon, who criticised the English claim to universal trade, Forbonnais (1755b, 68) supported the idea that, just as European nations have been able to gradually find a balance on land by rejecting the spirit of conquest, likewise they should find a “balance on the sea” (“equilibre maritime”), namely the balance between trading and seafaring nations, the proportions of each of which would have to be fixed. Each nation would have a share of trade, a “share of power” (“portion de force”) indicated by its “natural commerce”.